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OUR LOCALISM: PART II-LOCALISM
AND LEGAL THEORY*
RichardBriffault**
A. A Tale of Two "Cities" Local Governments in Local Government Law
A central theme in the literature of local government law is that
local governments are powerless, incapable of initiating programs on
behalf of their citizens or of resisting intrusions by the state.' How can
scholars make this claim when under state legislation and federal and
state judicial decisions local autonomy plays a critical role in the law of
school finance, 2 land-use regulation 3 and local government formation
and preservation? 4 As we have seen, a partial response turns on the
varying assessments of the nature of power.5 But much of the answer
also has to do with differing assumptions about the underlying political,
economic and social characteristics of local governments.
There are more than 82,000 local governments in the United
States, but when most scholars write about local governments generally
they are, I suspect, thinking about one particular category of localities:
cities. For example, Professor Frug's analysis of local government law
is styled "The City as a Legal Concept."'6 Professor Ellickson's contrast
of public and private local organizations is titled "Cities and Homeowners Associations. ' 7 And Professor Clark's study of local legal autonomy is called "Judges and the Cities." 8
There is some sense to this. Although a minority of all local govThis is the second part of a two-part Article.
** Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School. B.A., Columbia, 1974,J.D.,
Harvard, 1977.
1. See Briffault, Our Localism, Part I. 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 6-12 (1990).
2. See id. at 24-39, 59-64, 99-101.
3. See id. at 39-58, 64-72, 101-09.
4. See id. at 72-86, 109-11.
5. See id. at 111-115.
6. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1057 (1980) [hereinafter
"City as Legal Concept"]; see also Frug, Empowering Cities in a Federal System, 19
Urb. Law., 553 (1987) [hereinafter "Empowering Cities"].
7. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1519 (1982)
[hereinafter "Cities"]. Professor Ellickson is aware of the centrality of suburbs to American local government law. See Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic
and Legal Analysis, 86 Yale LJ. 385 (1977) [hereinafter "Growth Controls"]. Nevertheless, when he addresses the issue of local public power generally he writes of "cities."
8. G. Clark, Judges and the Cities: Interpreting Local Autonomy (1985). The title
of Professor Williams's examination, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 83, also
assumes the equation of "local government" with "city," although within the body of
her article she criticizes the practice of "lumping together these disparate [local] entities
into one legal category .... " Id. at 83 n.1.
*
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ernments, 9 cities are the most numerous form of general purpose local
government. In areas with multiple local governments, cities are the
focus of local political life. As a matter of legal analysis, the term "city"
sharpens the distinctions with "state" and with unincorporated rural
areas. "City" thus serves as an understandable shorthand for the more
cumbersome "local government."
But "city" is a loaded term; indeed, it is an overloaded one, the use
of which ultimately obscures legal analysis. "City" is not just a synonym for "municipal corporation"; it is also a political, economic and
social concept that conjures up associations with respect to size, economics, politics, social life and history that the blander "local government" does not.1 0
"City" usually implies "big city" or "central city" or "inner city"a large center of population and production, commerce, communications and culture, distinguished not simply from the "state" and the
countryside, but also from small towns and suburbs. "City," according
to Bernard Frieden, "suggests bustling streets with a mixture of factories, offices, apartments and homes crowded together amidst heavy
traffic, noise, dirt and excitement." '1 Lewis Mumford defined the city
''as a complex of inter-related and constantly interacting functions"
that large size and density make possible.1 2 ForJanejacobs, similarly,
the hallmark of "great American cities" is diversity-of people, func13
tions, land uses and activities.
As a social and a political concept, the city is a heterogeneous
place, combining residence, work, recreation and cultural life, and mixing people of different racial and ethnic groups, socioeconomic classes
and levels of educational and occupational attainment. "City," in
short, signifies a complex microcosm of the state or nation and a socially, economically and culturally dynamic part of the larger polity.
Such a "city" seems a fitting place for legal and political autonomy,
which is no doubt why many advocates of local autonomy make their
case in terms of cities. 14
9. More than half of all local governments are special purpose districts. See 1 Bu-

reau of the Census, 1982 Census of Governments 3 (table 3). In 1982, 43,439 of the
more than 82,000 local governments were either special districts or school districts. Id.
An additional 16,734 local units were townships, which tend to function as limited subdivisions of counties. There were 19,076 municipalities and 3,041 counties. Id.
10. As Robert Dahl observed in criticizing the use of the term "city" to describe

local governments too large for effective participatory democracy, "names conceal realities." R. Dahl, After the Revolution?: Authority In a Good Society 157 (1970).

11. B. Frieden, Metropolitan America: Challenge to Federalism 17 (1966).
12. L. Mumford, The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its

Prospects 85 (1961).
13. J. Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities 141-51 (1961).
14. See, e.g., Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1119, 1120 nn.267-70.

Frug's citations to Arthur Schlesinger's The Rise of the City 1878-1898 (1933) and the
work of the Chicago School of urban sociology indicate his association of "city" with

"big city."
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But once the term "city" is used in the sense of municipal corporation, used, that is, "as a legal concept," in Frug's phrase-then many
"cities" are neither large nor complex nor heterogeneous. Most cities
are small. Half of all municipal corporations have populations of 1,000
or fewer, and three-quarters of all municipalities have 5,000 people or
fewer.' 5 Nearly one half of urban Americans live in municipalities of
fewer than 50,000 people. 16 Many "cities" are primarily residential,
composed of homes and politically responsive to homeowner interests; 1 7 others are primarily industrial or commercial, functioning as
centers of employment but with relatively few residents.1 8 Many municipal corporations are not demographic microcosms of the state but
are instead composed predominantly of people of one race or class.' 9
Simply put, in most metropolitan areas many of the entities the law
defines as cities are-in social science parlance and lay understandingsuburbs. 20 More Americans reside in suburbs than in either central cities or rural areas, and sixty percent of the residents of metropolitan
areas live in suburbs. 2 ' In virtually every large metropolitan area, the
suburbs outnumber the central city in both population and employment. 22 The suburb, not the city, is the principal form of urban settlement in the United States today.
15. 1 Bureau of the Census, supra note 9, at 8-9 (table 6). Of 19,076 municipalities, 9,514 had fewer than 1,000 people and an additional 5,850 had between 1,000 and
5,000 people. Id.
16. Id.
17. SeeJ. Logan & H. Molotch, Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place
191-92 (1987) (discussion of exclusive residential towns); Ellickson, Growth Controls,
supra note 7, at 404-07 (discussion of homeowner domination of politics in suburban
residential communities).
18. See J. Harrigan, Political Change in the Metropolis 249-50 (4th ed. 1989) (approximately one-third of suburbs are purely residential, another third are employment
suburbs and the final third are mixed residential and industrial).
19. See id. at 250-51 (categorizing suburbs according to demographic distinctions
among residents-predominantly affluent, middle-class, working-class, black and elderly).
20. In particular, a majority of the municipalities incorporated in recent decades
are suburbs. See Miller & Forstall, Annexations and Corporate Changes: 1970-79 and
1980-83, in The Municipal Year Book 1984 at 96, 100-01 (Int'l CityManagement Ass'n
ed. 1984) (most of the 788 localities incorporated between 1970 and 1983 were "suburban in character"); see also D. Elazar, Building Cities in America: Urbanization and
Suburbanization in a Frontier Society 4 (1987) (noting "the non-urban character (in
common sense usage) of American urban settlements (in Census Bureau usage)").
21. In 1980, 45% of Americans lived in suburbs, 30% lived in central cities and
25% lived in nonmetropolitan areas. In other words, 60%o of the residents of metropolitan areas lived in suburbs. See U/S: A Statistical Portrait of the American People 27 (A.
Hacker ed. 1983).
22. Of the 25 largest metropolitan areas in 1980, the central city had a majority of
the population in only two. See M. Baldassare, Trouble in Paradise: The Suburban
Transformation in America 7 (1986). The suburbs accounted for 70% or more of the
metropolitan population in the Detroit, Washington, D.C., Boston, St. Louis,
Pittsburgh, Atlanta and Miami areas. See id. at 26. The suburbs have also become major centers of industrial employment. In 1980, there were eleven million people em-

1990]

OUR LOCALISM

Cities and suburbs differ from each other politically, economically
and socially. Notwithstanding these differences, local government law
does not distinguish within the category of municipal corporation between city and suburb, and legal theory generally has not taken the differences between cities and suburbs into account. Law and legal theory
both treat most suburbs as cities, and this critically affects any attempt
to measure the scope of local power.
Incorporated suburbs usually have the same legal status as central
cities. 2 3 Even those suburbs not accorded the full panoply of big city
powers generally enjoy the fundamental elements of local autonomy:
the authority to tax property, spend on local services and regulate land
use, 24 and the right to come into governmental existence and protect
local autonomy from nonconsensual absorption into another locality.
Indeed, local legal powers may be more adequately matched to local
economic and social needs in the suburbs than in the cities.
The logic of local legal autonomy assumes local solutions to local
problems, with local programs funded by taxes on local property. 25
Many big cities, however, have relatively large social welfare and infrastructure demands.2 6 Local political existence, zoning autonomy and
ployed in manufacturing in the suburbs, as opposed to just six million in the central
cities. Id.
23. Some states classify localities and tailor the scope of local authority according
to population size so that smaller localities have fewer powers than larger ones. But
state classification systems often treat as "first-class cities" localities with surprisingly
small populations. In Arkansas, the minimum population for a first-class city is 2,500,
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 14-37-103 (1987); in Kansas the minimum is 15,000, Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 13-101 (1982); in Nevada it is 20,000, Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 266.055 (Michie 1986); in
South Dakota, 5,000, S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 9-2-1 (1981); in Virginia, 10,000, Va.
Code Ann. § 15.1-1011 (1981); in Washington, 20,000, Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 35.22.010 (1965); see also 1 Bureau of the Census, supra note 9, at 118, 182, 241, 301,
319, 325. And, of course, not all suburbs are small.
24. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 18-25; see also M. Baldassare, supra note 22, at
123-45 (discussing tax planning and service expenditures in Orange County, California
suburbs); M. Danielson, The Politics of Exclusion 50 (1976) (in 1968 more than half of
suburbs with populations greater than 5,000 had the power to zone, as did nearly half of
the smaller suburbs); J. Harrigan, supra note 18, at 282 ("Almost universally in suburbs
[the issues that dominate local politics] are taxes, schools, and zoning."); V. Ostrom, R.
Bish & E. Ostrom, Local Government in the United States 206-07 (1988) (discussing
city-suburb tax competition); R. Wood, Suburbia: Its People and Their Politics 164
(1959) (tax rates among central issues in suburban politics); id. at 186-94 (discussing
centrality of schools and school expenditures in suburban politics).
25. According to Hicks, the property tax, which "matured in congruence with the
urban-industrial system," is based on a concept of localism that assumes that "localities
are ... self-contained entities whose tax bases can be harnessed to serve local needs in
accordance with local wishes .... " Hicks, The Property Tax and Local Finance, in The
Property Tax and Local Finance 208, 217 (C. Harriss ed. 1983).
26. Central cities must deal with the problems of poverty, unemployment, dependent populations, crime, drug addiction, deteriorating housing and crumbling roads,
bridges and mass transit, even as many of them are in economic decline. See R.
Burchell, J. Carr, R. Florida &J. Nemeth, The New Reality of Municipal Finance: The
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taxable property provide neither the regulatory authority nor the revenues necessary to meet these problems. To cope successfully with local
needs, these cities must look beyond the city limits to outside public
and private actions: intergovernmental aid, additional revenue-raising
authority from the state and private investment.
Many big cities are heavily dependent on intergovernmental aid to
balance their budgets, pay their employees and satisfy local demands
for basic public services. 2 7 In terms of local political independence, it
is an open question whether big cities are better off with intergovernmental aid, which often comes with strings attached, or without it.28
But there should be no question that the fiscal dependency of many big
cities means that local legal authority alone is not sufficient to create
29
real local autonomy.
Many big cities also need to raise revenues from internal sources
other than real property. As commercial and production centers that
provide services and employment opportunities to nonresidents, cities
may be able to develop alternative bases of local revenues. Many states
have, in fact, given some of their cities power to tax incomes and sales
as well as property, 30 yet these cities continue to be gripped by severe
fiscal strain. Even for cities with relatively broad revenue-raising authority, the inadequacy of local financial resources is often a central fact
of local existence-and a structural limitation on local political
autonomy.
Moreover, the realities of interlocal relations restrict the ability of
big cities to exercise fully the revenue-raising authority they do have.
Rise and Fall of the Intergovernmental City 93-132 (1984) (discussing fiscal burdens
faced by cities).
27. See, e.g., id. at 219-58.
28. Compare Pfiffner, Inflexible Budgets, Fiscal Stress, and the Tax Revolt, in The
Municipal Money Chase: The Politics of Local Government Finance 37, 57 (A. Sbragia
ed. 1983) ("State aid... often diminishes home rule and increases the centralization of
control at higher levels of government, for there is a tendency for those who control
financing to try also to control policy.... Spending priorities are eventually decided in
state rather than in local political arenas.") with T. Clark & L. Ferguson, City Money:
Political Processes, Fiscal Strain, and Retrenchment 224-32 (1983) ("[AJutonomy is preserved by adapting outside funds to local preferences .... ) and D. Elazar, supra note
20, at 168 (the wide range of federal aid programs protects local autonomy).
29. Robert Dahl has observed, "the greatest inroads on the autonomy of the city
result from its lack of financial resources." R. Dahl, supra note 10, at 164.
30. See, e.g., Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 7201 (West 1987) (authorizing counties to
levy sales and use taxes); id. § 7202.6 (Supp. 1990) (authorizing city redevelopment
agencies to levy sales and use taxes); N.Y. Tax Law §§ 1202a-j (McKinney 1987 & Supp.
1990) (authorizing hotel and motel taxes levied by various counties); id. § 1301 (authorizing cities with over one million people to tax residents' incomes); id. § 1340 (authorizing'cities with populations between 190,000 and 215,000 to tax commuters' incomes);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 718.01-.06 (Baldwin 1988) (municipal income tax); Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 53, § 6902 (Purdon 1972 & Supp. 1989) (city income and sales taxes); id. tit.
72, § 4750.521 (Supp. 1989) (optional county sales and use taxes); seeJ. Aronson &J.
Hilley, Financing State and Local Governments 142-50 (4th ed. 1986).
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The fiscal well-being of most localities is determined fundamentally by
the decisions of private taxpaying individuals and revenue- and employment-generating businesses to move to, remain in, expand in or depart
from the geographical confines of the city. 3 1 Local dependence on private investment decisions limits the utility of legal autonomy for localities generally,3 2 but for big cities with serious social welfare and
infrastructure problems, straitened economies and traditionally high
tax rates, the significance of formal legal power is particularly uncertain. Big city revenue-raising authority is severely constrained by the
cross-cutting pressures to hold taxes low enough to make the city attractive to businesses and affluent residents while keeping taxes high
33
enough to fund essential infrastructure and social welfare programs.
Big city zoning authority is comparably affected by the need to assure
34
the availability of land for new economic development.
Even when cities deploy the full array of municipal powers to the
satisfaction of business and high-income residents, there is no guarantee of success. 35 Local power is merely the power to bargain and persuade, to make concessions, provide incentives and reduce or eliminate
local taxes or restrictions; it is not the power to compel people or businesses to move into or remain in the jurisdiction. Cities compete with
suburbs in better economic shape and with fewer social needs for the
same attractive businesses and residents. Cities may have autonomy in
law, but their economic and political power in practice is shaped by
private investment decisions. 36
31. See, e.g., P. Peterson, City Limits 22-37 (1981).
32. See, e.g., S. Elkin, City and Regime in the American Republic 36-60 (1987); T.
Gurr & D. King, The State and the City 57-62, 189-90 (1987); T. Swanstrom, The Crisis
of Growth Politics: Cleveland, Kucinich, and the Challenge of Urban Populism 136-53
(1985); see also text at notes 278-291 infra (discussing mobility of business and residents as a constraint on ability of cities to pursue progressive social agendas).
33. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 5581-85, Agency Dkt. No.
307-8/85 (Aug. 21, 1988), rev'd, C.37-89 (Comm'r of Educ. Decision, Feb. 22, 1989),
aff'd, SB Dkt. No. 12-89 (State Board of Educ., Apr. 13, 1989) at 254-73, cert. granted,
117 NJ. 51, 563 A.2d 818 (1989) (describing high taxes and depressed financial and
economic circumstances of New Jersey's major cities); see generally J. O'Connor, The
Fiscal Crisis of the State (1973) (state revenues lag behind expenditures).
34. See, e.g., S. Elkin, supra note 32, at 90-95;J. Logan & H. Molotch, supra note
17, at 154-66; P. Peterson, supra note 31, at 22-37 (summarizing political effect of zoning and land-use devices).
35. Local taxes and tax abatement programs may, in fact, make very little difference
in the ability of local governments to attract industry. See Neenan & Ethridge, Competition and Cooperation Among Localities, in Urban Economic Development, 27 Urb. Aff.
Ann. Rev. 175, 188 (R. Bingham &J. Blair eds. 1984).
36. See, e.g., Clarke, More Autonomous Policy Orientations: An Analytic Framework, in The Politics of Urban Development 105, 107-09 (C. Stone & H. Sanders eds.
1987). This is not to say that cities offer residents and potential migrants no reasons to
enter or to stay; but rather that, in the fierce competition for new and existing taxpayers,
cities' powers to attract and retain the most sought-after residents and businesses are
limited.
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By contrast, for affluent or middle-class suburbs, local legal powers
are more likely to be sufficient for the satisfaction of local wants. Less
burdened by poverty, crime, congestion and physical deterioration than
big cities, these localities tend to have lower per capita spending needs,
while their tax bases are, per taxpayer, more substantial. 37 In addition,
local autonomy insulates suburban tax bases from the fiscal needs of
city residents. 38 To the extent that local resources are inadequate and
further growth is required, suburbs find it easier than cities to compete
for that growth. 3 9
Moreover, for many suburbs, particularly the more affluent ones,
the principal local regulatory goals often are controlling growth and
preserving the status quo. Local legal autonomy significantly empowers them in this quest. These suburbs can retain local revenues and use
them to maintain local schools, utilize their land-use authority to prevent unwanted local development and resist merger or absorption into
poorer central cities or regional governments. As a rule, local legal
powers will be more effective in attaining the suburban goals of limiting
growth and preserving formal autonomy than in attaining the central
cities's goals of intergovernmental assistance and private investment.
Of course, not all suburbs are affluent. The variations in municipal
size, wealth and economic structure among and within states defy easy
generalization. Poorer suburbs, lacking the commercial or industrial
facilities of the cities, are fiscally poor indeed. 40 More generally, the
steady economic expansion and increasing demographic diversity of
37. In the 37 largest Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (the Census Bureau's
formal term for a metropolitan area), per capita central city expenditures exceeded suburban per capita expenditures by 25% in 1957 and 43%o in 1970. W. Colman, Cities,
Suburbs, and States: Governing and Financing Urban America 52 (1975). In 1970, for
the four major regions of the country, city per capita expenditure exceeded suburban
per capita expenditure by 48% in the Northeast, 38% in the Midwest, 28% in the South
and 26% in the West. Id. The tax burden as measured by dividing per capita state and
local taxes by per capita personal income shows that in 1970, city residents on average
were paying 6.7% of income for state and local taxes compared to only 5% in the suburbs. Id.
Unlike most big cities, suburbs are usually able to limit local spending to a relative
handful of goods and services, primarily education. For most suburbs, school spending
consumes one-half to two-thirds of local budgets while the majority of big city expenditures are for public safety, public health, welfare and physical infrastructure needs that
do not exist in many suburbs. See, e.g., id. at 51-53.
38. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 19-24.
39. The lower tax rates and lower welfare burden, the newer physical infrastructure, the better-financed school systems and the more affluent and family-oriented milieu present a more attractive setting to new taxpaying residents and to business and
commercial development. See R. Premus, Urban Growth and Technological Innovation, in Urban Economic Development, supra note 35, at 47, 51 (suburbs more attractive
to high technology companies).
40. J. Logan & H. Molotch, supra note 17, at 190-91. As the findings in some of
the school finance cases demonstrated, the poorest localities in metropolitan areas, as
measured by property wealth per child, are often poor suburbs. See, e.g., Board of
Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 486-87,408 N.Y.S.2d 606, 615 (Sup. Ct. 1978), mod-
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the suburbs limits the force of the city-suburb distinction. Suburbia as
a whole has become less residential and more socially and ethnically
41
integrated than its traditional image would suggest.
Yet in many metropolitan areas the model of an economically declining inner city surrounded by more prosperous suburbs continues to
have considerable descriptive power. 4 2 Moreover, the increased heterogeneity of suburbia as a whole is usually not matched by a greater
diversification within particular suburbs. There are now more poor and
working-class people, more minorities and more industrial and commercial sites in suburbia. But poorer, working-class or black suburbanites are likely to live in different jurisdictions separate from those
inhabited by affluent or white suburbanites 4 3-and legal and political
ified, 83 A.D.2d 217,443 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1981), modified, 57 N.Y.2d 27,439 N.E.2d 359,
453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1139 (1983).
41. See generally M. Baldassare, supra note 22, at 1-45 (discussing national trend
toward expansion of, and increased social diversity in, suburbs).
42. The sharpness of the city-suburb gap and the magnitude of the suburban advantage in terms of mean family income, average educational attainment and average
occupational status correlates directly with the age of the metropolitan area. The suburbs had higher incomes, more high school graduates and more white-collar workers
than the central cities in all 33 metropolitan areas in which the central city had been
founded before 1880 and in roughly three-quarters of the metropolitan areas which urbanized between 1890 and 1920. See J. Harrigan, supra note 18, at 157-58. In the
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas founded between 1930 and 1970, the suburbs
consistently had a lower percentage of population in poverty, but in half the cases, the
central cities had a higher median family income and more high school graduates. Id.
A recent study of the Cleveland area found that in 1979, the average family income
for Cleveland residents was only 61.5% of that for subutban residents while the poverty
rate in Cleveland was nearly five times greater than in the suburbs. See T. Swanstrom,
supra note 32, at 62.
43. With respect to racial segregation, researchers have found that although the
percentage of blacks living in suburbs has increased sharply, "[t]his suburbanization
does not seem to have markedly affected the extent of black-white segregation." Massey
& Denton, Suburbanization and Segregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 94 Am. J. Soc.
592, 593 (1988) ("Once a suburb acquires a visible black presence, it tends to attract
more blacks than whites, which leads to neighborhood succession and the emergence of
a black enclave."). Black suburban areas tend to have lower socioeconomic status,
higher population density, weaker tax bases, poorer municipal services and higher degrees of debt than white suburbs. Id. at 593-94. Although there is considerable regional variation, in some metropolitan areas black segregation is actually greater in the
suburbs than in the central cities. See id. at 605 (citing Detroit, Michigan, Paterson,
NewJersey, and Gary, Indiana). Massey and Denton also found both more suburbanization and less segregation for Hispanics and Asian-Americans. Id. at 621-22; see also M.
Danielson, supra note 24, at 8 (In 1970, almost 90%o of the black population in suburban
Essex County, NewJersey lived in just three towns, where they composed from 27% to
53% of the population; no other town in the county was as much as seven percent
black).
With respect to wealth differences, both the 10 richest and the 10 poorest incorporated communities in America are suburbs. Metropolitan Chicago and metropolitan St.
Louis can claim suburbs on lists of both the 10 richest communities of 2500 or more
people (Kenilworth, Illinois, per capita income of $48,950, and Ladue, Missouri, per
capita income of $40,700) and the 10 poorest communities of 2500 or more (Ford
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authority is wielded by the governments of particular jurisdictions, not
by an amorphous, unincorporated "suburbia."
The schematic presented here-the abstraction of local governments as cities and suburbs-while more concrete and detailed than the
notion of local government tout court is, of course, still too general to
capture the considerable variation within each category. 44 But the
smaller size and greater homogeneity of economic function, class or
ethnicity of particular suburbs, in contrast to the relative heterogeneity
of most big cities, are critical distinctions with important implications
for thinking about local autonomy. The contrast between "city" and
"suburb" may be a useful heuristic device, with "suburb" read as a
shorthand or surrogate term for a municipality that is more functionally
and demographically specialized than the traditional city, is a much
smaller fragment of the metropolitan area and has fiscal resources and
regulatory authority relatively adequate to its needs. Such municipalities will usually be suburbs, even if not all suburbs fall into this
category.
A full consideration of the scope of local government power, then,
requires a double reconceptualization-of both "local power" and "local government." Instead of treating "local power" as the right to prevail in direct city-state conflicts, local power should, as noted in Part I,
be viewed as emerging out of the standard state practices of delegating
revenue-raising, regulatory and expenditure authority to localities and
of not interfering with the local exercise of that authority. 4 5 Localist
values pervade the system and make state legislatures and courts resistant to altering these arrangements in ways that would undermine local
independence. As a result, municipalities have considerable de facto
power to frame local policies and pursue local goals. 46 "Local government" should be analyzed in terms of the two most important types of
localities-large, complex, heterogeneous and fiscally dependent "cities," and smaller, more4 7homogeneous "suburbs" with greater resources and fewer needs.
Heights, Illinois, $4523, and Kinlock, Missouri, $5529). See Johnson, The View from
Poorest U.S. Suburbs, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1987, at A18, col. 2; see also P. Florestano &
V. Marando, The States and the Metropolis 23 (1981) (although there are rich, middle
class and poor suburban residents, "[r]arely are these different income groups found
integrated in the same suburban locality. The individual suburban localities are quite
homogeneous as to the characteristics of their populations and their basic economic
activities.");J. Logan & H. Molotch, supra note 17, at 187-99 (presenting a typology of
suburbs-"the affluent employing suburb," "the working-class residential suburb" and
"exclusive residential towns").
44. Furthermore, there are a large number of local communities that are neither
cities nor suburbs.
45. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 111-15.
46. See id.
47. See, e.g., M. Danielson & J. Doig, New York: The Politics of Urban Regional
Development 256-59 (1982) (comparing the relative ability of cities and suburbs to use
local government powers to achieve local goals).
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Cities, as just defined, tend to fare relatively poorly under this system, not because of a lack of legal autonomy, as the argument about
city legal powerlessness suggests, but because the scarcity of local resources relative to local needs forces them to turn to external sources
for financial support. More generally, the localist values in the system
militate against the interests of cities. Legal localism presumes local
fiscal self-sufficiency; it provides neither a legal basis for compelling
state responsibility to help satisfy local needs when local resources
prove inadequate nor a political basis for persuading state legislatures
to assume a greater degree of responsibility for local fiscal inadequacy.
Furthermore, localism legitimates state inaction, making it more difficult for needy localities to obtain financial support from the state or
from more prosperous localities.
Suburbs, by contrast, often do better under this system. The core
of local legal autonomy is defensive and preservative, enabling residents of more affluent localities to devote local taxable resources to
local ends, exclude unwanted land uses and users and protect the autonomous local political structure that allows them to pursue local policies. 48 These are precisely the goals of more affluent localities. Local
autonomy enables these suburbs to protect their resources from the
fiscal needs of nearby cities while securing their independence from involvement in the resolution of urban or metropolitan economic or social problems. Suburbs benefit from the localist values of courts and
legislatures that discourage modifications of this highly satisfactory status quo and protect them from outside interference.
Moreover, although most discussions of local authority are limited
to the legal relationship between states and local governments, this
traditional focus on state-local bipolar conflict is too simplistic a model
for analyzing local government law. Local government law must deal
not just with disputes between states and localities, but also with conflicts among localities. 4 9 Strengthening local autonomy from the states
does not benefit all localities, but instead benefits those with the greatest local resources or the fewest public service needs, to the detriment
of poorer places. Local power thus can lead to city powerlessness.
48. Swanstrom notes,
Having a tax base more than ample to meet the service demands of a largely
middle class population, many suburban governments practice the politics of
exclusion, not the politics of growth. They are more concerned with excluding
the poor and minorities, as well as dirty industry, than with attracting new investment and residents. Ironically, it is precisely in those cities where growth is
least possible that growth politics ...

has its most tenacious hold.

T. Swanstrom, supra note 32, at 26.
49. As Elazar points out, most smaller localities, "really do not develop a 'city' outlook in the political arena. As a rule, they align themselves with the so-called 'rural'
areas (really a misnomer in the demographic sense today) against the 'big city' in urbanrural conflict situations." D. Elazar, supra note 20, at 152-53.
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So, too, state power is not necessarily the enemy of local power,
and enhancing state power need not injure all localities. For cities unable to meet local needs or suffering from the external effects of actions
taken by other localities, the state may be a source of financial assistance or serve as an instrument for controlling other, antagonistic municipalities. States, cities and suburbs form a triangular relationship, in
which the states have the potential to regulate interlocal competition,
address interlocal inequality and promote local interests on a state-wide
basis-although states have, for the most part, preferred to take a passive role, with the result that suburban autonomy goes largely
unchecked.
The different kinds of local governments, with their diverse needs
and often conflicting concerns, cast real doubt on the utility of "local
government" as a category for advancing legal analysis. The political,
economic and social distinctions that divide cities from suburbs are as
significant as the common legal status that unites them. Suburbs, their
differences from the cities and the role of the states in addressing citysuburb conflicts, should be central to the analysis of local government
law.
Moreover, suburban development and the development of local
government law are closely intertwined. The independence of suburbs
and the resulting fragmentation of most metropolitan areas are, in an
important sense, the product of local government law, while the emergence of suburbs may have contributed to the evolution of local government law in a direction favoring expansive local powers. Judicial
treatment of the suburb as the paradigm local government helps to explain the localist results in many cases, much as the political power of
the suburbs contributes to the localism of state legislation. The next
two sections elaborate on these themes.
B. The Suburbs and Local Government Law
Suburban growth-the emigration of people and businesses from
city centers to outlying areas-has been a constant feature of nineteenth and twentieth century American urban history. 50 The persistent
lure of cheaper land and open space, the desire to avoid urban crowding and proximity to people of undesirable classes or ethnic groups and
50. KennethJackson explains that before 1815 most suburbs-in the sense of areas
immediately outside a city-were industrial or blue collar slums, the locations of slaughterhouses, tanneries and brothels. See K. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The
Suburbanization of the United States 12-19 (1985). Jackson traces the origin of the
modern suburb-the middle class or affluent residential community whose inhabitants
earned their livelihood in the city-to the transportation revolution that began in the
early nineteenth century. Id. at 20-44. The steam engine permitted regular ferry links
between New York and its first suburb, Brooklyn. The steam railroad and the horsedrawn street car led to the growth of other new suburbs around New York, Philadelphia
and Boston in the period between 1815 and 1840. Id. at 35-42. Many of these early
suburbs were ultimately absorbed into their central cities. Id. at 142-43.
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the improvements in transportation and communication technology
that freed people and industry from the need to be situated in the city
have fueled a steady outward movement. For more than a century,
people have moved away from the older sections of cities and opened
up new urban neighborhoods while retaining economic ties to
downtown.
Growth on the urban fringe, however, does not necessarily mean
suburban independence. Indeed, for much of American history, cities
followed population growth and extended their boundaries to annex
new neighborhoods on the urban fringe, thereby recapturing old residents and adding new ones. 5 1 The existence of large numbers of legally independent suburbs wielding the powers of municipal
corporations is a relatively recent phenomenon. The emergence of autonomous suburbs and their legal and political separation from the city
is to an important degree attributable to developments in local government law.
1. The Authorization of Suburban Independence. - The localist character of the law of municipal formation, expansion and preservation contributed directly to suburban independence. As noted in Part I, most
states have allowed the decisions to incorporate a local government and
52
to expand or to merge municipalities to be made at the local level.

This facilitates the formation of new municipalities outside the major
cities. Such an approach to local government formation, was not inevitable; indeed, it was not always the case.
In the early nineteenth century, the states played a different and far
more active role in local government formation, participating directly
in decisions concerning municipal formation and expansion and creating or declining to create new municipalities one at a time. State policies often favored city expansion, and state legislatures redrew
municipal boundaries to increase the territorial scope of the central cities as urban populations and urban economies spread into outlying
55
areas.
51. Virtually every major city in the United States is substantially larger in area
today than when it was first incorporated. Jackson notes that "the adjustment of local
boundaries has been the dominant method of population growth in every American city
of consequence." Id. at 140. Indeed, if "suburb" is defined solely in reference to the
characteristic low-density residential neighborhoods, typified by single-family houses
surrounded by yards, and not in terms of separate political existence, then all large cities
today have suburbs within their borders. See R. Fishman, Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise
and Fall of Suburbia 6 (1987).
52. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 73-81.
53. The Massachusetts legislature, for example, consolidated the city of Boston
with its environs. SeeJ. Teaford, City and Suburb: The Political Fragmentation of Metropolitan America 54 (1979). The Pennsylvania legislature expanded the size of
Philadelphia to 130 square miles by merging 28 separate local governments into the city,
without seeking the consent of any of the affected local residents. Id. at 33. Both actions and comparable decisions by other states placed within city limits the people and
businesses linked to the central city.
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As the nineteenth century progressed, state legislatures withdrew
from direct involvement in municipal formation and expansion decisions. The states passed general enabling laws for the incorporation of
municipalities, thereby shifting operational decisions concerning local
government formation to local actors. State constitutional restrictions
on special or local acts, and the adoption of home rule,5 4 further constrained the ability of legislatures to become involved in particular municipal formation or expansion determinations. 5 5
The adoption of general incorporation and annexation laws did
not mean the end of urban expansion. Some states continued to associate their economic development and prestige with the growth of their
largest cities and, accordingly, pursued policies that discouraged the
formation of independent suburbs and encouraged cities to add new
land as urban populations moved beyond the city limits. Thus, states
facilitated annexations of outlying areas by central cities, often allowing
larger cities to add land without the consent of the residents of the areas annexed. Between the Civil War and World War I, most of the
great cities of the Northeast and Midwest experienced significant territorial growth through annexation or consolidation. 56 The combined
areas of the twenty most populous cities grew by approximately twenty
percent per decade between 1870 and 1920.5 7 According to Kenneth

Jackson, "[t]he predominant view in the nineteenth century was the
doctrine of forcible annexation. No small territory could be allowed to
58
retard the development of the metropolitan community."
Over time the structure of metropolitan development changed.
State legislatures liberalized their incorporation laws, moving toward
the contemporary criteria of relatively minimal population and area requirements. 59 State courts often interpreted the remaining restrictions
to facilitate the formation of autonomous municipalities on the urban
54. According to Teaford, "[s]ince home rule meant rule by the local authorities
and local electorates it also meant a-halt to any broader efforts at reorganizing the expanding American metropolis." Id. at 38.

55. Between 1870 and 1896, state consolidation and annexation plans for
Cincinnati, Denver, Des Moines and Topeka were invalidated by state courts that viewed
the plans as unconstitutional special acts. See id. at 37 (citing In re Extension of Boundaries of the City of Denver, 18 Colo. 288, 32 P. 615 (1893); State ex rel. West v. City of
Des Moines, 96 Iowa 521, 65 N.W. 818 (1896); City of Topeka v. Gillett, 32 Kan. 431, 4

P. 800 (1884); State ex. rel. Attorney General v. City of Cincinnati, 20 Ohio St. 18
(1870)).
56. The territory of the 20 largest cities grew 286% between 1870 and 1900. Id. at
32. Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York

City and Pittsburgh all enjoyed great territorial growth between 1870 and 1930. See
Miller, Municipal Annexation and Boundary Change, in The Municipal Year Book 1986
at 72, 78-79 (Int'l City Management Ass'n ed. 1986).

57. SeeJ. Teaford, supra note 53, at 77. The increase in big city area was 18% in
the 1870s, 26% in the 1880s, 32% in the 1890's, 11% in the 1900s and 26% in the

1910s. Id.
58. K. Jackson, supra note 50, at 147.
59. SeeJ. Teaford, supra note 53, at 6-9.
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fringe. 60 Central city expansion began to tail off, and the number
of
61
independent municipalities in metropolitan areas began to grow.

Thus, although many states limited local government formaition by
requiring the existence of an "urban community" as a prerequisite to
incorporation, 6 2 courts defined "urbanness" and "community" to fit
the economic and social characteristics of the emerging suburbs. The
traditional notion of the urban center as a closely clustered, internally
diverse settlement, spatially separate from other localities, began to
give way. The lack of a densely populated urban core, the weakness of
the internal ties of commerce, production or culture and the fact that
suburbanites earned their livelihoods by commuting to the central city,
were treated as products of advances in transportation-such as the automobile, interlocal highways and interurban rail lines-which permitted the diffusion of population, the territorial separation of jobs,
homes, culture and recreation and the emergence of wholly residential
communities. These new places were neither too rural for urban government nor too much a part of the central city to warrant independent
60. See, e.g., State ex rel. Pickrell v. Downey, 102 Ariz. 360, 366,430 P.2d 122, 128
(1967); State ex rel. Northern Pump Co. v. So-Called Village of Fridley, 233 Minn. 442,
447-51, 47 N.W.2d 204, 208-10 (1951); State ex rel. Burnquist v. So-Called Village of
St. Anthony, 223 Minn. 149, 153-55, 26 N.W.2d 193, 195-96 (1947); In re Borough of
Churchill, 111 Pa. Super. 380, 382-83, 170 A. 319, 320 (1934); State ex rel. Stephens v.
Odell, 61 Wash. 2d 476, 482-83, 378 P.2d 932, 936 (1963); Gotfredson v. Town of
Summit, 7 Wis. 2d 400, 403-04, 97 N.W.2d 189, 191 (1959); In re Incorporation of the
Village of Chenequa, 197 Wis. 163, 169-72, 221 N.W. 856, 858-60 (1928).
61. See R. Wood, supra note 24, at 59. There were 55 municipalities in Cook
County, Illinois in 1890 and 109 in 1920. In the New York metropolitan area, the
number of separate municipalities rose from 127 in 1900 to 204 twenty years later. Id.
62. See, e.g., State ex rel. Young v. Village of Gilbert, 107 Minn. 364, 367-68, 120
N.W. 528, 530 (1909); State ex rel. Childs v. Village of Minnetonka, 57 Minn. 526, 533,
59 N.W. 972, 974 (1894); Ascherin v. Milwaukee, 209 Wis. 645, 653, 245 N.W. 840, 843
(1932). Urbanness-a certain density of population, the close clustering of homes, the
mixture of commercial facilities and residences or the existence of a compact urban
core-was necessary to justify the costs local government would impose on property
owners. An evocative statement of the requirement of a traditional urban community as
a prerequisite to incorporation is that of the Florida Supreme Court in State ex rel.
Davis v. Town of Lake Placid, 109 Fla. 419, 147 So. 468 (1933). The Lake Placid court
explained:
The city of ancient Rome is the prototype for all municipalities of modem
times. The desire to be in close touch with the glitter of social life and political
activiity [sic] presented problems of overcrowding, bad sanitary conditions,
crowding of streets and public places . . . were all problems of the ancient
municipia of the Empire of Rome.
These problems arose as the population of the towns or cities increased.
So it is apparent that, before the legislative will may operate to establish a municipality, that is to say, to prescribe powers and duties for the governance of
towns, villages, or communities, there must be in existence a town, village, or
community of people, whose local public interests require, in the orderly
processes of government, orderly administration under state authority ....
Id. at 427-28, 147 So. at 471.

360

COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 90:346

existence; rather they were deemed to possess "suburban character" 63
and to be suitable for incorporation.
As the Wisconsin Supreme Court put it in reviewing the proposed
incorporation of the Village of Chenequa, an entirely residential community where all the petitioners for incorporation were "substantial
business men of good repute" who lived in the village but worked in
Milwaukee:
[T]he villages of to-day are unlike the villages of 1848 [when
the requirement that villages be urban communities was enacted] in many respects. . . Many villages adjacent or near
large cities are built up for the purpose of the convenience and
comfort of the residents who are largely business men of a
city, who wish to get away from the noise and rush of the city
to the quietude of country life. Such in a large measure was
the situation of the people who lived in Chenequa. 64
Similarly, although the suburbs lacked the population density of
traditional cities, and the expanses of.unplatted land within suburban
boundaries often caused suburbs to resemble rural districts more than
urban centers, the legal concept of a city was effectively redefined to
include this new form of community. The idea of a town had previously
meant "a small assemblage of houses collocated under a regular plan
regarding streets and lanes," a Pennsylvania court noted, 65 but the dispersal of homes and the lack of a town center did not mean that an area
was not sufficiently urbanized to be incorporated: "[W]e cannot lose
sight of the fact that in the more recent development of rural property
adjacent to cities or towns, villages are formed with houses having
larger areas surrounding them and the dwellings do not, strictly speaking, form a compact group."' 66 In a suburb, the "large area of land"
between the homes "did not prevent the formation" of a
67
municipality.
With dispersed settlement patterns and no requirement of com63. Borough of Churchill, 111 Pa. Super. at 383, 170 A. at 320.
64. Village of Chenequa, 197 Wis. at 168, 170-71, 221 N.W. at 858-59. In a later case
the Wisconsin court observed
While it may have been usual and customary fifty years ago, or twenty years
ago, for a community to grow around the market or place of employment,
school, church and perhaps the village blacksmith due to limitations in the
means of transportation, this is not so today ....
The construction of super
highways and the technical improvement in the manufacture of automobiles
have made it possible for families to live in one community, be employed in
another, and seek recreation in still others.
Gotfredson, 7 Wis. 2d at 403, 97 N.W.2d at 191.
65. Borough of Churchill, 111 Pa. Super. at 382, 170 A. at 320.
66. Id.; see also State ex rel. Burnquist v. So-Called Village of St. Anthony, 223
Minn. 149, 151-52, 26 N.W.2d 193, 194 (1947) (where land was "suitable for division
into smaller tracts and for use for suburban dwelling," court must note that such
"change has been taking place not only in the area included in the village, but also in the
surrounding area.., and the trend in that direction is increasing.").
67. Borough of Churchill, 111 Pa. Super. at 382, 170 A. at 320.

1990]

OUR LOCALISM

mon stores, jobs, schools or social or cultural facilities, 68 what would
bind suburban residents together in "communities"? Some state
courts looked to the common desire for public services and public regulatory authority and the common class interests and values of the residents. 69 Thus, where state law required that the local people" 'mingle'
in business, social, educational, and recreational activities," an Arizona
court found no need for the incorporated area to have a shopping or
business district. Instead, the court found that the "mingling" requirement was satisfied since the residents had "similar business interests,
professions, and occupations" even though they pursued those inter70
ests and occupations separately and outside the community.
To become a municipality, then, an area no longer needed to be a
relatively built-up, diverse and economically and socially self-contained
unit, set off from other localities by the density of its internal linkagesthat is, a city. Instead, the area could be a decentralized, homogeneous, residential district, economically tied to other localities-a suburb.
Class homogeneity might remedy the lack of regular patterns of business or social interactions among residents, and the common demands
of homeowners for public services and regulatory authority could supply the element of "community" that districts without common business, commercial or cultural institutions would otherwise lack.
Allied to the liberalization of the rules for incorporations were new
restrictions on the authority of cities to expand. States banned annexation of incorporated localities or conditioned such annexations on the
approval of the voters in the communities sought to be annexed. 71 The
changes in incorporation and annexation law together meant that most
major cities in the Northeast and Midwest were completely surrounded
72
by incorporated suburbs that could not be annexed without consent.
68. See, e.g., State ex rel. Stephens v. Odell, 61 Wash. 2d 476, 478-81, 378 P.2d

932, 933-35 (1963).
69. See, e.g., Village of St. Anthony, 223 Minn. at 152-53, 26 N.W.2d at 195 (1947);

Eden Park Borough Incorporation, 158 Pa. Super. 40, 43, 43 A.2d,529, 530 (1945);
Village of Chenequa, 197 Wis. at 171, 221 N.W. at 859.
70. State ex rel. Pickrell v. Downey, 102 Ariz. 360, 366, 430 P.2d 122, 128 (1967).
71. See, e.g., 4 E. Griffith, A History of American City Government 289 (1974)
("The local veto over boundary changes, on the part of both or all governmental units

involved, came to be so rigid that only outside intervention by a higher power could
break it."); see also Taliaferro v. Genesee County Supervisors, 354 Mich. 49, 57-59, 92

N.W.2d 319, 323-24 (1958) (invalidating an attempt to incorporate a new city to be
composed of the city of Flint and several incorporated suburbs on ground that home

rule bars the nonconsensual consolidation or dissolution of a municipality); P.
Florestano & V. Marando, supra note 43, at 67 ("In various states, legislatures passed

more restrictive annexation laws, gave up their prerogatives to pass ... special legislation, and allowed fringe area residents a voice in the process, which usually meant resistance to annexation.").
72. Changes in the law of incorporation and annexation did not always lead to
changes in the pattern of metropolitan area development. Many cities continued to ex-

pand through annexation even after suburban consent was required. See infra note 83.
Suburban votes on annexation proposals were influenced by changing suburban percep-
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As a result, those cities simply stopped growing as the residents of adja73
cent areas incorporated and vetoed annexations.
Proposals to make city boundaries congruent with the territorial
scope of metropolitan areas through the consolidation of central cities
with their surrounding counties were also conditioned on voter approval. Suburban voters blocked proposed city-county consolidations
involving Cleveland, St. Louis and other cities.74 In many Northeastern
and Midwestern states, city-county consolidation, like annexation and
the merger of municipalities, long ago ceased to be a viable means of
central city expansion due to the power of suburban voters to veto
75
measures that threatened their local legal autonomy.

The pattern of urban growth through territorial expansion persisted longer in the South and West. State annexation and consolidation laws in the Sunbelt continued to facilitate the growth of major
cities and curb the formation of suburbs during the middle years of the
twentieth century. 7 6 Much of the explosive population growth since
World War II of cities like Dallas, Houston, San Antonio, Phoenix and
Oklahoma City is attributable to the cities' legal authority, under the
liberal annexation laws of their states, to add hundreds of square miles
of new land.

77

tions of the relative advantages and disadvantages of merger with the central city. These
issues are discussed more fully in subsections 2 and 3 of this section, infra.
73. St. Louis and Philadelphia added virtually no new territory after 1870; New
York City, Chicago, Detroit, Baltimore, Cleveland, Boston and Pittsburgh added little or
no new territory after 1930. See K. Jackson, supra note 50, at 140.
74. See P. Florestano & V. Marando, supra note 43, at 70-73. These results seem
to have cast a permanent pall over city-county consolidation efforts in the Northeast and
North Central states. A recent study of city-county consolidations proposed during the
three decades between 1945 and 1976 found that no proposals at all were put before the
voters in the Northeast, and only four went before the voters in the Midwest-and all
four were defeated. By contrast, there were 64 proposals in the South and West, of
which 17, or a little over 25%, passed; all those passing were restricted to small or medium-sized cities. No consolidation involving a city with a population greater than
250,000 has received voter approval since World War II. See id. at 70-74.
75. The result of increasing suburban power to block city expansion has been to
bring city expansion to a halt. See authorities cited supra note 71; K. Jackson, supra
note 50, at 149. Jackson observes that those large cities now losing population typically
expanded rapidly from 1870 to 1930, but have grown "less than 10 percent since 1930."
Id.
76. Of the 12 largest cities that gained population between 1950 and 1980, all had
also gained territory. These cities were predominantly in the Sunbelt, and included
Dallas, Los Angeles, San Antonio, San Diego and San Jose. Of the 12 largest cities that
lost population in the same period, 6 had gained no territory and 5 gained only 5 square
miles or less. These cities were predominantly in the Northeast and Midwest. See id. at
139-40.
77. Between 1940 and 1984, Dallas grew by nearly 291 square miles, Houston by
nearly 493 square miles, Phoenix by nearly 377 square miles and San Antonio by 242
square miles; Oklahoma City grew by 553 square miles between 1950 and 1984. See
Miller, supra note 56, at 78-79; see also C. Abbott, The New Urban America: Growth
and Politics in Sunbelt Cities 52-54 (rev. ed. 1987).
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More recently, legislatures in some Sunbelt states have begun to
emulate their Northern and Eastern counterparts by curtailing big city
expansion and permitting increased suburban independence. Thus,
Texas responded to suburban concerns by amending its liberal annexation laws to restrict the opportunities of larger cities to acquire new
78
territory without the consent of the residents of the areas annexed.
In Georgia, residents of Atlanta's suburbs have blocked that city's annexation of new territory and rejected a consolidation of Atlanta with
Fulton County. 7 9 In Colorado, suburban resistance to Denver's growth
prompted a succession of defensive incorporations by adjacent communities, the adoption of a constitutional amendment requiring a countywide referendum on any new annexations and suburban rejections of
proposals to strengthen the county government.8 0 Oregon created local government boundary commissionssi
primarily to constrain
82
Portland's annexation program.
Changes in local government law have thus been critical in determining whether large cities will be able to expand to follow outward
population movements or whether new urban neighborhoods will be
able to declare their independence and become autonomous suburbs.
In this century, state laws have tended to favor suburban independence, particularly in the Northeast and Midwest and increasingly in
the South and West as well.
2. Incentives to Suburban Independence. - The legal right to become
independent, and to prevent absorption into a larger city, is a necessary
but not a sufficient condition for suburbs to choose autonomous government. Historically, even after states conferred on suburbanites the
right to veto annexation, many residents of outlying districts still consented to annexation proposals.8 3 Suburban independence required a
78. Tex. Local Gov't Code Ann. § 43.022 (Vernon 1988). See Ashcroft & Balfour,
Home Rule Cities and Municipal Annexation in Texas: Recent Trends and Future Prospects, 15 St. Mary's L.J. 519, 526, 545 (1984) ("[S]uburban residents, many of whom
reside within the [extra-territorial jurisdiction] of major central cities, have become increasingly active in initiating changes to curb the annexation power of home rule cities
79. See C. Abbott, supra note 77, at 197; see also Smothers, Atlanta Still on a Roll,
But New Doubts Arise, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1988, at A21, col. I (population of the city
of Atlanta dropped by 12% from 1974 to 1987 while surrounding metropolitan area
grew by 40% from 1970 to 1983).
80. See C. Abbott, supra note 77, at 192-95.
81. Or. Rev. Stat. § 199.425 (Butterworth 1983).
82. C. Abbott, supra note 77, at 198-200. In Oregon, each of the two local government boundary review commissions has jurisdiction over one of the state's two principal
metropolitan areas, Portland and Eugene. Or. Rev. Stat. § 199.425 (Butterworth 1983).
In reviewing annexations, the Portland area commission's "major interest is the effect of
annexation on the cost and efficiency of service delivery, a criterion that relegates central
city desires for increased tax base or population diversification to second place." C.
Abbott, supra note 77, at 199-200.
83. SeeJ. Teaford, supra note 53, at 61 (between 1850 and 1909, all eight annexations Cleveland proposed were approved by the voters in the areas to be annexed; be-
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shift in the relative balance of incentives to autonomy and disincentives
to annexation. This shift had two major components: the increased
economic and social segmentation of metropolitan areas and the increased regulatory authority of local governments over local land use.
a. Metropolitan Economic and Social Segmentation. - Local independence carries with it the power to elect local officials, enact local laws,
levy local taxes and spend locally raised revenues on local programs.
This legal meaning of independence was relatively constant during
both the era of urban expansion and the subsequent period of suburb
formation, although the spread of home rule enhanced local powers in
the later period. But suburban political autonomy, and the concomitant escape from the politics, legislation and taxes of the central city,
took on new significance as industrialization and immigration introduced deep class and ethnic differences between territorially defined
districts within the urban community.
As the late nineteenth century cities filled with poor immigrants
who eventually won urban political power, the older stock of Americans
living in outlying areas, aware of the economic and social gap between
themselves and city-dwellers, grew resentful of the new ethnic groups'
dominance. They came to associate the cities with foreigners, crime,
vice and political corruption.8 4 Fearing the emergent urban political
machines, suburban residents began to reject annexation, preferring
political autonomy in their own communities to minority status in the
immigrant cities. 8 5 Ethnic differences continue to be felt in the twentitween 1887 and 1898, 12 of 16 annexations Chicago proposed were approved by the
local voters).
84. A mid-twentieth century decision of the Illinois Supreme Court, sustaining a
state law that provided certain benefits for police officers in Chicago but not in other
municipalities, nicely captures this view of the city. The court held that the Illinois General Assembly could reasonably conclude that a policeman's job in the city of Chicago
is fraught with hazards uncommon to any other city in Illinois.... [A] conscientious study and survey of conditions in Chicago ... would doubtless reveal
congestion in travel, both pedestrian and vehicular, causing an uncommon
number of automobile accidents; blight and slum areas; areas of unassimilated
foreign elements where crimes are bred and protection is offered to fleeing
criminals; skid rows where poverty, crime and general disrespect for the law
abounds; narcotic rings, hoodlums, gangsters, and racketeers that kill with
sawed-off shotguns, all of which pose problems in Chicago that are not found
in other parts of Illinois.
Gaca v. City of Chicago, 411 111. 146, 154-55, 103 N.E.2d 617, 622 (1952).
85. See K. Jackson, supra note 50, at 150-51 (racial, ethnic and class distinctions
most important reason why incorporated suburbs are separated from cities);J. Teaford,
supra note 53, at 10-12, 82-85. City-suburb ethnic and class differences have policy as
well as political ramifications that may also have encouraged suburban incorporation
and resistance to annexation.
One point of Yankee-immigrant conflict at the turn of the century was the sale of
alcohol: prohibition was generally supported by older stock Americans and opposed by
some immigrant groups. Before the national adoption of prohibition, numerous suburbs were incorporated to permit local residents to deny licenses to saloons and ban the
sale of alcohol within municipal limits. According to Teaford, Pasadena, Monrovia,
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eth century, as white communities have sought to incorporate, pursue
annexation programs or resist annexations in order to avoid a political
combination with minority areas. 8 6
Widening interlocal economic differences, and the right of localities to set their own property tax rates and retain locally raised revenues, provided further incentives to independence. The turn of the
century was a period of substantial urban spending on physical infrastructure and social welfare programs, with the result that municipal
taxes and debt increased.8 7 Although initially the high quality of urban
services attracted residents of outlying areas to annexation by the central city, over time the suburbs became wealthier and better able to
fund their own infrastructure and services while they resisted paying
high city taxes for redistributive social welfare programs with limited
suburban benefit. 8 Local suburban wealth, and the desire to avoid city
Pomona and Compton in California and Oak Park and Berwyn in Illinois were all incorporated so that residents could ban liquor. See J. Teaford, supra note 53, at 17-18.
Jackson quotes from an antiannexationist editorial in the Morgan Park Post, a suburban
Chicago weekly in 1907: "'The real issue is not taxes, nor water, nor street cars-it is a
much greater question than either. It is the moral control of our village.'" K. Jackson,
supra note 50, at 151; see also J. Bollens & H. Schmandt, The Metropolis: Its People,
Politics and Economic Life 80 (3d ed. 1975) (describing an 1893 advertisement on behalf of the suburb of Wauwatosa, Wisconsin, which described the town as a place of
"fine churches, street lights, transit facilities, and freedom from saloons and heavy industry").
Occasionally, a suburb was incorporated to authorize a looser approach to vice, as
in the incorporations of Arcadia, California and North Randall, Ohio to permit the operation of racetracks. J. Teaford, supra note 53, at 18-20. Similarly, a report to the
Minnesota legislature in 1959 noted the incorporation of a village for the sole purpose
of enabling the sponsors to obtain a liquor license. Under Minnesota law, a license
could not be granted in an unincorporated area. See S. Sato & A. Van Alstyne, State and
Local Government Law 48 (2d ed. 1977).
Today, suburbs may incorporate to pursue more vigorous programs of environmental protection or to establish greater controls on growth than the central city is likely
to approve. See R. Babcock & C. Siemon, The Zoning Game Revisited 95-118 (1985)
(Sanibel, Florida incorporated so that residents could adopt a growth control plan); cf.
Wilson v. Hidden Valley Mun. Water Dist., 256 Cal. App. 2d 271, 63 Cal. Rptr. 889
(1967) (formation of a water district).
86. See, e.g., City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462 (1987); United
States v. City of BlackJack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042
(1975); Taylor v. Township of Dearborn, 370 Mich. 47, 120 N.W.2d 737 (1963); Village
of Inkster v. Wayne County Supervisor, 363 Mich. 165, 108 N.W.2d 822 (1961);
Marshall v. Mayor of McComb City, 251 Miss. 750, 171 So. 2d 347, cert. denied, 382
U.S. 836 (1965); In re Incorporation of Bridgewater, 87 Pa. Commw. 599, 488 A.2d 374
(1985); NAACP v. Town of Hilton Head, 287 S.C. 254, 335 S.E.2d 806 (1985); Symposium, The White Curtain: Racially Disadvantaging Local Government Boundary Practices, 54 U. Det. J. Urb. L. 679 (1977) (use of local governments' powers over
boundaries to disadvantage racial minorities).
87. See generally J. Teaford, The Unheralded Triumph: City Government in
America, 1870-1900, at 217-306 (1984) (discussing provision and financing of high
levels of services by cities in late nineteenth century).
88. Some suburbs incorporated as tax havens. This practice was developed by industry, which needed larger parcels of open land for factories, but had no need for social
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taxes, formed part of the case for suburban incorporation.
b. SuburbanAutonomy and Local Land Use Regulation. - The opportunity to escape the politicians, policies and taxes of the central cities
made local independence attractive, but it may not be a coincidence
that the critical shift in the Northeast and Midwest from urban expansion to suburban incorporation after World War I occurred concurrently with the widespread adoption, and judicial affirmation, of state
legislation authorizing local zoning.
Local zoning and the emergence of independent suburbs are
closely linked. Although local zoning was first developed in the major
cities in response to increasing urban congestion,8 9 within a few years
after the landmark Supreme Court decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co.,9° zoning had spread rapidly to the suburbs, where congestion was rarely a problem. 9 1 Instead, zoning in the suburbs was a solution to concerns about neighborhood stability. Zoning became a legal
device critical to suburban development.
Suburbanites, like the residents of the cities they left behind, were
threatened by uncertainties created by the financial, social and racial
dynamics of urban expansion. As relatively new communities, suburbs
services and no desire to fund the programs of the big cities. The minimal population
requirements for incorporation were readily satisfied and businesses and the small
number of area residents could enjoy substantial freedom from urban taxation. In the
late 1950s, California's City of Industry contained a few hundred residents but substantial industrial and commercial properties. By 1970, the town contained hundreds of
industrial establishments with tens of thousands of employees, but still only a few hundred residents. See Hoch, City Limits: Municipal Boundary Formation and Class Segregation, in Marxism and the Metropolis 101, 111-12 (W. Tabb. & L. Sawers 2d ed. 1984).
Similarly, Forest View, Illinois is an "enclave of industrial riches" with dozens of plants,
fewer than a thousand residents and a tax rate one-third of Chicago's, but local expenditures per resident four times as high as Chicago's. See Bravin, Forest View Asserts Independence as an Enclave of Industrial Riches, Chicago Tribune, July 27, 1986, § 3, at 1,
col. 1.
Taxes were initially less of a factor in the formation of residential suburbs since the
local desire to keep down taxes was counterbalanced by the need for urban services. It
was often cheaper for residents of outlying areas to join the cities and receive extensions
of city water systems, sewers and power lines than it was for them to finance their own
utilities. SeeJ. Teaford, supra note 53, at 58.
89. See generally S. Toll, Zoned American (1969) (discussing rise of zoning);
Baker, Zoning Legislation, 11 Cornell L.Q. 164, 165-68 (1926) (describing zoning as
solution to variety of problems arising from rapid and unplanned growth of American
cities).
An important goal of early zoning advocates was the prevention of nuisance in the
crowded, rapidly growing and largely unplanned cities through the separation of inconsistent land uses into distinct areal zones. Zoning was seen as mandated by the exigencies of urban life, particularly the need to restrict polluting industries and control the
height and bulk of the new skyscrapers to maintain habitable residential districts. See H.
McBain, American City Progress and the Law 92-123 (1918).
90. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Euclid was a suburb of Cleveland.
91. See Danielson, supra note 24, at 50 (more than half of suburbs with populations
greater than 5000 had power to zone, as did half of suburbs with populations less than
5000).
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were particularly risky sites for investment since there was little prior
history of local development from which projections of future growth
could be made. Some suburbs sought to maintain their exclusive character through deed restrictions and restrictive covenants, 92 but the
costs of persuading all landowners in a community to accept and abide
by private controls on sales and development meant that relatively few
communities could rely on private agreements as a long-term guarantee of neighborhood stability.
Zoning provided a solution. By precluding undesirable changes in
land use and providing a firm basis for predicting the future physical
and social evolution of the community, zoning reduced the risks to investors in urban real estate.93 As a political rather than a private act,
zoning required the approval of only a majority of residents, not the
unanimous consent of all property-owners. Moreover, given the consistent state practice of delegating zoning authority to local governments with little or no state supervision, zoning was a local solution.
Zoning ordinances could be closely tailored to the preferences of local
residents. 94 However, zoning did require the legal existence of a local
government. Suburban "[r]esidents perceived incorporation as a
means of neighborhood protection[]" 9 5 and many incorporated in or96
der to zone.
92. See, e.g., T. Swanstrom, supra note 32, at 65-66 (discussing role of deed restrictions in development of Shaker Heights, Ohio).
93. See generally C. Perin, Everything in Its Place: Social Order and Land Use in
America 149-61 (1977); White & Wittman, Long-Run Versus Short-Run Remedies for
Spatial Externalities: Liability Rules, Pollution Taxes, and Zoning, in Essays on the Law
and Economics of Local Governments 13, 42 (D. Rubinfeld ed. 1979) (noting that zoning, by reducing uncertainty, removes from individual landowners the burden of forecasting land use changes in the neighborhood).
94. Zoning spread rapidly in exclusive residential suburbs. Late nineteenth and
early twentieth century suburbs were relatively affluent for technological reasons. Before
the widespread use of the automobile and the construction of a highway system, commuting to the city was largely restricted to rail systems and was relatively expensive.
Consequently, when, after World War I, the mass production of the automobile and
state investment in new roads led to rapid suburban growth, the most affluent suburbs
may have felt particularly threatened. They responded by adopting zoning ordinances
with alacrity. See Toll, supra note 89, at 192-93. Zoning's capacity for exclusion was its
major selling point. See Makielski, Zoning: Legal Theory and Political Practice, 45 U.
Det.J. Urb. L. 1, 5 (1967).
95. Hoch, supra note 88, at 114.
96. See, e.g., R. Babcock & C. Siemon, supra note 85, at 95-100; see also S. Toll,
supra note 89, at 188-96 (describing the interaction and spread of zoning and
suburbanization in 1920s); R. Wood, 1400 Governments 93-95 (1961) (describing the
role of zoning in development of suburban Westchester County, New York in 1950s).
Suburbs have incorporated so that the residents could exclude industry, low-cost
housing, apartment houses and public housing or adopt growth control plans. See, e.g.,
United States v. City of Blackjack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1182 (8th Cir. 1974) (incorporation
to exclude subsidized housing); R. Babcock & C. Siemon, supra note 85, at 95-106 (discussing incorporation of Sanibel, Florida as part of local growth control strategy); see
also Marcus v. Baron, 84 A.D.2d 118, 119-22,445 N.Y.S.2d 587, 590-91 (1981), rev'd,

368

COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 90:346

Moreover, much as the authority to regulate local land use provided a powerful incentive to suburban independence, the emergence
of the independent residential suburb may have contributed to the judicial endorsement of local exclusionary practices. A defining characteristic of the suburb is that it is only a small piece of a larger metropolitan
region. This was noted by courts in the incorporation cases, as they
redefined the notion of an urban community to fit outlying residential
neighborhoods composed of people who commute to work in otherjurisdictions.9 7 In the zoning cases, the limited size and residential character of the suburb proved to be a justification, not an obstacle, for
affirming local power to reject particular land uses. Some courts
adopted a perspective that saw the region, and not the particular municipality, as the proper focus of land-use planning, allowing suburbs to
exclude lawful land uses on the assumption that, since the people or
businesses displaced by restrictive suburban zoning could find sites
elsewhere in the region, no "exclusion," in the regional sense at least,
had occurred at all.
Thus, in the leading case of Duffcon Concrete Products, Inc. v. Borough
of Cresskill,98 the NewJersey Supreme Court upheld Cresskill's total exclusion of heavy industry by treating the town as a mere residential
fragment of a broader regional economy. The Court would not rely on
"the adventitious location of municipal boundaries" 99 to bar Cresskill
from excluding industry since the region's industrial needs could be
satisfied by an all-residential Cresskill and factories elsewhere. 10 0 In
effect, Cresskill could turn itself into a residential "zone" as part of the
balanced development of the region.
Similarly, a federal court, relying on Ohio law, adopted a comparable "regional" perspective in sustaining the total exclusion of industry
from the residential town of Valley View: "Traditional concepts of zoning envision a municipality as a self-contained community with its own
residential, business and industrial areas," 1'0 wrote future United
States Supreme CourtJustice Potter Stewart, then ajudge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
It is obvious that Valley View, Ohio, on the periphery of a
large metropolitan center, is not such a self-contained community, but only an adventitious fragment of the economic and
57 N.Y.2d 862, 442 N.E.2d 437, 456 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1982) (town of Ramapo, New York

adopted a local law restricting the incorporation of villages within the town in order to
protect the town's growth control program); Foderaro, Neighbors Try to Secede Over

Housing Plan, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1988, at BI, col. 2 (attempt to incorporate village in
order to zone to prevent implementation of county plan to build housing for homeless
in the area proposed for incorporation).
97. See supra notes 62-70 (collecting cases).
98. 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949).
99. Id. at 515, 64 A.2d at 350.

100. See id., 64 A.2d at 351.
101. Valley View Village, Inc. v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412, 418 (6th Cir. 1955).
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social whole .... The council of such a village should not be

required to shut its eyes to the pattern of community life beyond the borders of the village itself [but has the authority] to
pass an ordinance preserving its residential character, so long
as the business and industrial needs of its inhabitants are sup10 2
plied by other accessible areas in the community at large.
Since Valley View and Cresskill were not self-contained cities, but
only pieces of economically and socially diverse metropolitan areas,
they did not have to make room within their borders for all legitimate
land uses. Zoning, which initially sought the separation of inconsistent
uses within ajurisdiction but not the total exclusion of otherwise lawful
land uses, was transformed to permit a community, separated only by
"invisible municipal boundary lines" 1 0 3 from the rest of the region, to
maintain itself as an exclusively residential place. By enabling suburban residents to reap the benefits of easy access to industrial or commercial opportunities in other jurisdictions without having to provide
any land for locally undesirable land uses, these decisions mirrored
suburban growth patterns and the suburban assumption that such residential communities were a natural, indeed a beneficial, development.
The cases ratified the emergence of all-residential communities, treated
them as typifying local government, and then relied on the all-residential model to sustain local legislation intended to mandate and continue
that all-residential character.
The regional perspective taken by the courts in the Cresskill, and
Valley View cases, and elsewhere 10 4 is paradoxical. If the region is the
proper focus of planning concerns, why are individual localities empowered to zone at all? With each of the many local governments in a
region zoning on the basis of its own interests, what guarantee is there
that land uses and land users displaced from one community will find a
place elsewhere in the region? More fundamentally, if a particular suburb is no more than a mere fragment of a larger community, set off
from its neighbors by "adventitious" boundaries, why should its regulations enjoy the presumption of political legitimacy accorded urban governments without greater supervision by the state or coordination with
05
other localities?'
102. Id.
103. Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 NJ. 238, 247, 104 A.2d 441,

446 (1954).
104. See, e.g., Town of Los Altos Hills v. Adobe Creek Properties, Inc., 32 Cal.
App. 3d 488, 502-03, 108 Cal. Rptr. 271, 282 (1973).
105. Courts have on occasion relied on the regional perspective to limit local autonomy when the actions of one locality impinged on another, thereby limiting the second locality's autonomy. For example, some courts have allowed a neighboring
community, or its residents, to challenge a local zoning action and to have the neighbor's interests taken into account. See, e.g., Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541,
546-49, 492 P.2d 1137, 1139-42, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745, 748-50 (1972); Township of
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During the postwar suburban boom, these questions were not addressed, let alone answered. Courts treated suburbs as autonomous
municipal governments for purposes of providing legitimacy to local
regulatory authority, yet also as "suburbs," that is as mere "adventitious fragments" of a larger, integrated metropolitan economy, in order to sustain local exclusionary policies. The regional perspective
provided municipalities with a shield for local exclusionary actions but
did not subject them to attack for failure to take regional interests into
account. The metropolitan areas surrounding a Cresskill or Valley
View might be seen as the appropriate "community at large" justifying
a local decision to make the suburb a residential preserve, but, until
recently, the argument that a community had to accept land uses it
deemed undesirable in order to satisfy regional needs was generally rejected. 10 6 Even now, as the discussion in Part I evidences, regionalism
10 7
has had only a limited effect in constraining local zoning autonomy.
Nor was suburban land-use policy limited to the advancement of
residential communities in general; instead, many suburbs had a very
specific type of residence in mind. The emerging affluent suburbs of
the postwar period regularly excluded not just commercial and industrial facilities, but apartment houses, other multifamily dwellings, and
publicly subsidized housing. Courts in the period of rapid suburban
growth accepted the suburban model of development and sustained local ordinances that lumped together apartments and other multifamily
dwellings with industrial or commercial uses and excluded them from
the locality as threats to the local residential character. 108 In a large
city this would be a bizarre definition of "residential," yet in the suburbs the assumption that apartment houses were not homes went
Washington v. Village of Ridgewood, 26 N.J. 578, 584-86, 141 A.2d 308, 311-12
(1958); Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. at 245-49, 104 A.2d at 444-47.
But these cases typically have involved actions by the zoning community to permit
an industrial or commercial development or the construction of multifamily housing adjacent to a single-family residential district of the protesting second community. Ordinarily local autonomy and the local preference for a residential community go hand in
hand and the regional perspective operates to reinforce both autonomy and the exclusion of nonresidential uses. However, when local action threatens the residential nature
of an adjacent community, the judicial vision of municipalities as residential communities permits one community to use the regional perspective to limit the autonomy of
another. Of course, even here the effect of the regional perspective is to deny a nonresidential use rather than curb the residential preference.
These cases of interlocal conflict aside, courts generally have not questioned the
municipality's power to zone or its right to base its zoning decisions on the best interests
of the municipality.
106. See, e.g., Fanale v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 26 N.J. 320, 328, 139 A.2d
749, 754 (1958).
107. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 39-58.
108. The New Jersey Supreme Court commented, "Apartment houses are not inherently benign" and their exclusion helped a community "retain its residential character." Fanale, 26 NJ. at 325-26, 139 A.2d at 752.
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unchallenged. 109
The large-lot zoning decisions also suggest the power of the suburban model in transforming the concept of the city from a place of people and buildings clustered tightly together, separated from the country
and characterized by the congestion of its streets and public places and
the intensity of its street life, 10 to a setting of individual homes, surrounded by large amounts of privately owned open space with people

living their lives relatively separate from their neighbors."' Although
12

large-lot zoning was justified, in part, by economic considerations,"
the judicial legitimation of exclusionary practices appears also to indilarge homes were constitutive of the
cate a belief that large lots and
1 3
character of suburban areas.
As in the incorporation cases, decentralized settlement ceased to
raise questions about an area's urban character. To the contrary, the
separation of homes from each other became an appropriate goal of
urban residential development. Courts referred to the "quiet and
109. Constance Perin links the suburban hostility to apartment houses to the general suburban insistence on the separation of work from home. As apartment units are
typically rented and not owned, apartment houses combine aspects of business with residence. This results in the intrusion of the "profanities of work and commerce" into the
"sacred aura of family." C. Perin, supra note 93, at 116-18.
110. See, e.g., K. Jackson, supra note 50, at 14-16.
111. Perin sees the residential "flight to the suburbs" and the suburban preference
for single-family detached houses as similar expressions of strategies of social avoidance.
Both the removal from the densely populated city and the meticulous detail in many
suburban zoning ordinances governing the size of lots and back, front and side yards are
mechanisms for reducing intrusions into residents' personal space. So too, zoning
measures designed to achieve income homogeneity are aimed at avoiding social conflict
and promoting "domestic tranquility." See C. Perin, supra note 93, at 81-98.
112. Courts have recognized that the home is the principal asset of most suburban
residents, and that by keeping down the demand for local public services and keeping up
the cost of new homes, large-lot zoning protects property values. See, e.g., Flora Realty
& Inv. Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 1036, 246 S.W.2d 771, 776 (en banc) ("[A]
reduction of the minimum area restrictions ...would have a materially adverse effect on
the value of all the property in the general vicinity."), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 802
(1952).
Indeed, large lot requirements not only serve residents' individual interests, but,
since suburban communities are composed largely of homeowners, the protection of
property values serves the community as a whole. See, e.g., Lionshead Lake, Inc. v.
Wayne Township, 10 N.J. 165, 174-75, 89 A.2d 693, 697-98 (1952), appeal dismissed,
344 U.S. 919 (1953); Clary v. Borough of Eatontown, 41 N.J. Super. 47, 60, 64, 124 A.2d
54, 61, 63 (App. Div. 1956).
113. Some courts that plainly were troubled by the economically exclusionary potential of large-lot regulations nevertheless were willing to sustain these costly mandates, and the allied requirements concerning large building frontages and large floor
areas, because they found them to be consistent with the proper social development of
the suburbs. See, e.g., Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 563-67, 42 N.E.2d
516, 518-20 (1942); see also C. Perin, supra note 93, at 164-68 (local motivations to
adopt growth controls are cultural as much as fiscal).
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beauty of rural surroundings,", 1 4 the "nice homes"1 5 or "better-type
home areas," 116 and the right of the residents to prefer "more land,
more living room, indoors and out, and more freedom in their scale of
living." 117 Suburbs were defined around yards, open spaces, roomy
homes, low population density and the lack of urban noise, traffic and
congestion. Where once city and country had stood as opposites, with
municipal government associated with the former and not the latter, in
the suburbs the two were combined. Suburban land-use regulation enabled residents to enjoy the privacy and "blessings of quiet seclusion"' 1 8 of country life 19 within commuting range of the employment
opportunities and cultural amenities of the city. Courts sustained the
efforts of developing municipalities to use their zoning powers to preserve the "country" aspects of local life and prevent their transforma20
tion into "cities."
Zoning, of course, is not limited to the suburbs. The protection of
property values, the preservation of social status and the defense of the
psychological and emotional benefits derived from a familiar and dependable environment in the face of a dynamic urban land market are
goals of many city residents, too. But city residents have not been as
successful in using zoning to produce stable residential neighborhoods.
In part, this is a result of timing. By the time zoning became widespread in the 1920s, most of the cities of the Northeast and Midwest
were substantially developed. The poor had already settled in these
cities in large numbers, and much city land was already devoted to
multiunit housing or commercial and industrial uses. Exclusionary
zoning. can prevent the influx of low-income people and the construction of less expensive housing, but it cannot eject people who are already there or destroy housing that already exists. 12 1 Zoning is a more
effective tool for shaping the future than for dealing with the consequences of the past.
Moreover, zoning is a regulatory device exercised on behalf of the
entire polity. In the cities, middle class and affluent residents share
power with the poor, the working class and business groups. It may be
114. Simon, 311 Mass. at 563, 42 N.E.2d at 518.
115. Flora Realty, 362 Mo. at 1036, 246 S.W.2d at 776.
116. Clary, 41 N.J. Super. at 67, 124 A.2d at 65.
117. Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Township, 10 N.J. 165, 174, 89 A.2d 693, 697
(1952).
118. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
119. Lionshead Lake, 10 N.J. at 174, 89 A.2d at 697.

120. The commitment to the pattern of separated settlement goes beyond a concern to keep down population density. Some suburbs have opposed planned unit developments (PUD's) and cluster housing, neither of which would increase density but both
of which depart from the detached single-family dwelling that is characteristic of suburban areas. See R. Babcock, The Zoning Game 75-76 (1966).
121. Of course, urban renewal and slum clearance programs are an effective means
of destroying existing low-income housing and, thereby, excluding low income residents
from the city. See, e.g., J. Mollenkopf, The Contested City 97-212 (1983).
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more difficult for any one group to prevail consistently or to use the
legal powers of the city as a whole to protect a particular neighborhood. 12 2 In the city, a neighborhood cannot by itself zone to maintain
its particular economic and social status quo or control the pace and
122. This is not to deny that white, middle class city neighborhoods can, and often
do, dominate municipal housing and zoning decisions to maintain patterns of housing
segregation within the city. They may do this, for example, by siting all public or subsidized housing in poor or minority areas. See, e.g., Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n, Inc. v.
City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971);
United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 837
F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2821 (1988).
Nevertheless, cities are more likely to be called to account for segregative housing
practices. Cities are more likely to have minority residents with standing to sue the municipality, whereas in exclusionary suburbs the persons aggrieved by the segregative
practices are more likely to be nonresidents, who would probably lack standing. See
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), discussed in Briffault, supra note 1, at 107-09.
Cities, especially poor cities like Yonkers, are more apt to seek federal assistance for
public or subsidized housing and become subject to federal statutory and administrative
obligations governing the siting of such housing. Suburbs, since they tend to depend
less on federal housing assistance, may be sued only under the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment or more general fair housing statutes. It may be easier for
plaintiffs to demonstrate a city's violations of the conditions for housing assistance than
to prove a suburb's violation of the Constitution, since, given the general refusal of
suburbs to accept subsidized housing, it is difficult to distinguish racially-motivated exclusionary ordinances from usual local zoning practices. See Village of Arlington
Heights V. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
Thus, Yonkers, for all its sins, is a city that in 1988 was 1 I% black, had a median
family income of $28,000, and had 6800 units of low-income housing. By contrast, in
the nearby suburb of Hastings-on-Hudson, the population was 3% black, the median
income was $41,000, and there were no units of low-income housing; in the suburb of
Scarsdale, the population was 2%o black, the median income was $93,000 and there were
no units of public housing; and in the suburb of Bronxville the population was 0.1%
black, the median income was $70,000 and there were no units of low-income housing.
See Salins, A Tale of Racism in the Suburbs, N.Y. Times, July 28, 1988, at A27, col. 1.
Yet, under current law only Yonkers could be sued successfully for discriminatory housing practices.
Moreover, changes in the structure of local legislatures will make it more difficult
for cities with any substantial minority population to engage in discriminatory practices
against their own residents. Under the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act, 96
Stat. 131 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973c (Supp. III 1985)), the Department of
Justice and the courts have given close scrutiny to at-large city councils and local apportionment plans that do not result in the election of minority representatives in numbers
reflecting the minority share of the local population. See, e.g., Cruz Gomez v. City of
Watsonville, 863 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1534 (1989); United
States v. Dallas County Comm'n, 850 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 1768 (1989). With greater minority representation on city councils, the ability of
white neighborhoods to dominate municipal housing and zoning decisions should be
lessened, and local legislatures should be more attentive to minority interests in a city.
By contrast, minority interests will continue to be unrepresented in the lo'cal legislatures
of all-white suburbs. Those municipal councils are already responsive to local residents'
interests; from the perspective of housing integration that is precisely the problem. The
only way to reduce segregative actions by suburbs would be to require them to represent
the interests of nonresidents-something well beyond the scope of the Voting Rights
Act and, for the most part, outside the general strictures of local government law.
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direction of future 123
growth. But in the suburbs, a neighborhood, once
incorporated, can.
Zoning, thus, joins political, legislative and fiscal autonomy in providing a legal incentive for suburban incorporation. The emergence of
the autonomous suburb was closely intertwined with doctrinal changes
in incorporation and zoning law that resulted from suburban growth,
much as the development of the suburbs led to changes in the legal
assumptions governing the political, economic and social characteristics of municipalities. Local governments and local government law
were suburbanized together.
3. Reducing Disincentives to Suburban Independence. - The right to incorporate and the expansion of local regulatory authority might not be
sufficient to lead a suburban area to incorporate if the suburb's tax base
is inadequate to fund basic municipal services. 124 Indeed, as previously
noted, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the high
quality of city services and the high cost to suburbs of providing
equivalent services independently led many suburbs to forego incorpo125
ration and accept annexation by the larger cities.
The basic goals of the suburbs-separation from the city and the
provision of high-quality municipal services-are in tension. 126 In the
123. Babcock observes,
The central city is a conglomeration of many neighborhoods, each of which
may have as much social and historic unity as the average suburb. The suburb,
however, enjoys virtually absolute control over the location, size, style, and
characteristics of housing and other land uses, while an equivalent neighborhood in the city has no control whatsoever over its own affairs.
R. Babcock, Billboards, Glass Houses and the Law: And Other Land Use Fables 39
(1977); see also Hays, The Changing Political Structure of the City in Industrial
America, 1 J. Urb. Hist. 6, 27 (1974) (formation of"[s]uburban political units reflected a
desire to separate out one's community from the larger urban world").
124. Even today the working-class suburb "is quite likely to be unincorporated. It
is cheaper that way ..
' " J. Harrigan, supra note 18, at 251 (quoting C. Adrian & C.
Press, Governing Urban America 46 (4th ed. 1972)). In order to preserve their independence from the city, these communities will either take their services from the county or
a special district, see infra text at notes 128-140, or choose to receive a lower level of
services.
125. The major cities were the first localities to create professional police and fire
departments, develop extensive school systems, pave streets, sidewalks and roads, create
parks and invest in the costly public works necessary to provide water, power and sewage and waste removal. See J. Teaford, supra note 87.
Moreover, not only were independent suburban services costlier, but suburban per
capita tax bases were smaller. Suburbs may have lacked the inner city's poor, but they
were also without the cities' manufacturing and commercial establishments. Even as
industry began to move to the suburbs, industrial establishments often concentrated in
particular business-oriented communities and were of little direct help in financing infrastructure and services in residential communities.
126. Cf.J. Harrigan, supra note 18, at 260 (discussing tension between suburban
goals of autonomy, which call for "small-town suburban governments," and the need to
supply the infrastructure for growth, such as highways, sewers, water supply, hospitals
and schools, which is "too expensive for small-town governments to do on their own.").
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nineteenth century relatively few communities could afford to go italone.1 2 7 Even as suburban affluence increased and the ethnic and cultural rifts between cities and suburbs widened, reducing the fiscal disadvantages of independence while increasing the perceived social and
political price of joining the city, the costs of paying for local services
still caused many suburbanites to draw back from incorporation.
New state laws reduced this fiscal disincentive to suburban incorporation in three ways: the creation of new governmental structures
which allowed suburbs to combine with each other and with cities in
order to fund infrastructure without ceding local political autonomy
over other matters, the authorization of intergovernmental contracting
and direct financial assistance from the state.
a. Limited-Purpose Governments. - Since the turn of the century,
state legislatures have invented a "baffling array" of "pseudo governments" to provide infrastructure services to the suburbs without disturbing suburban political autonomy.1 28 These entities-variously
christened boards, districts, authorities and commissions-are authorized to construct, operate or finance physical infrastructure services,
usually water supply services, sewers, parks or transportation, over an
area including many general-purpose governments. These limited-purpose entities can pool the resources of a number of localities in an area,
but solely to'provide one or a handful of specified services.
Where the board's jurisdiction includes both the city and the suburbs and the city has already installed its own water supply or sewers
out of its own funds, the board effectively redistributes city revenues to
the installation and support of suburban services. 129 Where the board
or district includes only developing areas in need of the initial installation of new services, the creation of a single area-wide water or sewer
system and the combination of revenues from numerous localities lead
to substantial economies of scale, reducing the per capita cost of providing new infrastructure systems but undermining the competitive advantage of the central city and permitting suburbs to enjoy municipal
Harrigan notes that "[i]f the system of autonomous small-town suburban governments

was going to be maintained, some mechanisms had to be created to provide those expensive essential services." Id.
127. A harbinger of things to come was the decision in 1874 of the voters of
Brookline, the self-styled "richest town in the world," to reject annexation by Boston"the first really significant defeat" for big city expansion. K. Jackson, supra note 50, at
149. In the preceding decade, Boston had successfully annexed five outlying cities, and,
even after Brookline's rebuff, Boston would again annex areas poorer than Brookline in
need of urban services, but Brookline's action set the future pattern for wealthier suburbs. See id. Brookline's decision had significant effects on the long-term development
of the Boston metropolitan area. See M. Edel, E. Sclar & D. Luria, Shaky Palaces:
Homeownership and Social Mobility in Boston's Suburbanization 233-63 (1984).
128. R. Wood, supra note 24, at 84.
129. See M. Edel, E. Sclar & D. Luria, supra note 127, at 60-61.

COLUMBIA L4W REVIEW

[Vol. 90:346

services without submitting to annexation or consolidation.' 30
The structure and design of these special-purpose units minimize
the intrusion on suburban autonomy. First, they are limited-purpose
governments. The metropolitan unit overlaps cities and suburbs but
has no general governmental authority over the territory or residents
within its jurisdiction. Cities and suburbs are not merged, and the city
gains no lawmaking authority over the suburbs. Rather, different municipalities are linked only for a particular purpose, such as supplying
water or removing wastes.
Second, these units provide services that facilitate separate suburban political existence without disrupting suburban class or ethnic homogeneity. In Oliver Williams's terminology, the metropolitan special
districts perform "system-maintenance functions" without impinging
on suburban "lifestyles." 3 1 The physical infrastructure that metropolitan districts provide usually lacks broader implications for the economic or social demography of suburban communities. Special
districts supply engineering solutions to technical problems; they do
13 2
not directly engage in area-wide social or economic policymaking.
Metropolitan districts do not zone or provide police, housing or
schools on an area-wide city-suburb basis. 133 Suburbs that have accepted regional provision of certain transportation facilities, like airports, have been able to reject other area-wide services, like
metropolitan mass transit systems, because of the concern that the latter would increase the ability of central city residents to travel to the
3 4

suburbs.1

Third, special districts' financial and governance arrangements
minimize their regional redistributive and political potential. The operation of these agencies is usually funded through service fees or user
charges, with local service recipients paying a specified amount for each
130. See, e.g., J. Teaford, supra note 53, at 78-81; see generally Schwartz, Evolu-

tion of the Suburbs, in Suburbia: The American Dream and Dilemma 1, 18-21 (P. Dolce
ed. 1976) (discussing New York and Philadelphia suburbs' successful opposition to city

expansion).
131. Williams, Life Style Values and Political Decentralization in Metropolitan Areas, 48 Sw. Soc. Sci. Q. 299, 304-07 (1967).
132. See R. Wood, supra note 24, at 248.
133. See R. Babcock, supra note 120, at 38; Friedland, Piven & Alford, Political
Conflict, Urban Structure, and the Fiscal Crisis, in Marxism and the Metropolis, supra
note 88, at 273, 285.

134. See C. Abbott, supra note 77, at 193, 197 (describing refusal of three suburban Georgia counties to join Atlanta's regional mass transit system and limitation of the
functions of Portland's metropolitan service district to solid-waste planning and the
zoo); Lineberry, Reforming Metropolitan Governance: Requiem or Reality, 58 Geo. L.J.
675, 684 (1970) (voters in metropolitan Seattle refused to add mass transit to the func-

tions of metropolitan Seattle public authority previously handling regional sewage disposal); Schmidt, Racial Roadblock Seen in Atlanta Transit System, N.Y. Times, July 22,

1987, at A16, col. 3 (continued refusal of Atlanta suburbs to join transit system, allegedly due to fear that extension of transit lines will bring more blacks to suburbs).

1990]

OUR LOCALISM

unit of service they receive. Local tax bases are generally not exposed
to the public service needs of the region or of people residing outside
local political boundaries.
The metropolitan boards generally lack regional popular political
constituencies. Often their members are unelected, and are, instead,
appointees or officials of the affected municipalities serving ex officio. 13 5 The board members do not serve as representatives of a re-

gional electorate, but either represent their home locality to the
regional unit-where they vote on a "one government, one vote" and
not a "one person, one vote" basis-or they are not locally representative at all. There are few political ties linking metropolitan districts directly to the residents of the metropolitan area, so that these districts
disturb the existing political alignment of cities and
do not significantly
13 6
suburbs.
As metropolitan areas have grown, special districts have proliferated. There are now more than 28,000, and the special district is the
most common form of local government.1 3 7 In most areas there are
more special districts than municipalities.' 38 At one time, political
scientists saw these metropolitan boards and districts as a bridge from
local independence to regional government. They predicted that as local governments developed institutions for interlocal cooperation and
saw the need for regional solutions to area-wide problems, metropolitan consolidation would follow.' 3 9 Instead, the opposite has occurred.

135. See, e.g., Friedland, Piven and Alford, supra note 133, at 283 ("transportation
and industrial development policies are often delegated to agencies . .. whose officials
); Shestack, The Public Authority, 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 553, 554-55
are not elected ....
(1957); cf. Comment, An Analysis of Authorities: Traditional and Multicounty, 71 Mich.
L. Rev. 1376, 1380-81 (1973) ("On the whole, there are more elected than appointed
officials directing special governments, but the more important authorities are usually
governed by appointed directors."). Moreover, even where special district boards are
elected, those elections are, with the exception of school board elections, not subject to
the one-person, one-vote rule, so that the electorate is often limited to landowners who
are entitled to vote on a "one-acre, one-vote" basis. See, e.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S.
355, 370-71 (1981); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S.
719, 733-34 (1973).
136. See, e.g., M. Edel, E. Sclar & D. Luria, supra note 127, at 60-80; R. Wood,
supra note 24, at 83.
137. In 1982, there were 28,588 special districts, not including school districts; by
contrast, there were 19,076 municipalities and 3041 counties. See J. Aronson & J.
Hilley, supra note 30, at 76. The number of special districts has also grown more rapidly than that of municipalities. Between 1957 and 1982, the number of municipalities
rose by 1893; in the same period, the number of special districts increased by 14,183.
Id.
138. In 1972, the average metropolitan area included 20 municipalities and more
than 30 special districts. See W. Colman, supra note 37, at 125. In the 31-county New
York metropolitan area there were 780 municipalities and 716 special districts. See M.
Danielson &J. Doig, supra note 47, at 4.
139. See, e.g., Ylvisaker, Some Criteria for a "Proper" Areal Division of Governmental Powers, in Area and Power: A Theory of Local Government 27, 42-43 (A. Maass
ed. 1959); cf. W. Sayre & H. Kaufman, Governing New York City: Politics in the Me-
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State-authorized limited-purpose governments have provided suburbs
with an alternative to annexation, consolidation to the central city or
acceptance of full-fledged metropolitan governments. 140 A suburb can
maintain political independence, including control of its tax base,
schools and lands, while still sharing in the economies of scale provided
by infrastructure services organized and funded on a regional basis.
b. Interlocal Contracts. - Interlocal contracting provides a second
method of solving suburban service delivery problems without forfeiting political independence. In forty-two states, municipalities are authorized to purchase services from other localities. 14 1 Typically, this
means that a small suburb can purchase municipal services from a
larger suburb, the central city or the county. This permits smaller suburbs to benefit from economies of scale and to pay only for the marginal cost of extending services to a newly developed area rather than the
larger, fixed costs of creating entirely new service systems.
As with special districts, interlocal contracts operate on a serviceby-service basis. Interlocal contracts are not redistributive; the suburb
pays for the cost of receiving the particular service but does not contribute more broadly to the cost of city or county government. A suburb's decision to contract for any one service has no broader
implications for interlocal agreements for any other services. Although
interlocal contracts often cover a wide spectrum of services, and may
include law enforcement, street maintenance and administrative services as well as sewers, water supply and parks and recreation, 4 2 there
14 3
are few agreements to provide services with social implications.
Interlocal contracts are even less of a threat to local autonomy than
metropolitan special districts. States may create special districts without the express consent of the affected localities, but interlocal contracts are entirely a matter of local option. No locality need enter into a
contract with any other. Moreover, while special districts have no fixed
term and their bond obligations may guarantee them long lives, interlocal contracts do expire and the decision to renew is, again, a matter of
local option. Still less do interlocal contracts entail creation of a regional government. The purchasing suburb contracts with an existing
tropolis 596 (1965) (New York City-area Metropolitan Regional Council's "influence
appears likely to increase gradually but steadily in years ahead.").
140. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 130, at 18-21.
141. See Florestano & V. Marando, supra note 43, at 81; see, e.g. Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 7339b (West 1989); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 127, 743.1 (Smith-Hurd 1981 & Supp.
1989); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40:8A-3 (West 1967 & Supp. 1989);
142. See, e.g., R. Bish, The Public Economy of Metropolitan Areas 86-87 (1971).
143. See, e.g.,J. Bollens & H. Schmandt, supra note 85, at 291-98, 327. The reluctance of local governments to cooperate over issues with lifestyle implications, for example subsidized housing, is illustrated by the refusal of the suburbs of Cleveland to enter
into agreements with the regional housing authority to accept subsidized units within
their borders. See Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., 500 F.2d 1087, 1089 (6th
Cir. 1974).
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locality; there is not even the minimal danger of a regional entity exercising control over the suburban jurisdiction.
Interlocal contracts, of course, must benefit the central city or
county providing the suburb with public services as well as the suburb
receiving the service. For some urban governments, interlocal contracts
provide a means of employing excess capacity. The extension of city
utility services to the suburbs may be an inexpensive means of earning
additional revenues. For a city unable to expand by annexation, interlocal contracting is a kind of consolation prize; it permits the city to
obtain some financial support from outlying areas, although the revenues received are usually tied to the cost of the services provided and
the contractual relationship is likely to result in less redistribution from
affluent or middle class suburbs to the central city poor than annexation would have.1 4 4 Moreover, although interlocal contracting takes
some of the sting out of the city's inability to annex, it also makes it far
more likely that an outlying area will reject annexation.
The most famous elaboration of interlocal contracting as an alternative to annexation is illustrative. In the 1950s Lakewood was a
rapidly growing area in Southern California, adjacent to the city of
Long Beach. To avoid annexation by Long Beach, an attorney for a
local developer, together with county officials, devised a plan whereby
the community could incorporate as a city but contract with the county
to receive all the county services it had received as an unincorporated
1 45
area plus additional services necessitated by population growth.
Lakewood became the first municipality to exist on the basis of
46
purchasing all of its basic services from another unit of government. 1
The plan assured Lakewood the necessary municipal services while protecting it from being annexed and allowing it to govern itself and exercise its own taxing and police powers, including zoning.
The Lakewood Plan provoked an explosion of incorporation activity in Southern California, with twenty-five additional suburban communities incorporating into separate municipalities between 1954 and
1961.147 The Lakewood Plan continues to provide a model for suburbs
seeking a fiscally feasible method of sustaining political independence.
Together with the formation of metropolitan service districts,
Lakewood-style contracting provides suburbs with an alternative to
joining the central city or agreeing to general governments that span
144. Cities that supply public utility services, such as water and power, to other

localities are sometimes subject to the same restrictions as privately owned public utilities. Hence they may not be able to discriminate in pricing these services in favor of city
residents unless such discrimination is justified by differences in the cost of providing
the service. See, e.g., City of Texarkana v. Wiggins, 151 Tex. 100, 104-05, 246 S.W.2d
622, 624-25 (1952).

145. See Hoch, supra note 88, at 103.
146. SeeJ. Harrigan, supra note 18, at 261-63.

147. See R. Bish & V. Ostrom, Understanding Urban Government 60 (1973).
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metropolitan areas. 148
c. IntergovernmentalAid. - The states also facilitated suburban autonomy by providing funds directly for the construction of suburban
physical infrastructure. State programs contributed to the building
and maintenance of the highways connecting the suburbs to the cities,
the financing of suburban water and sewer systems and the funding of
suburban schools.
Highway construction was a major economic activity of state governments in the 1920s. 14 9 Highways permitted large numbers of middle-class city residents to emigrate to the suburbs while continuing to
work in the city, and the extensive state role in highway construction
and maintenance in the decades before the federal interstate system
relieved the suburbs, which depended on these new roads, from what
could have been a severe financial burden. 15 0
Similarly, the states were actively involved in securing the provision of water supply and sanitary services to the suburbs-functions
15
which the central cities had financed for themselves in prior decades. 1
In part, the pattern of state assistance to suburbs with respect to water
and sewers was a result of timing. In the nineteenth century, the major
cities were far more activist than the states in supplying public goods
and services to their residents. 15 2 The cities were the first governments
to develop effective water and sewer systems. 158 The city systems established new standards of public health and amenity, which, by the
twentieth century, came to be considered a governmental obligation.
With the rapidly growing areas on the urban fringe often unable to construct or fund their own systems, the more active state governments
began to assume some degree of responsibility, either through the formation of special districts, direct state provision or financial aid to suburban localities.' 5 4 The physical facilities that the major cities had
funded for themselves were, to a considerable degree, provided for the
suburbs through programs of state assistance.
148. For a generally favorable description of the Lakewood Plan, see id. at 59-61.
149. See K.Jackson, supra note 50, at 166-68 (between 1919 and 1929, every state
adopted a motor fuel tax and earmarked the revenue to fund highway construction);
Ashton, Urbanization and the Dynamics of Suburban Development Under Capitalism, in
Marxism in the Metropolis, supra note 88, at 54, 63-64; see alsoJ. Aronson &J. Hilley,

supra note 30, at 240 (table A-6) (in 1927 highways were second only to education as
recipients of state and local expenditure); id. at 246 (table A-12) (in 1927 one-third of

state assistance to local government was for highway construction).
150. See, e.g., Ashton, supra note 149, at 63-66.

151. SeeJ. Teaford, supra note 87, at 219-27.
152.'See Briffault, supra note 1, at 15.
153. See id.
154. See, e.g., M. Danielson, supra note 24, at 283. Federal water, sewer and highway grants also enabled suburbs to grow while remaining independent, without straining local resources. See, e.g, W. Colman, supra note 37, at 73-74; K. Jackson, supra
note 50, at 293; R. Wood, supra note 96, at 170.
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State school-aid programs were also developed, initially, to enable
the suburbs and rural areas to meet the educational standards set by
the cities.15 5 Because of the lack of industrial and commercial property
in most suburbs and the large concentrations of families with children,
the capital costs of creating new public school systems placed a major
strain on the budgets of the emerging suburbs. Although older,
wealthier suburbs were able to carry this burden and offer educational
programs comparable to the cities' without state assistance, the newer,
less affluent middle-class suburbs of the twentieth century might have
been unable to fund school systems internally. 15 6 State aid formulas
generally favored the suburbs, for example, by funding a higher proportion of school construction or pupil transportation costs, which
were far more important in the developing, sprawling suburbs than in
the older, more concentrated cities. 15 7 State aid was critical in enabling
the newer suburbs to build their schools and start up their school systems. Indeed, from the inception of state school assistance programs
until the 1960s, in most metropolitan areas suburbs generally received
1 58
more aid per pupil than did the central cities.
Together, state intergovernmental aid, state authorization of interlocal contracts and state creation of special service districts made
suburban independence fiscally feasible and rendered merger with the
central city unnecessary. These developments in local government law
allowed suburbs to be politically separate from the city and still enjoy
high-quality municipal services without bearing unduly burdensome
costs.
As a result, even as metropolitan areas have expanded and the localities of a region have become economically intertwined, local governments have grown apart politically. Outside the central cities, the
imaginary lines separating neighborhoods of different classes or ethnic
groups are also political boundaries, setting off self-governing municipalities. The rise of autonomous suburbs has had profound implications for the political structure of most metropolitan areas. Moreover,
by providing a new model for thinking about local government, the
155. See, e.g., S. Sacks, City Schools/Suburban Schools: A History of Fiscal Conflict 57-58 (1972).
156. See Williams, supra note 131, at 309.
157. In addition, state equalization assistance looked to local expenditures per capita, not per pupil, as the measure of local fiscal capacity. In cities the school-age population is generally a smaller proportion of the total population than in suburbs. Thus, city
education spending may appear higher than suburban spending if both are measured
per capita but lower if both are measured per pupil. State aid that focuses on equalizing
spending per capita will help suburbs and rural areas; only if the aid program focuses on
spending per pupil will cities benefit more than suburbs. See, e.g., Bossert, Education in
Urban Society, in Handbook of Contemporary Urban Life 299 (D. Street & Associates,

eds. 1978).
158. See S. Sacks, supra note 155, at 92.
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suburb has contributed to the ideological commitment to local autonomy that is a hallmark of our localism.
C. Changing Paradigms: The Suburb and the Legal Concept of the City
Much as local government law has contributed to suburban independence, the localist structure of state-local relations may be seen as
reflecting the emergence of the suburb as a distinct, if not dominant,
form of contemporary urban community. Contemporary courts and
legislators frequently appear to model their notions of local governments on the small size, homogeneous populations and residential nature of suburbs. Questions of local power are often resolved by an
implicit reliance on the idealized residential suburb as the paradigm
locality. In a sense, "the city as a legal concept," has become a suburb,
and this has contributed to the broad judicial deference to local autonomy elaborated in Part 1.159
The essence of the suburban model is the association of local government with the values of home and family. The suburb, the most
common form of local government today, is conceived of as a small,
primarily middle-class residential community, a place for domestic consumption rather than industrial production and a haven from the heartless political and economic world beyond local borders. The central
function of local government is to protect the home and family-enabling residents to raise their children in "decent" surroundings, servicing home and family needs and insulating home and family from
undesirable changes in the surrounding area.
This association of the municipal corporation with home and family provides a stronger foundation for legal localism than did the older
notion of the locality as a complex urban ministate. At the same time, it
obscures the perception of local government as a state institution and
thus erodes the longstanding legal rule that local government actions
are attributable to the state. In cases of head-to-head conflict with the
state or of clear local violations of constitutional norms, the legal status
of localities as state subdivisions will operate to limit local power. But
when local governments conflict with individuals, particularly outsiders, or even when local governments prove fiscally unable to fulfill their
responsibilities, then, so long as constitutional norms limiting government power are not clearly at issue, the locality may be seen as an agent
not of the state but of local families, acting to defend the private sphere
surrounding home and family.
The frequent linkage of local government to home and family leads
to a deferential or protective attitude toward local power and a reluctance to mandate state intervention in local arrangements. As extensions of home and family, local governments appear to be less of a
threat to personal -liberty and less subject to central state control.
159. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 24-58, 85-111.
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Rather, local governments merit legal protection because of their close
160
association with the home and family interests of their residents.
This is clear from the United States Supreme Court's opinion in
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,16 1 not simply in the holding sustaining
local zoning authority to exclude nontraditional households, 16 2 but in
the Court's broader evocation of local government as a kind of moat
protecting home and family from the crime, congestion and alien influences of the outside world.' 63 The local government in Belle Terre was
an extension of the home, not an arm of the state, a defender of the
family rather than an oppressor of individual liberty. 164 The locality's
exclusion of people who practiced an alternative lifestyle was unobjectionable because it was seen as an action similar to that of a family
choosing not to welcome an unwanted guest into its home. Nor was
Belle Terre's authority undermined by its position as a component of
an economically and socially heterogeneous and interdependent metropolitan region. Rather, the village was, in Justice Douglas's words, "a
sanctuary for people,"' 16 5 a sort of national park for homes and families
threatened by state power and urban ills.
The idea of local government as a "sanctuary for people" helps
explain judicial and legislative support for local autonomy in zoning
and school finance. Of all government activities, land use regulation
and education have perhaps the greatest implications for home and
family; these are the areas in which the local government as suburb may
be presumed to be most effective in vindicating home and family
values. '

66

In the exclusionary zoning setting, as noted in the previous section, the new suburban paradigm was critical in redefining the concept
of a residential area and of the role of local government in protecting
67
"the well-being of our most important institution, the home."'
160. Elazar points out, "Suburbia has become the equal of small-town America as
the symbol of the country's grassroots." D. Elazar, supra note 20, at 12.
161. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
162. See id. at 7-10.
163. See id. at 9.
164. In her discussion of Belle Terre, Professor Radin links the defense of the home
to the concept of "personhood." She writes that "[o]ur reverence for the sanctity of the
home is rooted in the understanding that the home is inextricably part of the individual,
the family, and the fabric of society." Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev.
957, 1013 (1982).
165. Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 9.
166. Suburban development has been closely associated with protection of homes
and families. "The appeal of the suburbs had a great deal to do with anxiety about
child-rearing, about giving one's children the space they needed yet controlling the people they met and what they did outside the home." G. Wright, Building the Dream: A
Social History of Housing in America 210 (1981). Buder refers to this as "family territoriality." See Buder, The Future of the American Suburbs, in Suburbia: The American
Dream and Dilemma, supra note 130, at 193, 200.
167. Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 NJ. 165, 173, 89 A.2d 693,
697 (1952); see supra text accompanying notes 89-120.
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Courts justified local laws restricting land use to large, private, owneroccupied, single-family houses situated on large lots as home-protection policies, with the courts implicitly accepting the suburban definition of "home." Even courts troubled by exclusionary zoning did
not doubt the legitimacy of local efforts to support the socioeconomic
168
interests of suburban homeowners.
The courts' underlying assumption that protecting the home requires policies that mandate an affluent homogeneity in the surrounding community drew on the suburban model of local government,
which differs profoundly from the traditional concept of a city as a place
of diverse incomes, lifestyles and land uses. American cities are not
exclusive communities but rather heterogeneous microcosms of the
larger society that surrounds them. Judicial legitimation of local zoning
that seeks residential homogeneity as a home-protection policy suggests the influence of suburban settlement patterns. 169 Even today,
Mount Laurel' 70 and a handful of cases like it notwithstanding, the association of home protection with local control and homogeneous residential communities remains powerful.
Similarly, the school finance cases 17 1 reflect the influence of the
suburban model and the transformation of local government from
subordinate arm of the state to protector of family interests. For many
courts the central issue in these cases was not interlocal inequality but
local control. The courts that defended local control, accepted wealthbased spending differences and rejected demands that the states
assume a greater fiscal responsibility did so not because of any assumption that local governments possessed technical superiority in funding
or operating schools but because they equated local control with parental involvement in the education of children. Not only would local control permit a larger parental role than under a system providing for
greater state responsibility, but local control was also treated, at least
metaphorically, as identical to ptrental control. 172
168. See Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582,
608-09, 557 P.2d 473, 488-89, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 56-57 (1976); see also Robert E.
Kurzius, Inc. v. Village of Upper Brookville, 51 N.Y.2d 338, 344, 414 N.E.2d 680, 683,

434 N.Y.S.2d 180, 183 (1980) (large lot zoning is an appropriate means to assure open
space and protect locality "from the ill-effects of urbanization"), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1042 (1981).
169. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 39-41; supra text accompanying notes 160-168.

170. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975); see Briffault, supra note 1, at 48-55.

171. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 24-39 (discussing cases).
172. See Lujan v. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1023 (Colo. 1982); Thompson
v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 803, 537 P.2d 635, 645 (1975); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist,
57 N.Y.2d 27,46,439 N.E.2d 359, 367,453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 652 (1982), appeal dismissed,
459 U.S. 1139 (1983); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 377-78, 390 N.E.2d

813, 820 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980). Treating local school districts as
surrogates for local parents, some courts were quick to reject arguments for equalizing
school spending and imposing limits on spending by more affluent districts based on
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The association of local control over school financing with family
or parental control of education may be more likely to occur when suburbs, not cities, are the focus of attention. The association may, in fact,
be more accurate when applied to the suburbs. Residents of suburban
communities focus on family and school issues; schools and taxes,
along with land use, are the chief subjects of suburban political discourse173

Suburban school districts tend to be smaller and have

smaller bureaucracies than urban ones, so the structure of suburban
school governance makes it easier for suburban parents and families to
get involved in educational decision-making than it is for their counterparts in the cities.' 74 Suburban districts also commonly have more
money to spend on local needs. Local tax revenues are devoted primarily to schools, and the smaller percentage of suburban children who
are poor, who do not speak English, come from broken homes or need
special educational assistance in the suburbs minimizes the local need
for outside financial support. For cities, local fiscal autonomy-in education as in other areas-is often an illusion, and parents' interests
would be better served by greater state fiscal responsibility for local
schools.
Local control of education is more likely to be seen as a means of
protecting the family interest in public schools if suburbs, rather than
cities, are the norm in thinking about local governments. The tendency to conceptualize local government after the model of suburbs as
centers of families and homes facilitates the equation of local control
with family control, encourages deference to state decisions devolving
educational, administrative and financial responsibilities to the local
level and makes it more difficult for concerns about interlocal inequality
and the external effects of local actions to overcome the decentralization endemic to the system.
This "suburbanization" of local government law suggests that exclusionary zoning and school finance, rather than being weak links in
the localist system of state-local relations, 75 may have been the most
problematic subjects for seeking to challenge the dominant pattern of
state decentralization of regulatory authority and financial responsibilfederal or state equal protection grounds. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1973) ("In part, local control means ... the freedom to
devote more money to the education of one's children"); see also Briffault, supra note 1,
at 29-30.
173. See R. Wood, supra note 24, at 186-94. A higher percentage of suburban

than city residents are families with school age children and a greater percentage of tax
dollars is devoted to local schools in the suburbs than in big cities. See W. Colman,
supra note 37, at 51-53. "In the suburbs, schools comprise a central institution around
which community ties form, often because the school is the first and most important

institution in the new community." Bossert, supra note 157, at 302.
174. See, e.g., R. Bish, supra note 142, at 104-18. But see Bossert, supra note 157,

at 302 (despite centrality of schools to suburban community life and structures facilitating parental participation in school governance, rates of participation are low).
175. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 18-19.
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ity for basic public services. By focusing on the largest and most expensive public service and the most important local regulatory authority,
law reformers may have thought they were spotlighting the inequalities
and inefficiencies built into the localist system of state-local relations.
Yet schools are the public service most bound up with the idea of family, and zoning is the regulatory function most likely to signal "home"
to courts attentive to suburban values. As the subjects most likely to
trigger localist concerns in courts and legislators, schools and homes
may be questionable candidates for attempts to reduce local autonomy
or increase the state role in decisions affecting the metropolitan
area. 176
Beyond the issue of local powers and responsibilities, the identification of local government with the small, homogeneous residential
community and the values of home and family may have contributed to
the courts' tendency to downplay the "createdness" of local governments. Although traditional doctrine provides that local governments
exist only because of an act of creation by the state-with the implication that they hold their powers on behalf of the state-many of the
cases reviewed in Part 1177 take local governments and their powers as
givens rather than as products of conscious choices by states to structure governmental power in a particular way.
Thus, several state courts, in resisting the claim that the education
articles of their state constitutions imposed a fiscal or administrative
obligation, looked to state history and found that local school districts
and local fiscal responsibility predated the constitutional obligation to
provide public schools and may even have predated statehood itself. 17 8
The rejection of the redrawing of school district boundary lines or the
restructuring of districts to promote greater interdistrict wealth equality or racial integration suggests a view of local school districts as somehow organically connected to local parents and not as state-created
boundaries dividing the larger metropolitan community.' 79
176. See, e.g., Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem
of Local Legitimacy, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 837, 911 (1983).
177. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 24-58 (reviewing cases).
178. See Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1021 (Colo. 1982);
Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 803, 537 P.2d 635, 645 (1975); Hornbeck v.
Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 654, 458 A.2d 758, 788 (1983); Board of
Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 377, 390 N.E.2d 813, 820 (1979); Olsen v. State,
276 Or. 9, 24-25, 554 P.2d 139, 147 (1976); Danson v. Casey, 484 Pa. 415, 427, 399
A.2d 360, 367 (1979); Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 570-72, 247 N.W.2d 141, 150-52
(1976).
179. The question of the nature of suburban school districts-whether they are local or arms of the state-was at the center of the division of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc in the Kansas City school desegregation
caseJenkins ex rel. Agyei v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986) (plurality opinion),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816 (1987). The dissenters would have approved a metropolitan
area-wide interdistrict remedy because (1) the state of Missouri had been found liable
for having previously required and supported segregated schools in Kansas City and (2)
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Local school autonomy, in a sense, became pregovernmental. The
New York Court of Appeals, in denying that the state had any responsibility to remedy interlocal taxing and public service inequalities, explained: "[T]he cited inequalities existing in cities are the product of
demographic, economic, and political factors intrinsic to the cities
themselves, and cannot be attributed to legislative action or inaction"' i 8 0 -as if the state were not responsible for the rules limiting city
expansion and facilitating the formation of independent, exclusionary
suburbs. Similarly, in New Jersey, the Robinson v. Cahill18 Court excused the state from having to equalize spending across district lines so
long as interdistrict spending disparities were not mandated by the
state but rather resulted from seemingly natural interdistrict variations
in wealth.' 8 2 The United States Supreme Court's hostility to interdistrict remedies for educational and housing disparities, as illustrated by
Milliken v. Bradley '8 3 and Hills v. Gautreaux,i8 4 suggests the Court's acceptance of suburban governments as independent entities, defenders
of local families and homes, rather than as creatures of the state, acting
on behalf of the state in their local territories.1 8 5
the suburban school districts were arms of the state, and therefore could be included in
the Kansas City remedy. As ChiefJudge Lay wrote in dissent,
While it is true that the [suburban school districts ("SSDs")] may have some
authority to act independently, that authority is delegated to them by the state
and the state retains ultimate authority over the SSDs' actions. The SSDs exist
pursuant to provisions of the Missouri constitution, are maintained at the pleasure of the Missouri legislature, and are subject to the authority of state statutes
and the rules and regulations of the Missouri State Board of Education.
Id. at 699 n.6 (Lay, CJ., dissenting).
The plurality, however, relied on the finding of the district court that "the SSDs
were autonomous and independent" and that "the establishment and maintenance of
school district boundaries was a local matter in Missouri, determined through local initiative," id. at 668, 678, to reject the argument that the state's liability could provide a
basis for forcing the suburban districts to participate in a metropolitan area plan to desegregate the schools in Kansas City.
180. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 41, 439 N.E.2d 359, 365, 453
N.Y.S.2d 643, 649 (1982); see Briffault, supra note 1, at 28.
181. 62 NJ. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973); see Briffault, supra note 1, at 31-35.
182. See Robinson, 62 NJ. at 499-500, 303 A.2d at 286.
183. 418 U.S. 717 (1974), discussed in Briffault, supra note 1, at 94-96.
184. 425 U.S. 284, 303-06 (1976) (upholding lower court remedial order requiring
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") to site public housing
projects in Chicago suburbs in part because HUD could not build housing without approval by locality where proposed site was located); see Briffault, supra note 1, at
106-07.
185. The move from local school districts as creatures of the state to local districts
as possessors of a kind of organic independence was made with little discussion in
Milliken. Early in the opinion, the Court, in summarizing the district court's findings
concerning the state of Michigan's liability for segregation in the Detroit school system,
noted: "School districts in the State of Michigan are instrumentalities of the State and
subordinate to its State Board of Education and legislature." 418 U.S. at 726 n.5. The
Court cites as authorities the provision of the state constitution directing the legislature
to "'maintain and support a system of free public elementary and secondary schools,'"
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Of course, not all courts have adopted the suburban model of local
government. The state courts that invalidated local property-tax-based
school finance systems did so, in part, by harkening back to the traditional notion of local governments as arms of the state. Treating education as the responsibility of the state and emphasizing that local
school districts were created to carry out the state's educational duty,
these courts held the state accountable for interlocal spending differences and mandated state action to improve the quality of education in
the poorest districts. 18 6 Similarly, the handful of courts that challenged
exclusionary zoning returned to the concept of local power as delegated state power, and held that exclusionary measures could be invalidated since there was no state interest in local exclusion.' 8 7 The Mount
Laurel doctrine, mandating that developing suburbs plan and provide
for their "fair share" of regional low- and moderate-income housing
needs, 18 8 invoked the older notion of the locality as a microcosm of the
id. (quoting Mich. Const. art. 8, § 2), and two Michigan Supreme Court decisions from
the first decade of the twentieth century that took the black-letter law position that
" '[t]he school district is a State agency .... of legislative creation'" and "'no part of
the local self-government.'" Id. (quoting Attorney Gen. ex. rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 131
Mich. 639, 644, 92 N.W. 289, 290 (1902); Attorney Gen. ex. rel. Zacharias v. Detroit Bd.
of Educ., 154 Mich. 584, 590, 118 N.W. 606, 609 (1908)).
A few pages later, in finding that the separate existence of the suburban school
districts immunized them from involvement in any remedial plan for the desegregation
of the Detroit schools, the Court took a very different position on the autonomy of
school districts. The Court stated that the district court's
analytical starting point was its conclusion that school district lines are no more
than arbitrary lines on a map drawn "for political convenience." Boundary
lines may be bridged where there has been a constitutional violation calling for
interdistrict relief, but the notion that school district lines may be casually ignored or treated as mere administrative convenience is contrary to the history
of public education in our country. . . . [L]ocal autonomy has long been
thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support
for public schools and to quality of the educational process.
Id. at 741-42. At this point, the Court cited various Michigan statutes providing for the
popular election of school boards, giving control of the "day-to-day affairs of the school
district" to the local board and spelling out local school board authority. Id. at 742 n.20
(citing Michigan Schools Code of 1956 (current version at Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§§ 380.1-380.1853 (1988 & Supp. 1989))). Local autonomy in practice proved to be
more constitutionally significant than the formal status of school districts as state
instrumentalities.
186. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 603, 487 P.2d 1241, 1254, 96 Cal.
Rptr 601, 614 (1971), ("[g]overnmental action drew the school district boundary
lines .... "); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 NJ. 473, 501-521, 303 A.2d 273, 287-98 (1973).
187. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of
Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 601, 607, 557 P.2d 473, 483, 487, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 51, 55
(1976); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 NJ. 158,
209, 456 A.2d 390, 415 (1983); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 174-77, 336 A.2d 713, 725-26, appeal dismissed and cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); cf. Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 476 Pa. 182, 189, 382
A.2d 105, 108 (1977) (state's interest in having each municipality bear its "fair share" of
growth requires heightened scrutiny of antigrowth zoning ordinances).
188. Mount Laurel, 67 NJ. at 178-88, 336 A.2d at 727-34.
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larger society. Mount Laurel sought to require suburbs-as political
arms of the state-to wield their state-delegated zoning power to allow
people of different backgrounds to live among them and become socially and economically integrated communities.
Belle Terre 18 9 and Mount Laurel exemplify the different approaches
to local government and to the relationship between locality and state.
Both have a place in thinking about local government law. Local governments are state-created and state-empowered, yet particularly responsive to local residents' social concerns. Local governments can be
heterogeneous microcosms of the larger society or class-segregated
residential enclaves. But as the review of the law in the areas of school
finance, land use and local government formation indicates, 190 the approach taken in Belle Terre appears to be dominant. 19 1 And the power
of the Belle Terre approach is consonant with the role of the suburb as a
paradigm for thinking about local governments.
The argument that the legal conceptualization of the city as a suburb may have contributed to the tendency of courts to affirm the localist
structure of the law is an ironic counterpoint to Gerald Frug's contention that local governments lack power, and that local powerlessness is
attributable to changes in "the legal concept" of the city-but to
changes very different from the ones identified here.
The gist of Frug's argument is that in the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, cities enjoyed considerable legal power, in part
because the word "corporation" in the term "municipal corporation"
had legal significance. In that era, the city was akin to a closely held
corporation, combining economic and political authority. 9 2 The state
was not hierarchically superior to the city, nor was the city merely a
political subdivision of the state. Rather, the city was conceived of as an
independent association of its constituents, more like a church, a uni189. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); see Briffault, supra note 1,

at 101-04; supra notes 161-165 and accompanying text.
190. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 24-111.
191. Even in New Jersey, Mount Laurel's vision of the local government as a regional microcosm was expressly modified by the legislature, which authorized suburbs
to contract out of their Mount Laurel obligation to absorb their fair share of regional

housing needs by making payments to other, presumably less exclusive communities.
See Briffault, supra note 1, at 54-55. A New Jersey deputy public advocate has been
quoted as stating that the regional agreements do not permit a challenge to exclusionary
local practices but instead " 'have the effect of reinforcing racial stratification.'" Han-

ley, Open Housing is Mired in Lawsuits Again, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1990, at BI, B4, col.
3.
The state supreme court decisions invalidating school finance systems, see Briffault,
supra note 1, at 36-38, indicate that the relationship between the two models continues
to evolve, and that, with respect to education, the legal model requiring the states to

take greater responsibility for the operation of the state-local system may come to play a
larger role.
192. See Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1095-99. Frug writes that
colonial towns did not have charters and may not have been corporations in the techni-

cal sense, but that they were "conceived of as corporations." Id. at 1098.
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versity or a guild-or a modem business corporation. 193
Frug argues that in the nineteenth century courts came to deny the
autonomy of cities and to downgrade the significance of a municipality's corporate status.' 94 The city ceased to be an association of its
members and became instead a mere subdivision of the state, subject to
extensive state regulation and control. City powers were limited to
those expressly provided by state legislation, and were circumscribed
by Dillon's Rule. 19 5 City autonomy fell victim to the view of municipalities as inferior creatures of the states, and states became free to intervene in municipal matters.
According to Frug, the change in the legal concept of the city can
be attributed to the emergence of liberal ideas that sought to vest a
unitary political sovereignty in the state legislature and strengthen the
bonds directly linking the state and the individual. Once the state became the fundamental unit of political association, Frug contends,
96
there was no room for political bodies that operated independently. 1
Thus, the municipality was transformed into a subordinate arm of the
state, and its powers, political processes and regulatory goals limited to
those the state chose to give it. Moreover, municipal action became
subject to the constitutional rules that limited state regulatory and economic activity.' 9 7 The demotion of the municipality from autonomous
corporation to state subdivision curbed the scope of municipal action
and restricted the ability of municipalities to engage in entrepreneurial
activity.' 9 8
193. The corporate city did not just regulate the private use of local land; it owned
substantial local property and developed that property for overarching public purposes.
The city did not just administer state laws locally, but legislated independently over a
broad range of subjects for its own constituents, and its charter and corporate status
insulated it from state interference with internal municipal affairs. See generally H.
Hartog, Public Property and Private Power 1-60 (1983).
194. See Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1099-1109.
195. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 8 (discussing Dillon's Rule).
196. Early American cities were not particularly democratic. Indeed, early nineteenth century state legislatures were hostile to the municipal corporation of the time, in
part because of property or wealth requirements for the municipal franchise. These
requirements inspired the view that municipal corporations were citadels of entrenched
privilege to be stormed by state governments as the guardians of democratic control.
State legislative intervention was not seen as outside intervention in the local polity but
rather as democratization of municipal governance. See generally J. Teaford, The Municipal Revolution in America 79-90 (1975) (discussing increasing role of state legislatures in supervising municipal affairs).
197. See Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1099-1120.
198. Going beyond Frug's argument, the changing legal image of the city in the
nineteenth century was followed by political, economic and social changes that confirmed the judicial tendency to support strong state controls over local governments.
See, e.g., Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of
the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429, 477-79 (1987). Immigration and industrial
growth created sharp distinctions between the people, politics and ways of life of the big
cities and the rest of the state. The city came to be perceived as a noisy, dirty, crowded,
foreign and politically corrupt place. Many city taxpayers and residents of older, Yankee
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Frug fails to note that the nineteenth century view of the great cities was not consistently negative. The city's political, economic and social complexity, the density of its internal interactions, the distinctive
cast of its problems and the enormous differences between urban and
rural areas during this period of rapid economic and demographic
change provided some justification for city autonomy. Underlying the
contemporary home rule movement was the belief that the city needed
a government responsive to its particular needs and that it could sustain a diverse local public life.1 99
The coexistence of home rule and Dillon's Rule reflected, and continues to reflect, this tension between two views of the city: a complex
local polity, entitled to self-governance and capable of supporting a local political system; and an administrative arm of the state, and as such
both a potential threat to individual liberty and a hierarchically
subordinate institution subject to state control. These developments
concurrently justified and constrained local autonomy. But neither ur-

ban development nor legal modelling ended with World War I. The
municipal corporation has been transformed again, this time from city

to suburb-from local government as political, social and economic mi200
crocosm to local government as middle-class residential refuge.

stock became political minorities in the cities they once controlled and may have felt
greater kinship with the interests and values of the nonurban parts of the state than with
the immigrant-dominated machines. These traditional urban elites opposed municipal
spending and revenue-raising programs, so that for them state limitations on municipal
taxing, borrowing and spending were no interference with their political freedom but
rather a defense against the encroachments of corrupt local governments. See generally
M. Schiesl, The Politics of Efficiency: Municipal Administration and Reform in America,
1860-1920, at 88-132 (1977). At the same time, the emigration of these groups from
the city to the outlying suburbs provided the political basis for the legal changes facilitating suburban incorporation and permitting suburbanites to resist annexation. See, e.g.,
J. Teaford, supra note 53, at 82-84; supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
The legal concept of the city as ajunior political institution, then, was reinforced by
a negative perception of the city as a social entity.
199. See M. Schiesl, supra note 198, at 6-24 ;J. Teaford, supra note 87, at 103-22.
200. As political scientists and sociologists have noted, contemporary suburbia,
considered as a whole, is no longer exclusively residential or middle class, but it is instead marked by considerable functional and demographic diversity. See, e.g., M.
Baldassare, supra note 22, at 30-31, 49-50; R. Fishman, supra note 51, at 182-207;J.
Harrigan, supra note 18, at 249-52; J. Logan & H. Molotch, supra note 17, at 187-92.
Yet, as these scholars also point out, "the suburban image" of a "white middle class
settlement" "is so strong as to be engraved in America's collective memory." M.
Baldassare, supra note 22, at 30; accordJ. Harrigan, supra note 18, at 249 ("our thinking about suburbs is in many ways still dominated by several myths that .... portrayed
suburbia as a large dormitory .... ). It is this image, not current practice, that affected
the conceptualization of suburbs which appears in local government law. Moreover, the
suburban myth may have more closely approximated suburban reality in the early and
middle decades of the century when the suburbs, and legal status of the suburbs, were
first being formed. M. Baldassare, supra note 22, at 6. Perhaps once the changes affecting suburbia are more widely understood, the hold of the traditional suburban model
will weaken and a new approach to local governments-one that recognizes the frag-
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Adding the two earlier views of the city to the current concept of
local government as suburb suggests that there are three concepts
of local government at work in the law today: the traditional standard
of local government as arm of the state; the "city" idea of local government as a diverse, urban polity-a state in microcosm; and the suburban notion of local government as the site, and virtual extension, of
home and family. Exclusive focus on local government as state subdivision leads to the assumption that the legal system provides no place for
local control. When combined with the further assumption that most
local governments are cities, it is easy to indict local government law for
failing to provide political autonomy to those urban polities clearly capable of local self-government. But when attention is given to the third
model, a different picture emerges. Within the constraints of the formal, underlying authority of the state, suburbs enjoy substantial legal
autonomy.
As was suggested at the beginning of this Part, legal theory must
attend to the wide variety of places captured within the broad category
of local government, especially the economic and social differences that
distinguish cities from suburbs. As cities have been the focus of traditional writing about local governments, this section and the two which
preceded it have sought to underscore the importance of suburbs, the
fit between local powers and suburban interests, the role of the law in
promoting and protecting suburban autonomy and the role of the suburbs in the shaping of local government law. An understanding of the
place of the suburbs in the legal landscape is crucial to the critical description of the scope of local legal authority and to an analytical account of how a body of law ostensibly built around a state-centered
theory evolved into a strongly local-oriented set of powers, practices
and institutions.
The salience of the suburbs, in fact and in law, must also be taken
into account in addressing the question of how broad local powers
ought to be. Much of the contemporary case for expanding local power
relies on the traditional association of local government with city, and
on the presumed difference between the city and the state. Once
greater attention is paid to the significance of the suburbs and to interlocal differences, the argument for greater localism becomes considerably more problematic.
D. The "Polis" and the "Firm," or Two Tales of the City
Contemporary normative discourse about the proper scope of local autonomy is dominated by two theories which-although they proceed from distinctive premises, are phrased in different rhetoric and
represent separate scholarly traditions- converge on the general propmentation of metropolitan areas and the significance of interlocal wealth differences, see
infra text accompanying notes 369-380-will emerge.
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osition that local autonomy should be protected and enhanced. The
two arguments emphasize different fundamental values: participation
in public life in the one and efficiency in the provision of public sector
goods and services in the other. Similarly, the theories rely on contrasting metaphors for the central mechanism of local public life:
"voice" in the one case and "exit" in the other. 20 1 Yet the two tales
told by political and economic theorists share a common commitment
'to localism.
This Section sketches out these arguments, political and economic,
for local autonomy, and then examines their relative strengths and
weaknesses, their points of agreement and their common failings. It
attempts to show that the two localist theories, whether considered separately or taken together, fail to provide a compelling normative basis
for an ideological commitment to localism.
1. Localism and Participation: Local Government as "Polis.'

-

As

Clayton Gillette has written, "[p]articipation is again in the air. Apparently fueled by current debates concerning decentralized power and republican versus pluralist traditions in our political and legal theory,
those concerned with political decisionmaking have turned their attention to calls for increased public involvement in the process. ' 20 2 The
argument for enhancing opportunities for individuals to participate in
politics has been strongly tied to local autonomy.
The centerpiece of legal scholarship advancing the link between
political participation and local government is Gerald Frug's The City as,
a Legal Concept.20 3 Frug's thesis has three parts: (i) individual participa201. The source of this typology of mechanisms for collective decisionmaking is A.
Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and
States (1970).
202. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local Government
Law, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 930, 930 (1988).
203. Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6; see Frug, Empowering Cities, supra
note 6, at 563-66; Frug, Property and Power: Hartog on the Legal History of New York
City, 1984 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 673, 687-90 [hereinafter "Property and Power"].
Frug's work, particularly its commitment to decentralized decision making as a basis
for "devising viable alternative visions of society," Hutchinson & Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought,
36 Stan. L. Rev. 199, 230 (1984), has become an integral part of the Critical Legal Studies canon, although the endorsement of participation and the connection to local power
has not been limited to proponents of Critical Legal Studies.
On the place of Frug's work on local government in the body of Critical Legal Studies scholarship, see M. Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies 206-12 (1987) (Frug
situated in the Critical Legal Studies movement's consideration of legal process and
institutional issues); Kelman, Trashing, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 293, 302 & n.28 (1984) (Frug an
example of a Critical Legal Studies thinker who proposes "concrete" reforms); Presser,
Some Realism About Orphism or the Critical Legal Studies Movement and the New
Great Chain of Being: An English Legal Academic's Guide to the Current State of
American Law, 79 Nw. U.L. Rev. 869, 892 & n.86 (1985) (calling Frug's examination of
local government as a form of "intermediate association" one of the "most prominent
example[s]" of "the noblest ... work" in Critical Legal Studies scholarship); Sparer,
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tion in public decision making is an important political value, yet opportunities for participation are inadequate and declining; (ii)
individual involvement can occur only in small political units, primarily
local governments; and (iii) individuals will participate in local politics
only if there is "a genuine transfer of power" to local government.
Frug thus moves from asserting the value of popular participation in
20 4
politics to making a normative claim for greater local legal power.
Frug's argument for political participation is couched in terms of
benefits to the individual and the society. Indeed, individual and social
welfare are intertwined, with political participation seen as enhancing
both the lives of the participants and the welfare of the polity that promotes it. Following Hannah Arendt, 20 5 Frug and other participation
theorists return to the concept of "public freedom'-the ability to par'20 6
ticipate actively in the basic societal decisions that affect one's life."
Frug claims that modern society allows "little opportunity.., for the
individual to create his own material life, determine his own political
future, or form his own ideas from personal experience. ' 20 7 Political
participation can thus serve as a remedy for this condition, a form of
personal empowerment and an antidote to the anomie and alienation of
modern mass society. Moreover, since political issues are collective issues, individuals involved in politics will be compelled to discuss, deliberate and debate with each other. They will have to listen to each
other's positions, learn the arts of persuasion and compromise and engage in what Frug refers to as "a conversation designed to find a satisFundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly
Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 509, 510 & n.4 (1984)

(Frug "is the leading work in American legal literature on decentralized government authority."); Williams, supra note 198, at 477-79 (criticizing Frug's local government work
but calling it "extremely influential in CLS circles").

Other legal scholars who justify local power at least partially in terms of participation include Gillette, supra note 202, at 952 ("[O]nly at the local level [can] the mass of

individuals ... fully participate and realize their potential."); Gillette, Fiscal Federalism
and the Use of Municipal Bond Proceeds, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1030, 1076-78 (1983)

("Given the distance between electors and elected at the state and national levels, local
politics remains the last bastion of political participation."); Libonati, Reconstructing
Local Government, 19 Urb. Law. 645, 651-52 (1987) (discussing impact of "communal-

ist thinking" on local autonomy); Rose, supra note 176, at 883-84 ("Participation or
voice is a particularly venerable legitimator of local government.").
Contemporary "civic republican" political theory also justifies expanded local
power in terms of political participation. See, e.g., S. Elkin, supra note 32, at 10,
105-07, 146-83 (treating cities as "formative institutions" that provide citizens with opportunities for participating in self-government).

204. See Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1068-70.
205. H. Arendt, On Revolution (1963).

206. Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1068 (quoting H. Arendt, supra
note 205, at 114-15, 119-20).

207. Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at, 1069. According to Jane
Mansbridge, participatory democracy fills "human needs." J. Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy 4 (1980).
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factory resolution of differences ....

-"208 Participation, it is asserted,
will improve the relationship between the self and others and so
strengthen the fellow feeling within a community.
In addition, through political participation it is hoped that people
will learn about the issues, processes and institutions of government.
They will come to know their government better-how to use it and
how to control it. Participation is an education for self-government in a
double sense: it equips people with the "individual attitudes and psychological qualities" that make self-government possible while providing an opportunity for what Carole Pateman calls "practice in
democratic skills and procedures. ' 20 9 The expansion of opportunities
for participation in public life becomes a way of saving the civic republican tradition from an elite-dominated, special-interest pluralism. Participation, it is suggested, will enable the people to reclaim their
political birthright from professional politicians and will infuse public
decision making with public-regarding values.
Running through the work of Frug and the other writers who link
participation and its attendant political, social and psychological benefits to local autonomy is what Robert Dahl called the "millennial appeal" of the Greek city-state.2 10 The "polis" metaphor is important,
both as an invocation of a mythic, golden era in the history of democracy when political communities were small enough to give each citizen
an effective voice and the citizenry exercised a collective role in politics
211
and as a contemporary exhortation to vest power in today's cities.
21 2
The "tradition from Aristotle to Rousseau
associated democratic
self-governance with urban states. Although the size and scale of a continental polity like the United States limits the relevance of Periclean
Athens, Rousseau's Geneva or the colonial New England town as a
model for national governance, 2 13 the longing for a greater degree of
citizen involvement in public life has led many participation theorists to
make the contemporary vestige of the polis-local government-a focal
208. Frug, Empowering Cities, supra note 6, at 559.
209. C. Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory 42 (1970).

210. Dahl, The City in the Future of Democracy, 61 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 953, 954
(1967). In the American setting, the longing for the polis is often transmuted into nostalgia for the New England town meeting. See, e.g., City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 672-73 (1976).
211. Referring to another historical place that has become a metaphor for the
shared values of participation and local empowerment, Ira Katznelson writes, "[v]isions
of the high-medieval town perform an important ideological function for those who wish
to distinguish a more satisfactory past from the present. Distinctions such as those between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschafi, folk and urban, and tradition and modernity are used
to distinguish a lost (but retrievable?) past from contemporary society." I. Katznelson,
City Trenches: Urban Politics and the Patterning of Class in the United States 25-26
(1981). Frug devotes considerable attention to the high-medieval town. See Frug, City
as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1083-90.

212. Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1069.
213. See Dahl, supra note 210, at 956-57.
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point for efforts to advance participatory democracy. 21 4
Local governments are crucial arenas for participation because
they are small in area and population-at least when compared to the
state or nation. Frug asserts that "individual involvement in decisionmaking is impossible except on a small scale" 2 1 5-and that means local
governments. Small size facilitates the deliberative process, the exchange of information and ideas that is at the heart of participation.
Face-to-face interaction is possible only in small units.

21 6

Furthermore,

people in small units are believed to understand more about the issues
at stake and know more about each other, both of which may facilitate
public-spirited decision making. 2 17 It is often assumed that people in
smaller units are likely to have common interests and to share values
and norms, 218 and that, as a result, they may be willing to put aside
individual self-interest for the local city's common good. 2 19 In other
words, localities may have a grehter sense of community, which, it is
assumed, will facilitate participatory decision making. Participation, in
turn, is said to reinforce the sense of community that promotes greater
20
local participation. 2
214. See, e.g., R. Dahl & E. Tufte, Size and Democracy 53-62 (1973); Dahl, supra
note 210, at 963-64 ("[In pursuing the quest for] a unit that seems optimal for rational
self government .... I think that we shall finally end up about at the place where the
Greeks left off: somewhere within view of the democratic city."). Noting developments
in communications technology, Benjamin Barber presents the relatively rare argument
that participatory democracy is possible in large-scale institutions. B. Barber, Strong
Democracy 260-98 (1984).
215. Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1069. Frug actually provides
very little discussion of the link between small size and participation. He states simply,
without citation, that "[o]ne step towards meeting th[e] objective" of increasing the degree of individual involvement in societal decision "is the reduction of the scale of decisionmaking, since limited size appears to be a prerequisite to individual participation in
political life or at the workplace." Id.
216. SeeJ. Mansbridge, supra note 207, at 281-85.
217. Clayton Gillette puts it in economic terms: small size permits repeated interactions among identifiable members of the community. See Gillette, supra note 202, at
984-85. Once people see that fellow community members are willing to look to the
common good, they will also put community interest over self-interest. See id. at 965.
Jane Mansbridge and Robert Wood make the same point but in different language.
For Mansbridge, small size permits "face-to-face assembly" and the attendant benefits of
"empathy and commitment to the common good." J. Mansbridge, supra note 207, at
270, 275. Wood links the value of the small community to propinquity, interdependence and common beliefs and background. From living close to each other people
become familiar with each other's needs and characteristics; interdependence leads to
good will and cooperation; shared goods and values are conducive to collective decision
making. All three of these aspects facilitate participation, and all three are present in a
small community. See R. Wood, supra note 24, at 266-67.
218. See R. Dahl & E. Tufte, supra note 214, at 13-14;J. Mansbridge, supra note
207, at 270-73, 281; R. Wood, supra note 24, at 267-68.
219. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 202, at 964-68.
220. See P. Steinberger, Ideology and the Urban Crisis 67 (1985).
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Furthermore, small size is important, it has been argued, because
only in smaller units will people feel that their participation counts, that
they can make a difference. At the national or state level, the individual
may well conclude that his voice will be drowned out by millions of
others, that her views will have only an infinitesimal effect on the outcome, and therefore that participation is futile. But where the unit is
small, each individual can be heard by and can influence a significant
portion of the community. In small units, each citizen has a greater
share of power. The resulting enhanced sense of "citizen effectiveness" 22 1 presumably will lead to more participation, which, by reinforcing the sense of effectiveness, will maintain and increase
22 2
participation.

Although the link between local government and greater participation is strong in theory, it is uncertain in fact. In a leading empirical

study of the connection between unit size and political participation,
Dahl and Tufte compared large and small democratic nations and

found no general correlation between size and participation. They also
looked within countries at units of the same legal type but different size

and again found no general relationship between size and participation. 2 23 In the United States, it is common knowledge that voter turn221. The term is from R. Dahl & E. Tufte, supra note 214, at 41.
222. Local governments are not the only small units. Many writers assert that the
work place, rather than the local government, is the more likely place for the development of participation. See C. Pateman, supra note 209, at 45-102; see also J.
Mansbridge, supra note 207, at 47-58, 139-48 (examining participation in both a New
England town and a work place). Frug notes that work places as well as local governments are of sufficiently small scale to provide opportunities for participation but believes that decentralization of power is far more likely to occur in public institutions like
governments than in private work places. See Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6,
at 1148-49.
Stephen Elkin makes a different argument for the empowerment of local governments as opposed to other small institutions. He asserts that local governments are
particularly well-suited for educating people in self-government because of the nature of
the issues that come before local governments. Elkin writes:
[S]truggle and debate over the public interest must be connected to the day-today vital interests of citizens .... Political argument about the public interest
must be tied, then, to specific policy choices, and those choices must be of such
a kind that at least the major dimensions are comprehensible to those involved;
in the case of ordinary citizens, this means choices that involve such things as
neighborhood matters, schools, the land-use patterns of their localities ....
S. Elkin, supra note 32, at 153.
Thus, as John Stuart Mill put it, participation at the local level is the "practical part
of the political education of a free people." J.S. Mill, On Liberty 181 (Penguin ed.
1974).
223. R. Dahl & E. Tufte, supra note 214, at 41-66. A study of political behavior in
the suburbs of metropolitan Philadelphia found that participation was more directly correlated with the income and education of residents than with the size of the jurisdiction.
See C. Gilbert, Governing the Suburbs 275-77 (1967).
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out is usually higher for presidential elections than for state-wide
elec2 24
tions, and greater for state-wide contests than for local ones.

Frug, however, suggests that the lack of empirical support for the
claimed connection between unit size and participation is largely attributable to the lack of local autonomy, which, he argues, characterizes
American local government law.2 2 5 People will not engage in local

politics, Frug contends, because local governments have little power.
Enhanced participation requires not simply the existence of small units
but the devolution of power to them. He claims that "[p]ower and participation are inextricably linked: a sense of powerlessness tends to
produce apathy rather than participation, while the existence of power
'2 2 6
encourages those able to participate in its exercise to do so."
This insight is at the center of Frug's argument and links his positive and normative critiques. Much of Frug's article attempts to substantiate the assertion that local governments have little power, that the
legal status of American cities has been in steady decline and that local
government law has crippled the cities. "City powerlessness matters," 22 7 he argues: it excuses the current low levels of participation in
local politics and it justifies the call for greater local autonomy and the
protection of local governments from state interference. Empower localities, restrict the states from imposing their will on local units, and
2 28
greater participation will result.

Political participation, thus, drives Frug's commitment to expanding local legal power. Greater local legal power and the decentralization of authority from the states to localities will give people a
stronger voice in public decision making and a new ability to take
charge of the decisions that affect their lives. In turn, greater local autonomy, by encouraging participation and giving people a sense of
their capacity for governance, will affect the politics of the larger soci224. Mansbridge's study of a Vermont town found that only about one-third of
voters attended town meetings-this in a town with an adult population of approximately 350, where the town meeting had plenary authority over zoning and school
budgets. J. Mansbridge, supra note 207, at 47-48. This is consistent with other findings
about participation in local elections. By comparison, even the recent low levels of voter
participation in presidential elections have consistently exceeded 50%. See, e.g., N.
Polsby & A. Wildavsky, Presidential Elections 14 (7th ed. 1988) (table) (turnout in presidential elections as a percentage of eligible voters was 60.9%o in 1968, 55.2% in 1972,
53.5% in 1976, 52.6% in 1980 and 53.3% in 1984); Berke, 50.16% Voter Turnout Was
Lowest Since 1924, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1988, at 36, col. 1 (reporting preliminary findings concerning turnout of age-eligible Americans in 1988 presidential elections).
225. See Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1067-71. But see Briffault,
supra note 1, at 6-12 (critically discussing Frug's characterization of local government
autonomy).
226. Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1070.
227. Id. at 1067.
228. See id. at 1073; see also S. Elkin, supra note 32, at 176 ("[U]nless political
institutions touch on the day-to-day concerns of citizens, they will not succeed in placing
citizens in a deliberative relation.").
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ety. It will also, it is hoped, transform the people from apathetic onlookers and occasional participants in the quadrennial choice among
candidates representing a limited range of positions to active, publicspirited agents of change. The participationist case for local autonomy
envisions local power as, ultimately, the key to the reformation of national politics and the creation of a new, more vibrant public life. 2 29

2. Localism and Efficiency: Local Government as "Firm." - Like localist
participation theory, the principal economic analysis of local government also proceeds from a concern that the centralization of public
power at the national level impairs the vindication of a fundamental
norm. The economists' focus is on the lack of a market mechanism by
which the national government can register and respond to individual
preferences with respect to the types and levels of public goods and
services.2 30 As a result, both the aggregate level of public goods and
2 31
services and their mix are unlikely to correspond to public desires.
Given the government's coercive power and its monopoly over the provision of public goods and services, taxpayers are likely to be compelled
to pay for goods and services they do not want, and the overall operation of the public sector will be inefficient.
Like the participation theorists, the urban economists see the empowerment of local governments as a way to overcome the perils of
centralization. In his seminal article, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,23 2 Charles Tiebout hypothesizes that " 'a market-type' solution" 233 exists to determine the a level and mix of government
expenditures that are responsive to citizens' demands-but only at the
local level. Tiebout argues that the local public sector is more likely to
be efficient than the national government because at the local level people have more freedom to choose the services they want and to pay for
229. See, e.g., Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1067-73, 1149 ("[A]
restructuring of city power to promote a greater degree of 'public freedom' is the ratio-

nale for an increase in city power.").
230. See, e.g., Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64J. Pol. Econ. 416,
416-18 (1956) (discussing work of Richard Musgrave and Paul Samuelson in public finance theory).
231. "No 'market type' solution exists to determine the level of expenditures on
public goods." Id. at 416. Earlier writers suggested that because of the lack of an adequate mechanism to get citizens to reveal their preferences, and because of the free rider
problem, public services would be underprovided or not "sold" at all. See id. at 417
("As things now stand, there is no mechanism to force the consumer-voter to state his
true preferences; in fact, the 'rational' consumer will understate his preferences and
hope to enjoy the goods while avoiding the tax."). Later public-choice writers emphasized the ability of relatively small special interests to manipulate the process to get the
public as a whole to pay to implement their agenda because the public as a whole was
immobilized by steep barriers to collective action. See, e.g., J. Buchanan & G. Tullock,
The Calculus of Consent 283-95 (1962); M. Olsen, The Logic of Collective Action 144
(1971).
232. Tiebout, supra note 230.
233. Id. at 416.
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just those services. 234
Tiebout's model does not rely on the small size of localities or the
greater opportunities for participation in the local political process. Indeed, he has nothing to say about the inner workings of local government at all. Instead, he proceeds from two other characteristics of local
governments that sharply differentiate them from the national government: their numbers, and the relative ease of individual movement
23 5
from one locality to another.
The multiplicity of local governments in a metropolitan area
means that, as long as each locality is free to adopt its own mix of services, regulations and charges, area residents will be offered a wide array of types and levels of public services and a wide variety of rates of
taxation. By moving from one locality to another, an individual can
select from among these diverse local tax, service and policy packages
the one that best matches her interests. The multiplicity of local governments and the freedom of individuals to move among them together
create a market in public services.
Tiebout assumes that local governments play a relatively passive
part in this market-type mechanism, presenting a variety of revenue and
expenditure patterns that are "more or less set."'23 6 The dynamic element in the public sector marketplace is the individual, or, in Tiebout's
terminology, "the consumer-voter." 23 7 The central mechanism for revealing public service preferences is relocation: "The act of moving or
failing to move.., replaces the usual market test of willingness to buy23 a8
good and reveals the consumer-voter's demand for public goods."
By settling in a particular locality, "[t]he consumer-voter may be viewed
as picking that community which best satisfies his preference pattern
for public goods." ' 23 9 People decide on the taxes they want to pay and
the type and level of services they want to receive by "shopping
around" among the various localities in a given metropolitan area
before "purchasing" by moving to the one that best fits their needs.
The multiplicity of localities assures a range of choices and increases
the likelihood that one locality will approximate the mobile consumervoter's preferences.
Since Tiebout first articulated his theory, the economic approach
to local government has evolved from an assumption of purely passive
localities to include an argument that consumer-voters influence local
government policies, taxes and services. A consumer-voter is free to
leave a locality that taxes her at a rate higher than she wants to pay,
pursues policies she dislikes or funds services she does not want; she
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

418.
419.
418.
417.
420.•
418.
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can move to another locality that provides a more optimal mix of taxes
and programs. A locality whose public policies are inconsistent with
the preferences of too many of its residents or potential entrants will
will respond by cutting
lose population and tax revenue. Such a locality
2 40
costs, reducing taxes and altering policies.
The addition to the model of activist local governments that compete with each other like private firms heightens the market-like features of interlocal relations. 24 1 The freedom of taxpayers to exit and
the availability in a metropolitan area of large numbers of local governments as possible destinations restrain the monopolistic tendencies of
government. 24 2 Interlocal competition constrains taxing, spending and
administrative inefficiency for all localities and thereby improves local
government's general responsiveness to consumer-voter concerns
holding down the aggregate cost of local
while systematically
243
government.
The urban economists' commitment to the efficiency value of local
autonomy and interlocal competition has significant programmatic consequences. A basic premise of the Tiebout hypothesis is that localities
can and must have the power to set the types and levels of public services they offer and must rely on local resources to fund their expenditures. The multiplicity of local governments would not promote
efficiency unless each could set its own fiscal policies. Thus, urban
economists support local decision-making authority over taxing and
spending.
Moreover, these economists strenuously oppose such traditional
"good government" proposals as the consolidation of smaller localities
into larger units, 2 44 the creation of metropolitan-area-wide govern24 6
ments, 24 5 restrictions on the incorporation of new municipalities
and the transfer of responsibility for the provision of public services
from localities to higher levels of government. 24 7 Whereas traditional
240. See, e.g., R. Bish & V. Ostrom, supra note 147, at 53.
241. See, e.g., V. Ostrom, R. Bish & E. Ostrom, supra note 24, at 206 ("[R]ivalry

among local governments is analogous to rivalry among firms ....

").

242. See R. Bish & V. Ostrom, supra note 147, at 30-31.

243. See, e.g., P. Peterson, supra note 31, at 46--47.
244. See, e.g., R. Bish, supra note 142, at 55; V. Ostrom, R. Bish & E. Ostrom,
supra note 24, at 139-87.
245. See, e.g., R. Bish, supra note 142, at 79-103; Wagner & Weber, Competition,
Monopoly, and the Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas, 18J.L. & Econ.

661, 672 (1975) (metropolitan-area-wide government can force taxpayer to pay for the
"full line" of government services rather than allowing him to select among components

of the government's "line"); Warren, A Municipal Services Market Model of Metropolitan Organization, 30 J. Am. Inst. Planners 193 (1964).
246. See, e.g., Martin &Wagner, The Institutional Framework for Municipal Incorporation: An Economic Analysis of Local Agency Formation Commissions in California,
21 J.L. & Econ. 409, 414-16 (1978).

247. See, e.g., Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren, The Organization of Government in

Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry, 55 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 831, 841-42 (1961).
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political scientists warned that the fragmentation and overlap of local
governments that characterize most metropolitan areas posed a threat
to political accountability, these urban economists praise fragmentation
and overlap for enhancing the capacity of the "metropolitan municipal
services marketplace" to accommodate differences in personal preferto generate the efficiencies that
ences for public goods and services2and
48
result from interlocal competition.
This endorsement of fragmentation and overlap follows directly
from the Tiebout model. The multiplicity of local governments is significant not simply because it provides consumer-voters with a variety
of public service and tax packages, but also because it facilitates the
operation of Tiebout's central decision-making mechanism-consumer-voter mobility. The more governments there are in close proximity to each other, the easier it is for any individual to gather
information, to compare the tax and service packages offered by each
locality and to move from one to another. The greater the number of
local government "firms" in competition, the more responsive each will
be to the preferences of consumer-voters, and the more efficient local
2 49
government will be.
Although Tiebout's localism is based primarily on the multiplicity
of localities and the freedom of interlocal movement, other economists
have also looked to the internal structure of localities to justify local
autonomy. Like the political theorists, these economists emphasize the
value of small size, contending that the costs of government correlate
directly with the size of the governmental unit. Even without interlocal
competition, they argue, government is likely to be more efficient at the
local level because the costs of government will be lower.
The costs of government include the costs of political transactions-the time and effort involved in the bargaining, debate and interactions that are necessary for a collective body to reach a decision-and
the costs to individuals of government decisions that go against them.
Bish refers to the former as decision-making costs and the latter as
"political externality costs." ' 250 Decision-making costs relate directly to
the size of the polity. The larger the group, and the more interactions
within it, the more time and effort a collective decision will require.
Political externality costs may also increase with the size of the polity
since bigger units are typically more heterogeneous. In heterogeneous
units more people are likely to have preferences that diverge from the
median, while in smaller, more homogeneous units, there may be less
248. See, e.g., R. Bish & V. Ostrom, supra note 147, at 71-75; V. Ostrom, R. Bish &
E. Ostrom, supra note 24, at 83-95; Wagner & Weber, supra note 245, at 661, 684.
249. See, e.g., Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren, supra note 247, at 838.
250. R. Bish, supra note 142, at 35-37; see also J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, supra
note 231, at 63-84 (applying economic theory to structures for political decision
making).
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internal disagreement. 25 1
The economic argument for small size and the reduction of political externality costs is reinforced by the Tiebout model. The multiplicity of local governments and the mobility of consumer-voters, it is
argued, mean that people will be drawn to localities providing the types
and levels of services they prefer. The theory suggests that people will
sort themselves out through free movement, settling in the localities
that offer the taxes and services they want and leaving the localities
whose taxation and service packages they dislike. As a result, localities
will draw the people that most resemble existing local majorities, lose
local dissenters and fail to attract people who do not agree with local
public decisions. Localities will tend to become more homogeneous,
thus reducing political externality costs within each jurisdiction. 252 By
facilitating local homogeneity, small size 2 53 joins Tiebout's multiplicity
and mobility factors in justifying local autonomy and the proliferation
of local governments as the best means of promoting efficient
government.
3. The Two Tales Taken Together: The Uncertain Casefor Local Autonomy. - Despite their divergent intellectual provenances and differing
normative first principles, the political and economic arguments for localism have much in common. The two theories arrive at the same end
point of advocating local autonomy and complement-and borrow
from-each other along the way.
Thus, participation theorists have on occasion relied on Tiebout's
an
assumptions about the importance of interlocal personal mobility as 254
important rejoinder to the Madisonian attack on local power.
Madison's defense of the size of a continental republic based on the
251. See R. Bish, supra note 142, at 51-52.
252. See id. at 52.
253. History demonstrates that small size does not always mean internal harmony.

As Dahl observed about the classical Greek and medieval Italian city-states,
[t]heir history is a tale of bitter conflicts and an almost total failure to develop

effective institutions for settling political disputes by peaceful and constitutional means. Not only did they lack institutions for settling disputes between
one city-state and another; they were not much better at settling internal conflicts, which erupted with great frequency along all the lines of cleavage ...
family, kinship, neighborhood, occupation, class, religion. The outcome of

political conflict was typically savage.
R. Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy 10 (1982).
Although the conflicts were less intense, Mansbridge also found politics in Vermont
marked by sharp cleavages, primarily between newcomers and old-timers. See J.
Mansbridge, supra note 207, at 89-96.
254. Cf. Rose, supra note 176, at 882-87 (weaving "voice" and "exit" concerns
together to develop an anti-Madisonian legitimation of local decision making); Gillette,
supra note 202, at 944-45 (noting that ease of exit at the local level "underlies de
Tocqueville's esteem for decentralized administration" and that "exit from a locality
that has acted invidiously is largely salutary, as it informs the original municipality that
its policies require reform," though acknowledging the limits of the exit option in forcing changes in local decisions).
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dangers of "factious combinations" and majoritarian tyranny in smaller
polities has long posed a potent political counterweight to the
Jeffersonian tradition of favoring, the decentralization of power to local
governments.2 5 5 Following Madison, political scientists have contended that dissenters find it more difficult to express their disagreements with political decisions and maintain their opposition in the face
of majority pressures in smaller polities 2 5 6 and that smaller governments are more subject to factional domination than bigger or more
25 7
populous jurisdictions.
Contemporary participation theorists, however, rely on the ease of
exit from local governments to mitigate the tyranny latent in small
units. Frug uses the economists' analogy of the city to the firm to argue
that city politics are not coercive but voluntary since "no one is forced
to live in a particular city any more than he is forced to work for, buy
from, or invest in a particular corporation. ... In both cases, we can
select which entity we prefer. '25 8 It is easier to leave a particular city
than the political or economic systems of the whole society.2 59 The arguments of Carol Rose for broader local discretion in land-use regulation and of Clayton Gillette for greater use of plebiscites in community
decision making follow a similar structure of combining the values of
"voice" and "exit": the greater possibility for participation and a more
communitarian political process at the local level provide the affirmative argument for new local authority, while ease of exit answers the
Madisonian criticism of small units and takes some of the sting out of
2 60
the danger of majoritarian oppression at the local level.
Conversely, some economists have relied on "voice" considerations to bolster their claim that local governments, because of their relatively small size, will be more efficient in meeting citizen public service
preferences than higher level units. Bish and Ostrom, for example,
note the value of small units in promoting participation, which permits
people to indicate their public service demands to decision makers
255. See. e.g., A. Syed, The Political Theory of American Local Government
(1966). According to Madison:
the smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number
of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which
they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of
oppression.
The Federalist, No. 10, at 83 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
256. See, e.g., R. Dahl & E. Tufte, supra note 214, at 89-109.
257. See, e.g., G. McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (1966).
258. Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1135.
259. See id. at 1135-36; see also Frug, Empowering Cities, supra note 6, at 560
("[I]t would be a mistake to overstate the contrast between the free choice and participation theories of democracy ....").
260. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 202, at 944-45; Rose, supra note 176, at 886.
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more precisely, improving government efficiency. 2 6' Voice can supplement exit in promoting citizen satisfaction with public services, and
these economists agree with the participationists that voice most readily
occurs at the local level.
Despite the convergence of participation- and efficiency-based arguments in support of local autonomy, and the occasional analytic support each theory gives to the other, the two approaches differ in their
assumptions and in their reasons for valuing local power. Although the
two theories are not in direct conflict, an examination of each theory
from the perspective of the other may be a useful heuristic device to
evaluate their claims. As we shall see, however, when taken together,
each theory compounds, rather than ameliorates, the flaws of the other.
The two localist theories, whether contrasted or combined, demonstrate the uncertain nature of the case for localism.
a. Political Localism and the Economic Model. - The legal, political
and social data that confirm the descriptive accuracy of Tiebout's theoretical axioms about the local setting illuminate two major weaknesses
in Frug's theory: Frug both misconceives the scope of local lawmaking
power and fails to address the significance of the multiplicity of local
governments and interlocal mobility.
Frug asserts that localities are legally powerless. This is important
to his argument since otherwise it would be difficult to account for the
low level of popular participation in local politics. Indeed, much of
Frug's article is an historical and legal account of the loss of local autonomy in the United States.2 62 Yet a fundamental premise of the
Tiebout hypothesis is that localities possess substantial discretion over
local taxing, spending and regulatory decisions. Although this premise
usually passes unstated, 26 3 Tiebout's theory would make no sense without it, since it is this discretion that allows local governments to respond to consumer-voter preferences. Mobile citizens and multiple
local governments would have little economic significance if each locality simply executed the decisions of a higher level government or if
local decisions were regularly superseded by state or federal action.
As Part I of this Article indicates, 2 64 the economists' assumptions
come far closer to capturing the scope of local legal authority than does
Frug's assertion of city powerlessness. Local governments have substantial autonomy in deciding the size and distribution of local budgets,
setting tax rates and regulating local land use. The states generally
grant localities broad discretion, and as a rule state courts and legisla261. See R. Bish & V. Ostrom, supra note 147, at 24.

262. See Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1080-1120.
263. Economists generally do not address explicitly the scope of local legal authority, but one legal scholar of local government who follows the economic perspective has

noted the relatively broad authority of local governments, particularly with respect to
the power to participate in business activities. See Ellickson, Cities, supra note 7, at

1568-73.
264. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 6-18.
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tures have been reluctant to interfere with local autonomy in these important areas. State incorporation and annexation laws facilitate the
formation of new governments with the full panoply of local powers
while inhibiting the expansion of older governments or the consolidation of localities into metropolitan or regional units. 26 5 In short, the
economists' basic premise about local legal power captures local government law in practice; Frug's assertion of "city powerlessness" does
not.
Tiebout's assumptions about the number of local governments and
the mobility of people also have considerable contemporary validity.
Focusing only on general-purpose governments, one study of the
twenty-five largest urbanized areas found that in twenty-one areas there
were twenty or more local governments; in twelve areas there were
more than fifty local governments; in six areas there were more than
one hundred local governments. 26 6 Another researcher found that in
only two metropolitan areas did the central city account for as much as
half the metropolitan area population and in most cases the central
city's share of population was forty percent or less. 2 6 7 Nor was there a

concentration of land or population in a relatively small number of
large suburbs. 2 68 Instead, most urbanized areas are fragmented into
numerous general-purpose jurisdictions, and "[m]ost people who live
in large metropolitan areas do have several local governments in whose
jurisdiction they could realistically live." 2 69 As for mobility, since the
1950s approximately twenty percent of American households have
moved each year. 2 70 Over a five-year period nearly half of all families
change their residence at least once. 2 7 1 Although the majority of
moves are to new homes within a few miles of the original residence,
many moves, including some involving relatively short distances, entail
changes in political jurisdiction. 27 2
265. See section B.1, supra.
266. See Fischel, Is Local Government Structure in Large Urbanized Areas Monopolistic or Competitive?, 34 Nat'l TaxJ. 95 (1981). The study, based on the 1970 census,
found that the 25 largest urbanized areas accounted for 60% of the population in all 248
urbanized areas, or more than one-third of the total United States population. The urbanized areas with the most general-purpose local governments-Fischel included only
those local governments with zoning authority-were New York (399), Minneapolis
(180), Chicago (178), Philadelphia (166), St. Louis (116) and Los Angeles (104).
267. See A. Hacker, supra note 21, at 26-27 (1980 census figures).
268. See Fischel, supra note 266, at 96, 101-02.
269. Id. at 102. This is especially true in the Northeast, the North Central States
and the West.
270. See Hawley, Urbanization as Process, in Handbook of Contemporary Urban
Life, supra note 157, at 3, 13; see also M. Baldassare, supra note 22, at 190-91.
271. See A. Hacker, supra note 21, at 263 (between 1975 and 1980,45.2% of families containing married couples changed their residence at least once).
272. See M. Baldassare, supra note 22, at 191; A. Hacker, supra note 21, at 263.
According to Hacker, of the 45.2% of families that moved in the 1975-1980 period,
24.2% moved within the same county, and 19.2% either changed counties or moved to
another state. (Another 1.8% moved to the United States from overseas.) Although
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The large number of local governments and the mobility of local
residents lessen both the significance, if not the likelihood, of local
political participation in two ways. First, the impact of participation is
reduced when the multiplicity of local governments and the resultant
interlocal competition narrow the scope of local politics. 27 3 Second,
the multiplicity of local governments and the interlocal mobility of people together undermine the notion that local communitarian feelings
will inspire residents of local governments to greater participation than
is likely to occur at the state or national level. The bonds linking transient residents to their localities may be weak, and the sense of belonging to a particular place may be attenuated by the multiple linkages
each resident has to other jurisdictions.
Although Frug puts the case for participation primarily in terms of
the psychological and emotional benefits of individual involvement in
political life, latent in his theory is the assumption that city power will
somehow transform local politics in the direction of greater social justice. His specific proposals-that cities operate banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions, provide housing, create food
cooperatives and run profit-making businesses 2 74-reflect the idea that
such municipal activity would radically transform local political life and
provide a basis for empowering workers, the poor and consumers.
Thus, he suggests that a municipal bank or insurance company
"might make different judgments about the relative value it places on
the profit margin, the kinds of loans it deems socially useful, and the
kinds of consumer protection it seeks to provide" than would private
lenders. 2 75 Municipal ownership of housing "could prevent gentrification of these units, and encourage democratic control over the operation of multiple-family housing." 27 6 City-owned enterprises could lead
to the manufacture of socially useful products and provide opportunities for experiments in worker self-management. 2 77 In short, Frug suggests, greater individual participation in urban government would lead
to more redistributive local governments.
But it is highly unlikely that greater local participation would have
such a transformative effect. 278 The multiplicity of localities and the
Hacker gives no further information concerning intracounty moves, it must be assumed,
given the large number of municipalities in most counties, that a significant fraction of
these moves involved a relocation from one municipality to another. But cf. Sharp,
"Exit, Voice, and Loyalty" in the Context of Local Government Problems, 37 W. Pol. Q.
67, 70 (1984) (a large number of movers are repeat movers).
273. See, e.g., T. Gurr & D. King, supra note 32; P. Peterson, supra note 31.
274. See Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1150; Frug, Property and
Power, supra note 203, at 687-91.
275. Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1150.
276. Frug, Property and Power, supra note 203, at 688.
277. Id. at 688-89.
278. This discussion is intended to address the likelihood of local adoption of new
social or economic programs, not the desirability of Frug's goals or the efficacy of his
specific proposals in promoting those goals. Nevertheless, it may be worth noting that
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mobility of people and capital that Tiebout describes and that exist today seriously erode the capacity of most cities to undertake new programs that would impose costs on already straitened local budgets and
that are likely to be perceived as benefiting the poor or municipal workers at the expense of business and middle- and upper-income interests.
Corporate and upper-income residents are the city residents most sensitive to changes in local taxes and the quality of urban services. It is
relatively easy for affluent people and businesses who feel dissatisfied
with municipal tax and spending policies to leave the city, become residents of adjacent communities and continue to have ready access to the
city as a place to work, shop, sell and enjoy recreational and cultural
amenities. Officials in city governments know this, and the range of
political choices available to them is accordingly constrained.
Contemporary cities, as a rule, do not engage in innovative redistributive programs, not because they lack the legal authority, but rather
because they fear that initiating such programs would cause residential
and commercial taxpayers to depart. 2 79 It is debatable whether progressive social programs and redistributive policies caused the urban
fiscal problems of the 1970s, 28 0 but undeniable that urban politics in

the major cities in recent decades has been dominated by concerns
most publicly owned or operated enterprises have not realized their radical potential,
but rather are run much like private enterprises in the same industries, as low-risk,
profit-oriented activities. See A. Walsh, The Public's Business: The Politics and Practices of Government Corporations 155-57 (public authorities are overly sensitive to concerns of private financiers such as minimizing investor risk), 233-39 (widespread
mismanagement in government agencies) (1978); Berkowitz, Economic Development
Really Works: Baltimore, Maryland, in Urban Economic Development, supra note 35, at
201, 209-21 (urban economic development program's reliance on public-private partnerships); see also D. Henriques, The Machinery of Greed: Public Authority Abuse and
What to Do About It 7 (1986) (public authorities are subject to corruption).
279. See P. Peterson, supra note 31, at 37-38, 64, 167-68, 182-83; W. Tabb, The
Long Default: New York City and the Urban Fiscal Crisis 37-40 (1982). According to
Tabb, local governments are
under continual pressure not to redistribute from the rich to the poor. ...
"[M]oney providers" will leave if the "service demanders" want more than the
providers wish to provide. In a competitive economy, therefore, local governments must give less to demanders in order to satisfy providers. If they fail to
do so, some other jurisdiction will.
280. Rubin outlines the theories explaining the 1970s' fiscal crises, including migration of poor blacks and Hispanics to big cities; exit of middle- and upper-class people
and jobs and consequent erosion of tax base; growth of city bureaucracies and institutional impetus to greater city spending; and increased vulnerability of city political coalitions to demands of groups seeking higher levels of spending on social programs. See I.
Rubin, Running in the Red: The Political Dynamics of Urban Fiscal Stress 5-12 (1982);
see also R. Bailey, The Crisis Regime: The MAC, the EFCB, and the Political Impact of
the New York City Financial Crisis 3-4 (1984) (linking the New York City fiscal crisis to
growing gap between revenues and expenditures, inability to raise money in private capital markets, and long-term decline in manufacturing employment); C. Morris, The Cost
of Good Intentions: New York City and the Liberal Experiment, 1960-1975, at 238-40
(1980) (treating the New York City fiscal crisis as a result of public sector expansion and
municipal budget manipulation); T. Swanstrom, supra note 32, at 163-71 (hostility
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about credit ratings, balanced budgets, lower taxes, basic infrastructure
and curtailing expectations about urban government. 2 8 1 Such concerns are far more important than limits on local legal powers in restricting the ability of cities to pursue progressive social agendas.
Although the rise to power of black and Hispanic mayors in most
of the nation's largest cities and the switch from at-large to district representation in many city legislative bodies has increased the role of minority and neighborhood interests in urban government, the
imperatives of protecting the local tax base and maintaining access to
capital markets continue to structure urban politics.

28 2

New political

coalitions have reallocated patronage, integrated municipal workforces

2 83
and made marginal adjustments in spending on established services,

but there has been relatively little change in the size of the municipal
public sector or the role of city government in the urban polity or economy. Here, as elsewhere, the choices open to local governments reamong local business interests to Mayor Kucinich's populist programs contributed to
Cleveland's 1978 default).
281. See, e.g., W. Tabb, supra note 279, at 97-100 (New York City gave tax abatements for building rehabilitation projects while reducing funding for programs to benefit low-income residents). According o Mollenkopf, "the competition among local
jurisdictions to offer the best political climate for new investment produces a Gresham's
Law' effect. Public-service-poor jurisdictions have tended to drive out public-servicerich jurisdictions. This dynamic has restricted the ability of either type ofjurisdiction to
deal with pressing urban problems ....
J. Mollenkopf, supra note 121, at 253. Thus,
market discipline has reduced government burdens on the private sector while increasing urban distress. See id.; see also R. Bailey, supra note 280, at 172 ("Whereas government might once have used what few 'slack' resources it had in attempts to reintegrate
alienated groups into the political system, now it must spend them on keeping business
in New York."); M. Shefter, Political Crisis/Fiscal Crisis: The Collapse and Revival of
New York City 234 (1985) ("[M]ost participants in urban politics regard the imperative
of maintaining access to the capital market as akin to a law of nature ....
); Swanstrom,
Semisovereign Cities: The Politics of Urban Development, 21 Polity 83, 107 (1988)
("land interests, in coalition with growth-oriented politicians" play substantial role in
shaping city economic policies.).
282. See, e.g., P. Heilig & R. Mundt, Your Voice at City Hall: The Politics, Procedures, and Policies of District Representation 133-48 (1984); Elkin, State and Market in
City Politics: Or, The "Real" Dallas, in The Politics of Urban Development, supra note
36, at 25, 25 ("Diversifying participation in electoral politics does not alter development
policy in any simple or direct way. Instead it leads to a reconstitution of the urban
regime."); Reed, A Critique of New-Progressivism in Theorizing About Local Development Policy: A Case from Atlanta, in id. at 199, 199-215 (economic reality forced
Atlanta's first black mayor to accommodate traditionally powerful white private
interests).
283. There remains substantial debate over whether increased minority success in
winning municipal office results in a greater minority share of municipal jobs. See generally Mladenka, Blacks and Hispanics in Urban Politics, 83 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 165
(1989) (reviewing the literature and arguing that minority success in entering public
employment and gaining a greater share of public sector resources is subject to considerable regional variation and linked to other aspects of the local political structure).
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main limited by economic, not legal, factors. 284
Developments in transportation, communication and production
technologies have increased the ease of movement of both people and
capital. The locational advantages cities once possessed, in terms of
the presence of large markets and proximity to rivers and railroads, are
of decreasing significance in the age of aviation, computers and the
electronic and telephonic transmission of data and documents. As a
result, interlocal competition for businesses and affluent residents has
intensified, 2 85 city tax bases have become more fragile and cities' fiscal
capacities to carry out their current public service functions, let alone
28 6
implement progressive innovations, are more severely stressed.
284. See, e.g., D. Judd & R. Ready, Entrepreneurial Cities and the New Politics of
Economic Development, in G. Peterson & C. Lewis, Reagan and the Cities 209, 218-37
(1986) (discussing attention to economic development incentives in Denver after the
election of its first Hispanic mayor and Chicago after the election of its first black
mayor). See The Politics of Urban Development, supra note 36.
285. Ira Katznelson quotes former New York City Mayor Edward I. Koch as saying
"'The main job of municipal government is to create a climate in which private business
can expand in the city to providejobs and profit.' " I. Katznelson, supra note 211, at 4.
Several studies have found that, despite the rush to provide tax abatements, lowinterest loans and parcels of land, corporate investment and plant location decisions
generally turn on factors beyond the control of local governments, such as the presence
of a network of suppliers, prevailing wage scales or the degree of unionization. "Nevertheless, public officials desperate for jobs and tax dollars are understandably reluctant to
risk losing a source of revenue by offering fewer concessions than their ever-present
competitors; although they can't afford to offer the tax reductions, they can't afford not
to." Jones & Bachelor, Local Policy Discretion and the Corporate Surplus, in Urban
Economic Development, supra note 35, at 245, 249; see also Blair & Wechsler, A Tale of
Two Cities: A Case Study of Urban Competition for Jobs, in id. at 269, 269-82 (analogizing the competition between Springfield, Ohio and Fort Wayne, Indiana for an
International Harvester plant to game of Prisoner's Dilemma in which "the combined
welfare of residents ... would have been maximized if neither city had offered International Harvester financial incentives," but in fact both cities offered large assistance
packages). But cf. Markusen, Class and Urban Social Expenditure: A Marxist Theory of
Metropolitan Government, in Marxism and the Metropolis, supra note 88, at 82, 95-96:
The movement of industrial and mercantile establishments to suburban jurisdictions is largely a response to private-sector gains ... but taxes and public
services do play an important role ....
The existence of fragmented political
units allows corporations to play off one jurisdiction against the other to secure
preferential tax and expenditure arrangements ....
286. See, e.g., M. Castells, City, Class and Power (E. Lebas, trans.) 25-26 (1978);
W. Tabb, iupra note 279, at 69-75.
Federal policies over the last decade have accelerated the dynamic of interlocal
competition. Drastic cuts in assistance to cities have thrown the cities ever more on their
own resources, while federal tax cuts have served to highlight differences in local tax
rates, increasing the pressure on relatively high-tax jurisdictions to keep taxes down,
even if this limits the local capacity to fund social programs. In 1987, federal aid forjust
13.6% of state and local revenues, down from 18.7% in 1978 and the lowest figure since
1966. See Federal Aid to States, Localities Hits 20-Year Low, Wash. Post, Nov. 23,
1988, at A19, col. 1. The federal share of state and local revenues had declined from a
high of 18.7% in 1978. See id. On the significance of federal cutbacks for local autonomy, see T. Gurr & D. King, supra note 32, at 189-90.
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The watchword in urban politics in the last decade has been "economic development. '28 7 Cities have indeed been innovative in using
28 8
and stretching their legal authority in pursuit of economic growth.
The "public purposes" for which cities may spend, borrow, lend and
condemn have been expanded, but more often than not the goal of
expanded city powers has been to frame public policies that will retain
old businesses, attract new investment and promote gentrification
rather than reform urban life or empower ordinary citizens. 2 89 Cities
already have sufficient legal authority to intervene broadly in economic
life, take on traditional business functions and pursue ambitious social
programs. 290 But the economic constraints on urban politics deriving
from the multiplicity of local governments and the mobility of people
and businesses are structural, and they make the municipal pursuit of
private capital a far more likely prospect than the adoption of a pro287. According to a study prepared by the National League of Cities, local governments "expend tremendous energies maintaining and enhancing their economies." A.
Bowman, The Visible Hand: Major Issues in City Economic Policy 7 (NLC Working
Papers, Nov. 1987). Indeed, of 326 mayors surveyed by Bowman, 86% identified economic development as one of their top three priorities, and 36.5% said it was their
highest priority. See id. at 8.
288. As Bingham and Blair have concluded,
IT]he creativity of local development officials has been substantial. But the creativity has been directed at developing new (and complicated) arrangements
between governments, businesses, and third sector organizations. The variety
of subsidy/compensation schemes is enormous. However, the idea that a better city can be achieved by more jobs, money, tax revenues, and so forth is
entrenched in local economic development efforts.
Bingham & Blair, Introduction, in Urban Economic Development, supra note 35, at 11,
13.
289. See, e.g., Common Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1 (Me. 1983) (bond issue to rebuild harbor facilities to keep shipbuilding company in state); Poletown Neighborhood
Council v. Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981) (condemnation of populous
residential neighborhood to attract auto assembly plant); Yonkers Community Dev.
Agency v. Morris, 37 N.Y.2d 478, 335 N.E.2d 327, 373 N.Y.S.2d 112 (1975) (condemnation for urban redevelopment), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1010 (1975). But cf. Purvis
v. Little Rock, 282 Ark. 102, 667 S.W.2d 936 (1984) ("tourism bonds" to finance motel
construction invalid for lack of adequate public purpose). Cities have also adopted progressive measures linking economic development to payments for necessary municipal
improvements. See, e.g., Russ Bldg. Partnership v. San Francisco, 44 Cal. 3d 839, 750
P.2d 324, 244 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1988) (development fee on new office construction to help
fund mass transit), appeal dismissed, 109 S.Ct. 209 (1988).
290. The intensity of the interlocal competition for new investment illustrates both
the breadth of local legal authority and the fragility of local economies. Interlocal competition is possible only because localities have the policy-making discretion to pursue
programs to attract industrial and commercial concerns; interlocal competition is necessary primarily because of the mobility of capital. See Jones & Bachelor, supra note 251,
at 263-65.
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gram of municipal socialism. 2 91
Beyond narrowing the range of local political choices, the multiplicity of local governments and the mobility of people casts doubt on
the assumption, fundamental to participation theory, that local autonomy and the spirit of community are mutually reinforcing-that participation will be stronger in local governments because localities are
communities. Many writers treat "local government" as a synonym for
"community." As is true with the frequent equation of "local government" with "city" discussed in Section A, above, 29 2 the legal term "local government" has become freighted with the powerful social,
political and emotional associations that ordinarily accompany the
word "community." 29 3 For participationists, local governments are
communities-places where an individual's activities and experiences
are bound up with those of her neighbors, where repeated interactions
and daily communications breed interdependence, shared feelings and
values and a public-spirited commitment to the community's well-being. 294 This sense of community is said to provide an incentive to participate in local affairs and to ease participation by providing residents
with an awareness of how much they have in common, thereby facilitating community decision making.
But the connection between today's local governments and the
spirit of community is tenuous. One cannot, of course, find a standard
metric to gauge the sense of community. If, however, as some urban
sociologists contend, "the single most important variable leading to
stronger social bonds is length of residence"- more than social class or
291. See, e.g., P. Peterson, supra note 31, at 167-83 (realities of local politics preclude widespread implementation of redistributive programs); Clarke, supra note 36, at
107-09 (same).
Of course, interlocal economic competition does not strictly determine local political decisions. There is "[s]Ilack in the intergovernmental marketplace [that] creates
room for political discretion." Swanstrom, supra note 281, at 95. "Local decision makers do not simply follow the imperatives that emanate from the national political economy; they must also interpret those imperatives, apply them to local conditions, and act
on them within the constraints of political arrangements they build and maintain."
Stone, The Study of the Politics of Urban Development, in The Politics of Urban Development, supra note 36, at 3, 4. Local politics involves the particularities of time, place
and specific political actors, and cities may find opportunities to implement progressive
innovations within the structural constraints of interlocal economic competition.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 6-10.
293. As Raymond Williams has noted, although "community" may have many definitions, the term "seems never to be used unfavourably, and never to be given any positive opposing or distinguishing term." R. Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture
and Society 66 (1976). Albert Hunter agrees that among social scientists "community
[is] an unqualified good. The positive connotations of friendliness, warmth and support
are seldom countered .... Hunter, Persistence of Local Sentiments in Mass Society, in
Handbook of Contemporary Urban Life, supra note 157, at 133, 134-35.
294. See, e.g., R. Wood, supra note 24, at 102-08 (suburban government seen as
enhancing "community").
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stage of life29 5-then the high rate of interlocal mobility suggests that
community bonds within localities cannot be very strong. We are a mobile society, 29 6 and the ease and frequency of relocation necessarily
mutual values and shared lives
reduces the sense of common needs,
"community" ordinarily connotes. 29 7
Furthermore, the large number of localities in each metropolitan
area is a significant reminder that people are regularly involved in more'
than one locality in the course of their daily lives. We are not just a
mobile society; we are also a commuter society. Most people no longer
reside in the locality in which they work, and they no longer confine
their weekly travel, shopping, social, cultural or other routine activities
to the community in which they reside. The statement of a southern
California woman-" 'I live in Garden Grove, work in Irvine, shop in
Santa Ana, go to the dentist in Anaheim.

.

. and used to be president

of the League of Women Voters in Fullerton.' "298mis emblematic2 99of
the multijurisdictional lives most metropolitan area residents lead.

Some sense of interdependence and common experience, of
shared values and mutual knowledge and sympathy, no doubt remains.
Clearly, however, this sense cannot be as strong as participation theorists contend when so many communities are composed of newcomers,
transients and people whose attention is often focused on issues and
events outside the local jurisdiction.3 0 0 Participation theory, like the
law, treats an individual as a member of only one local community-the
295. Janowitz & Street, Changing Social Order of the Metropolitan Area, in Handbook of Contemporary Urban Life, supra note 157, at 90, 111.
296. According to Daniel Elazar, one of the hallmarks of American life that has
affected our urban development is the "nomadism" of the American people. See D.
Elazar, supra note 20, at 16; see also Lemann, Stressed Out in Suburbia, Atlantic, Nov.
1989, at 34, 46 (finding that in Naperville, Illinois, a Chicago suburb, "the average
house ... changes hands every three years"; in one of the city's two school districts
"new students make up more than a quarter of the enrollment every fall").
297. See D. Elazar, supra note 20, at 16 (American "nomadism" eliminates the notion of a "stable, self-perpetuating community"); cf. D. Popenoe, Private Pleasure, Public Plight: American Metropolitan Community Life in Comparative Perspective 149-56
(1985) (noting the particularly high level of interlocal mobility in the United States as
compared to Great Britain and Sweden; reeommending policies that would promote
residential stability as a means of increasing sense of community).
Jane Mansbridge reached a similar conclusion in her study of the Vermont town
meeting-that improved communications and mobility had reduced the political and social importance of the town in the lives of local citizens. SeeJ. Mansbridge, supra note
207, at 44. More generally, she recognized that national economic changes, including
increased interlocal interdependence and the expansion of scale of economic activity
and social problems, made intensive local participation in town-meeting form of government a thing of the past. See id. at 126-29.
298. Quoted in C. Abbott, supra note 77, at 186.
299. See D. Popenoe, supra note 297, at 35-36 (the separation of work, shopping,
cultural and recreational activities and residence, as well as the economic segregation of
residents, are aspects of the social differentiation that dominates metropolitan life).
300. "The separation of work from residence and the concentration of daily activities outside the home and neighborhood have reduced the sense of belonging."
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one in which he or she currently resides. But other localities-places of
work, schooling or shopping; places through which a person passes
during the diurnal commute; places of former residence-may play an
important role in the individual's life, thereby reducing interest in and
30 1
involvement with the person's current home locality.
Despite their numerous contacts with other local governments,
people remain intensely concerned with issues pertaining to their jurisdiction of residence. It is this locality that makes tax, regulatory and
spending decisions that directly affect the value of one's home, the
character of one's neighbors and the quality and cost of basic public
services. Still, the mystic quality with which the term "community"
often invests these shared interests-the hint of some organic unity of
the individual and the place-is hard to sustain. The strong identification of the citizen with the local community that characterized the
Greek polis, the high-medieval city and the New England town has
given way to a society in which daily life is spread over a number of
places. The role of any one locality in the life of the individual, the
personal commitment to that locality and one's fellow
feeling for other
30 2
local residents must be correspondingly reduced.
The role of mobility and the multiplicity of local governments in
limiting the sense of community as an incentive to and a benefit of participation do not require us to reject participation as a political value or
to deny the importance of the local setting as a focus of participation. 30 3 But we can question whether participation would be greatly
advanced by further local autonomy and whether the benefits of the
increment in participation would be worth the costs additional local autonomy would impose.
Kronus, Race, Ethnicity, and Community, in Handbook of Contemporary Urban Life,
supra note 157, at 202, 232.
301. In his comparative study of metropolitan community life in the United States,
Great Britain and Sweden, Popenoe found the greatest separation of work, residence
and shopping in the United States. See D. Popenoe, supra note 297, at 81-82.
302. This is just another version of Max Weber's observation that "when the city
lost its walls the city ceased to be." Long, The City as Reservation, 25 Pub. Interest 22,
22 (Fall 1971) (paraphrasing Weber). As Long points outs, for Weber the city began as
a "bounded association, literally enclosed by walls that clearly marked it off from the
outside society. Within these walls it had a life in common and a shared common purpose." Id. Today, "[t]he unwalled city can be safely exploited by those who can reside
without." Id. at 36.
303. Even assuming that smaller is better, a locality would have to be quite small in
order for residents to reap the full benefits of the potential for participation. Using the
town meeting as a model, Dahl calculated that if a town held a six-hour meeting and
limited participants to two minutes of speaking each, about 200 people would be able to
actually participate in the meeting. That would be 20% of the population of a town of
1000 people-and only 1% in a town of 20,000. R. Dahl, supra note 10, at 70-71. Dahl
and Tufte found that participation was best achieved in communities with populations
under 8000. See R. Dahl & E. Tufte, supra note 214, at 62-65. Although most local
governments are small, most people live in local governments too large to permit full
participation by all adult members of the community.
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Greater local autonomy would not substantially advance participation. There already is a great deal of local legal power, and the principal constraint on local power is often not legal but economic: the limits
of local resources and the structure of interlocal competition. So, too,
mobility and the spread of daily activities across a metropolitan area are
far greater impediments to a revitalized sense of local community than
any nominal limits on local legal power. As long as the social trends
that have eroded the connection between locality and community ties
continue unabated, it is difficult to believe that augmenting local governments' already substantial legal powers will have any significant effect on either the sense of community or the extent of political
participation at the local level. At the same time, the cost of local legal
autonomy, the burden it places on poorer localities and the crippling
effect it has on efforts to remedy local economic and social problems,
are far greater than participationists acknowledge.
b. Economic Localism in PoliticalPerspective. - The Tiebout hypothesis describes the contemporary urban setting better than does Frug's
theory. But the descriptive power of economic localism does not translate into a satisfactory normative justification for the enhancement 30of4
local power or even for the current broad scope of local autonomy.
Tiebout's theory is one of interlocal movement. It does not address the internal operations of urban government, local political institutions or local political activity. The model provides no basis for
understanding how local governments make decisions, nor is it concerned with how local residents participate in local decision making.
Indeed, Tiebout's model hardly acknowledges that local governments
are governments, and does not recognize the concept of local citizenship at all. Under economic localism, governments are little more than
citizens but
purveyors of public goods, and local residents are 30not
"consumer-voters," and highly transient ones at that. 5
For Tiebout, the central mechanism of citizen-government relations is departure. The individuals who drive the system and make it
work are the ones who leave, are likely to leave or have recently arrived;
their significance to the local polity derives from their marginal status.
Although the interlocal competition for taxpayers and investors indicates that there is considerable descriptive power in this view of local
government, it is unclear why we should want a local government system in which the critical actors are those with the weakest ties to the
304. The ensuing discussion in the text presents a normative critique of the

Tiebout model; it assumes arguendo the descriptive validity of Tiebout's analysis. The

Tiebout model, however, has been subject to considerable debate on positive as well as

normative grounds. See, e.g., Lowery & Lyons, The Impact of Jurisdictional Boundaries: An Individual-Level Test of the Tiebout Model, 51 J. Pol. 73 (1989).
305. Cf. Clark, Democracy and the Capitalist State: Towards a Critique of the
Tiebout Hypothesis, in Political Studies from Spatial Perspectives 111, 120-27 (A.
Burnett & P. Taylor eds. 1981) (Tiebout's focus on the provision of local public goods
and services has obscured the democratic potential of local governments).
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locality and the critical decisions do not involve the structure of local
decision making, the substance of local policies or the process of local
political activity, but rather the decision whether or not to exit.
This conception contrasts sharply with that of participationists like
Frug. Whatever the shortcomings of participation theory in accounting
for the actual scope and potential of local power, its basic premise is
that local governments are political institutions that decide on public
issues in a manner influenced by and accountable to an involved constituency, of local residents. Its critical decisioni makers are the residents who stay, {commit time and effort to their relations with other
local citizens and have a stake in the community. Participation theory
recognizes, indeed is built on, the normative assumptions about local
government that have long been basic to the structure of American
government. At least since Jefferson and Tocqueville, the appeal of localism has been rooted in a view of local governments as "little republics" 3 06 -- places of self-government, of collective decision making by
local residents about local problems-and that such local self-determination enables local governments to serve as "primary schools" of liberty, 30 7 educating and training citizens for national democracy.
The idea of local governments as governments-as centers of collective decision making rather than as firms that supply goods to the
municipal marketplace-is certainly the underpinning of the legal authority of local governments. State restrictions on special commissions
that would perform municipal services and on special acts relating to
municipalities, state authorizations of home rule and state statutes decentralizing power to localities, all were intended to protect the integrity of local decisions, not to facilitate interlocal movement. 30 8 And the
ascent of local autonomy in state and federal jurisprudence grows out
of a belief in democracy within localities, not in the external relations of
local governments to each other or to their departing "consumervoters."
The most emphatically localist decisions-the ones providing the
firmest basis for stating that local autonomy enjoys a measure of legal
protection-are based on the interest of local residents in local selfgovernment and on the rights of local residents to participate politically
in local decision making, not on their right of exit. Thus, the United
States Supreme Court's response to the complaint about the malapportioned county legislature in Avery v. Midland County3 0 9 was not that
plaintiffs were free to move to a jurisdiction with a governance structure responsive to their taste for the "one-person, one-vote" principle
but rather that local residents have a right to be represented and par306. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), reprinted in 13

The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 394, 400 (A. Bergh ed. 1905).
307. A. Tocqueville, Democracy in America 63 (Bradley ed. 1945).

308. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 9-10.
309. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).

1990]

OUR LOCALISM

ticipate in the decisions of the local governments in which they reside
on the basis of "one person, one vote." 310 The essence of Avery is that
cities and counties are governments and, as such, must be structured in
the principles that govern the operations of
accordance with
31 1
govemments.
In other cases that affirmed local control over land use and education finance-Belle Terre,3 1 2 Arlington Heights,31 3 Rodriguez,3 14 Milliken v.
Bradley3 15 and Buse v. Smith3 l---the legitimacy of local authority and
the appropriateness of local control and deference to local actions were
grounded not on the availability of a choice of local governments or on
the possibility of emigration but on the locally representative nature of
local institutions. Local laws and policies were seen as outcomes of local democratic processes and were accordingly deserving of respect.
Voice, not exit, accounts for the normative power of localism in our
legal and political system because voice, not exit, more accurately reflects the commitment to self-government that is at the heart of legal
localism.
Some economic theorists have recognized the anomaly of a theory
of local autonomy that accords a preferred position to the most marginal residents and ignores the inner workings of local governments.
These economists have sought to construct an efficiency-based theory
rooted in Tiebout's model but addressed to the internal dynamics of a
local polity and focused on the costs of participation and of local political action. As exemplified by Bish, Ostrom, Oates and others, this approach builds on Tiebout's assumptions but prizes primarily the
smaller, more homogeneous and responsive political units that it assumes will result from the multiplicity of local governments and the
freedom to move among them.
This more political version of the economic model shares
Tiebout's commitment to personal mobility within a multilocal metropolitan area, since mobility and large numbers of local governments
310. Id. at 480. Similarly, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), the abil-

ity of Tuskegee's black residents to relocate to other communities that might have

shared their preferences on matters of public policy was no renledy for the denial of
their right to vote in Tuskegee itself.
Not surprisingly, the leading legal scholar of urban government adopting the
Tiebout perspective would overrule Avery and allow localities to experiment with differ-

ent local governance structures including those not based on principles of equal representation and participation. See Ellickson, Growth Controls, supra note 7, at 1558-63.
311. See 390 U.S. at 480.
312. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); see Briffault, supra note 1,
at 101-03.
313. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977); see Briffault, supra note 1, at 104-05.
314. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); see Briffault,

supra note 1, at 99-101.
315. 418 U.S. 717 (1974); see Briffault, supra note 1, at 94-96.
316. 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976); see Briffault, supra note 1, at 29-31.
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increase the likelihood of local homogeneity. 3 17 But the political version of the economic model displays conflicting concerns when freedom of movement, local autonomy and the efficiency value of local
government come together. Mobility is the "crucial lever"3 18 of both
the Tiebout model and the more political version. Yet the shift from an
external model to an internal model featuring homogeneity, citizen involvement in local decision making and local autonomy renders mobility problematic.
Mobility is destabilizing. The movement of individuals from one
locality to another changes the nature of both places. The locality of
departure loses people and institutions that were constitutive of that
community's life; the locality of arrival must absorb people whose values, needs, interests, ethnicity or lifestyle may differ from those of the
previous inhabitants.3 1 9 The destabilizing effect increases with numbers. A city that loses many residents may lose the resources necessary
to provide the programs its residents want. A locality that receives
many newcomers may find the scale of local life transformed, with attendant problems of congestion, infrastructure needs, service burdens
and a loss of the quality of life that made the locality attractive to resi3 20
dents and immigrants in the first place.
As a result, local residents often seek to resist mobility. The localities of departure lack the legal authority to prevent people from leaving. But the localities of arrival, through their power to regulate land
use and determine the rate of investment in new infrastructure, can do
much to determine the wealth, life style and, indirectly, the ethnicity of
new arrivals and to control the pace of growth.
Moreover, "interlocal mobility" is*not an abstraction; most movement is from the central cities to the suburbs. The typical suburb is
smaller and more homogeneous than the nearby central city, suburban
residents are likely to feel more threatened by change and suburban
governments are more apt to adopt measures intended to retard
317. Indeed, these scholars have been even more normative than Tiebout, arguing
affirmatively for the creation of more, and more specialized, governments in metropolitan areas and opposing laws that would restrict new incorporations or create area-wide
metropolitan governments. See, e.g., R. Bish, supra note 142, at 45-62; Wagner &
Weber, supra note 245, at 684; cf. Martin & Wagner, supra note 246, at 425 (concluding
that California limitation on incorporation of unincorporated territory through administrative review has increased monopoly power of local governments).
318. G. Clark, supra note 8, at 164.
319. Tiebout's theory suggests only that new residents are likely to agree with previous residents concerning the locality's tax-services packages. Even if this is accurate,
migration may create new ethnic, cultural or social divisions within the locality.
320. As Oliver Williams notes, the advantages in terms of the quality of public services and the quality of life which result from location in a particular community "must
be safeguarded" by the community "for the curse of urbanism is the instability of site
advantages. A variety of social institutions, of which the municipality is one, help to
protect the place of advantage for its constituents and to slow down the forces of
change." Williams, supra note 131, at 302.
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change. Suburbs, themselves the products of residential mobility and
are most
ongoing beneficiaries of unimpeded interlocal commutation,
32 1

likely to pass exclusionary ordinances that reduce mobility.

Mobility, which is pivotal to the efficiency of Tiebout's system, is in
tension with the internal local efficiency prized by other economists.
Mobility creates heterogeneity, bringing into a community new people
with different backgrounds, different concerns, different attitudes toward the community and different expectations about local government. The new arrivals increase the size of the locality and cause new
divisions within it; both changes drive up the cost of local government.
Thus, some economists have endorsed local efforts to control mobility.
Exclusionary zoning has value "as a mechanism for controlling the
composition of the local population, ' 32 2 thereby preserving local homogeneity, reducing disputes over the role of local government and
increasing the satisfaction of the average member of the community.
But, of course, this efficiency-based claim for local policies that advance homogeneity by excluding others is in direct conflict with the
economic model's commitment to the free movement of people among
localities. Local policies that promote small size and homogeneity and
serve the interests of current residents interfere with the ability of nonresident consumer-voters to move into the community and consequently impede the smooth functioning of the metropolitan
marketplace in municipal services.
The economic argument for local autonomy, thus, contains divergent strands respecting the value of interlocal mobility. These differences are indicative of the normative difficulties of the economic
analysis. Tiebout's "pure theory" is built around the structure of interlocal relations and the role of the marginal consumer-voter in revealing preferences through exit. Although it contributes to an
understanding of how interlocal mobility constrains local government
action, it is not a theory of local government or of the inner workings of
a local polity. Its exclusive reliance on mobility means that it has nothing to say about how governments relate to those constituents who do
not move or how constituents may participate in local public activities.
Tiebout's pure theory yields no normative argument for local
autonomy.
The second economic approach, with its more political orientation,
is a theory of government based on the mechanism of public choice in
the locality and the importance of homogeneity in reducing the costs of
local political activity. It contributes to an appreciation of why many
321. See, e.g., Ellickson, Growth Controls, supra note 7, at 404-10.

322. Oates, On Local Finance and the Tiebout Model, Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers &
Proceedings), May 1981, at 93, 96; see also Neenan & Ethridge, supra note 35, at

181-82 (positing connection between "qualities of the local population" and "quality of
[local] public services"; discussing effect that exclusionary zoning has on nature of local
population and consequently on nature of services).
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places pursue policies that aim to preserve homogeneity. But by valuing local decision making and local actions that limit or prevent the
entry of would-be residents, political economy is in tension with
Tiebout's basic assumption about the normative significance of mobility in enabling all individuals to satisfy their preferences for public services at the local level.
The internal cleavage within economic theory over the place of
"consumer-voter" mobility in determining the efficiency of urban government signifies a further problem with relying on mobility and ease
of exit in justifying local autonomy: people are not equally mobile, and
exit is not equally easy for all residents. Economic theory ignores this
interpersonal inequality. Indeed, economic localism in general fails to
address interpersonal and interlocal inequalities. This silence produces
a theory that is biased in favor of business and the affluent.
Interjurisdictional movement is not cost-free. It is constrained by a
variety of economic and social factors that tend to affect poorer people
more than affluent ones. First, there are the out-of-pocket costs of relocation-of picking up, selling a home or otherwise disinvesting from
one's original locality, searching for a new place to live, transporting
one's self and family and finding and paying for a new home. Second,
most people can only reside where they have access to work. 323 Thus,

corporate investment decisions and local zoning regulations that determine the location of jobs, the education and skills requirements that
determine who will be eligible for those jobs and the costs of commuting from home to workplace all limit ease of movement. Poorer, less
educated potential movers will have fewer options and will be forced to
3 24
bear more costs if they attempt to move.

Similarly, people can only reside where they can afford to reside.
Suburban exclusionary ordinances, such as large-lot zoning and the exclusion of multifamily and subsidized housing, drive up the cost of
housing in many jurisdictions, denying many potential movers a meaningful choice of places to live. Access to jobs and access to homes are
often interrelated. Suburban zoning decisions often make the communities adjacent to new manufacturing facilities, office and industrial
parks or corporate headquarters economically inaccessible to all but
relatively affluent people, effectively refusing poorer people both housing and employment opportunities or forcing them to endure long
325
commutes as the price of a job.

323. SeeJ. Logan & H. Molotch, supra note 17, at 41.
324. Cf. Sharp, supra note 272, at 73 (mobility differs by race and, to a lesser extent, by educational level).
325. Despite the rapid movement of industry to the suburbs in recent decades, relatively little low-income housing has been built there. As a result, employment opportunities have been separated from the low-income people in the inner cities who need
them most. See D. Harvey, Social Justice and the City 60-64 (1973).
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Economic factors are not the only restrictions on movement. People are tied to their home jurisdictions by bonds of emotion and sentiment. A home is not just a house but a place with friends, family and
neighbors. The home jurisdiction is not just a political unit but a familiar and dependable environment, the setting of one's daily routine, a
source of physical and psychic security and a component of one's sense
of personal identity. Although patterns of mobility and commutation
strain the notion of community, sentimental attachments to place do
exist, and the severing of personal ties is a cost of relocation and a
3 26
restriction on interlocal movement.
Residents are, to some degree, grounded by social forces.3 2 7 The
relocation decisions of businesses and investors, by contrast, are usually less constrained by feelings of community or attachments to neighborhood. The economic costs of shifting capital from one place to
another are also less than the costs of relocation for residents. Investors can transfer wealth across local boundaries instantaneously.
Although investment in plants and equipment is less mobile, firms can
cut back on maintenance and decline to modernize old plants, while
328
gradually shifting new investments to new settings.
Thus, investors of capital and owners of businesses, rather than
residents, are the prime beneficiaries of the system of multiple jurisdictions and ease of movement. They can consider a broader array ofjurisdictions as sites for investment than are available to individuals as
possible new homes. These interjurisdictional shifts in investment will,
in turn, determine the location of jobs, the patterns of residential migration, local economic and fiscal prosperity (or decline) and the ability
of localities to provide programs that respond to the needs of local
32 9
residents.
The relative mobility of capital3 3 0 and, to a lesser degree, of more
affluent residents is central to the dynamics of the contemporary in326. See, e.g., J. Logan & H. Molotch, supra note 17, at 99-110.
327. Logan and Molotch argue that social costs of relocation also have a differential
impact reflecting differences in income. They contend that the disadvantaged are more
tightly "tied down by the surrounding social net" and more dependent for assistance on
friends, family and neighborhoods than are more affluent people. See id. at 42-43.
328. See id. at 39-40. On industrial disinvestment and relocation, see B. Bluestone
& B. Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry (1982).
329. The easy mobility of business and investment means that "capital clearly will
flow in a way which bears little relationship to need or to the condition of the least
advantaged territory. The result will be creation of localized pockets of high unfulfilled
need .... " D. Harvey, supra note 325, at 112.
330. The mobility of capital is, of course, only relative. "There is considerable friction in the movement of investment capital." Swanstrom, supra note 281, at 94-95.
And there are differences of mobility among various kinds of investments. For example,
it is more difficult for advanced corporate services to relocate than it is for manufacturing. Id.
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terlocal competition for new investment and new taxpayers."31 The operational significance of mobility and the multiplicity ofjurisdictions in
shaping local government behavior cannot be denied. But it is hard to
see why, given the system's built-in economic discrimination and its
preference for capital over residential consumer-voters, capital mobility
and jurisdictional multiplicity should constitute a normative justification for the preservation, let alone the extension, of local autonomy. A
metropolitan marketplace for municipal services in which local "firms"
cater primarily to the interests of businesses and wealthy residents may
enable investors and the affluent to maximize the satisfaction of their
preferences for local services, taxes and regulation. Clearly, however,
such a system provides fewer benefits for residents whose mobility is
constrained by the economic and social costs of moving and by local
exclusionary regulations.
The importance of economic and social inequalities in calling into
question the normative value of the Tiebout hypothesis cuts deeper
than the class- and wealth-based distinctions in ability to move. The
economic model assumes that the tax, service and regulatory differences among localities are the result of variations in "tastes." In theory, one locality may prefer a municipal swimming pool, another might
favor parks, a third might opt for new roads and a fourth might decide
to lower taxes and spend less on local services. In fact, however, local
taxing and spending decisions are often based not simply on idiosyncratic tastes but also on the stark differences in local fiscal capacity that
divide localities within each metropolitan area.
As the record of the school finance cases indicates, in state after
state the level of local spending on education and the quality of local
schools correlated with local taxable wealth, not just with local tax
rates. Wealthy communities generally spend much more per capita on
their schools, but can still tax their residents at much lower rates than
poorer communities, which typically tax at high rates but can still manage only relatively low levels of school spending. The small per-student amounts of school spending in poorer jurisdictions were a result
not of the lack of a "taste" for education among residents of that locality, but rather of the inadequacy of local taxable resources.33 2 Other
331. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing rise of suburban indus-

trial enclaves such as City of Industry, California and Forest View, Illinois). See R.
Healy &J. Rosenberg, Land Use and the States 20-21 (2d ed. 1979); M. Danielson,

supra note 24, at 46.
332. Thus, as the California Supreme Court found in Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d
584,487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, (1971), although the Beverly Hills Unified School
District was spending $1232 per child while the Baldwin Park Unified School District was

spending $577 per child, the difference in expenditures could hardly be said to have
been the result of Beverly Hills' greater "taste" for education. Indeed, Beverly Hills'
school tax was only $2.38 per $100 of assessed valuation while in Baldwin Park the tax
rate was more than twice as high-$5.48 per $100. The spending disparity was attributed to an enormous difference in assessed valuation per child-$3,706 in Baldwin Park
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studies have found that the quantity and quality of other local services
333
also vary directly with local fiscal capacity.
This is hardly surprising. Communities with larger tax bases per
capita can purchase the same amount of services at lower individual tax
rates. Other things being equal, where the effective tax price of a service is lower, more of the service will be bought. There is a generalized
interest among local residents in services such as good schools, paved
roads and safe streets. Given these common concerns it is likely that
interlocal taxing and spending differences are a result less of radical
differences in preferences than of the broad fiscal disparities among
334
municipalities.
The disparities in local fiscal capacity reduce the normative appeal
of the economic theory of local autonomy in a second way. Local fiscal
capacity is not so much a matter of local preferences as the result of the
siting decisions of industrial, commercial and financial firms and of
broader regional, national or international economic developments.
Although local governments regularly seek to influence the locational
and investment decisions of private firms, and may have some impact at
the margin, for the most part local fiscal resources are dependent on
decisions over which local governments have little control. Local
wealth thus is often not a result of local decisions but rather of external
forces-but the legal rules that constitute the system of local governments allow wealthier jurisdictions to reap the benefits of these exter33 5
nal decisions.
Interlocal differences in taxing and spending result from differences in local needs as well as from disparities in fiscal capacity. As
and $50,885 in Beverly Hills-mitigated somewhat by state and federal aid. Id., 5 Cal.
3d at 589-602 & n.15, 487 P.2d at 1244-52 n. 15, 96 Cal. Rptr. 604-12 & n.15; Briffault,
supra note 1, at 35-36.
333. See, e.g., C. Gilbert, supra note 223, at 280-81.
334. According to Markusen, "If Tiebout's view were correct, suburban political
units would exhibit a wide variety of public-service packages ....
In fact, the most
striking characteristics of suburban units are their ... nearly identical public-service
mixes, with quality of service rising quite consistently with class composition of residents." Markusen, supra note 251, at 83-84 (citation omitted).
Bish rejects the idea that public service levels ought to be relatively equal throughout a metropolitan area, contending that it reflects the false assumption that all individuals have identical tastes and therefore the desire to purchase the same mix of goods. See
R. Bish, supra note 142, at 153-54. But it seems equally implausible to suppose that
differences in the level and mix of basic services are not influenced by local fiscal capacity, especially in jurisdictions marked by high levels of tax but relatively low levels of
spending. As Meltsner observed, "fiscal federalism... is a euphemism that masks local
poverty . . . ." A. Meltsner, The Politics of City Revenue 252 (1971).
Jenny Holzer disposes of the relationship between preferences and wealth more
succinctly: "Money creates taste." See D. Waldman, Jenny Holzer, at cover, 29, 38, 39
(1989) (Guggenheim Museum exhibition catalog depicting selections from artist's 1986
work Truisms).
335. See Reschovsky, An Evaluation of Metropolitan Area Tax Base Sharing, 33
Nat'l TaxJ. 55, 56 (1980).
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discussed earlier, older, more crowded cities, with poorer, more dependent populations have qualitatively different, and greater, demands on
their local resources than do smaller, newer communities with relatively
more affluent inhabitants.3 3 6 These differences in service demands are
at least partially attributable to history, migration patterns, the social
and economic attributes of city residents, federal and state welfare
mandates, population and business concentration and the exclusionary
practices of the suburbs 3 37-- all factors beyond the cities' control. Critical aspects of the size and mix of city spending programs, and the differences between the bigger cities and the suburbs, are significantly
determined by past events or nonlocal forces and do not simply reflect
338
the idiosyncratic tastes of local residents.
Local regulatory decisions are also profoundly affected by local fiscal capacity. In affluent residential localities, land use policies often
seek to limit growth. These localities do not need the additional fiscal
capacity that industry would provide and affirmatively seek to avoid the
fiscal drain that admitting new, less affluent inhabitants would impose. 33 9 In otherjurisdictions, where residential wealth is more limited
and local fiscal capacity is based on the presence of business property,
localities will pursue policies designed to attract "clean" business
uses-industrial parks, research and development firms, high technology companies, shopping malls-and middle-class residents, while excluding other forms of industry and low-income residents. 340 Poorer
336. See supra text accompanying notes 31-37.
337. Suburban commuters, who daily travel in and out of the city, use the city's
transportation system and other services, but do not pay city property taxes, are themselves a source of central city expense. Studies have found that neither the size nor the
population composition of central cities affects city operating costs nearly as much as
does the number of suburbanites who commute to work in the central city. See, e.g.,
Kasarda, Urbanization, Community and the Metropolitan Problem, in Handbook of
Contemporary Urban Life, supra note 157, at 27, 53. The central cities also tend to bear
the costs of providing facilities like hospitals, libraries and museums which serve the
region as a whole but are funded out of city, and not suburban budgets. See, e.g., M.
Edel, E. Sclar & D. Luria, supra note 127, at 35. Although Kasarda contends that this is
evidence of suburban exploitation of the central city, other scholars, noting that suburban commuters pay city sales taxes and contribute to the productivity of city businesses,
find the question of exploitation uncertain. See, e.g., Neenan & Ethridge, supra note 35,
at 182-85.
338. See, e.g., W. Colman, supra note 37, at 51-53 (noting that in 1970 per capita
total expenditures in the 37 largest metropolitan areas were from 26% to 48% greater
in the central cities than in the suburbs, and that on average city residents paid 6.7% of
their income for state and local taxes while suburban residents paid 5%).
Although the fiscal austerity practiced by many cities since the mid-1970s indicates
that urban tax and spending practices are susceptible of local modification and are not
ineluctably compelled by an objective definition of local economic and social needs, the
economic and social facts of city life still powerfully constrain municipal government.
See generally Setting Municipal Priorities: American Cities and the New York Experience (C. Brecher & R. Horton eds. 1984).
339. See, e.g.,J. Logan & H. Molotch, supra note 17, at 191-92.
340. See id. at 188-90.
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jurisdictions, with limited tax bases and limited job opportunities, will
often be forced by their need for tax revenue to encourage development and make efforts to attract a wide range of commercial and industrial users. 3 4 1 It is these disparities in local fiscal capacity and in local
economic and social conditions, rather than free-floating variations in
tastes, that tend to drive the differences in local policies.
In summary, the economic model, for all its descriptive power, fails
to provide a satisfactory normative basis for localism. The critical role
of mobility and the marginal "consumer-voter" in the Tiebout model
does not account for the relationship of the locality, as a polity, to its
residents. And the political version, which attempts to propound a theory of the internal workings of the local polity, must, in the name of
small size and homogeneity, jettison the free mobility that is said to
make the whole system work.
More importantly, economic localism reflects and reinforces existing interpersonal and interlocal inequalities. By accepting the preexisting distribution of wealth, economic localism prefers the interests
of businesses and investors over those of individuals and families, those
of the affluent over those of the poor and those of localities with
34 2
healthy tax bases over those of localities with limited fiscal capacity.
The local government system may be efficient, but if the amelioration
of inequality is to remain an important value in our legal and political
culture, then economic localism cannot provide a sufficient normative
3 43
basis for protecting, let alone extending, local autonomy.
341. See id. at 190-91. These communities may also adopt residential land-use
policies that are at least partially exclusionary, as for example, by refusing to accept
public or subsidized housing. But for older, less affluent communities, it may be too late
to adopt exclusionary policies since there will already be substantial numbers of working
class or poor people resident within the jurisdiction whom the local government is le-

gally powerless to eject-although urban renewal at one time was an important mechanism that allowed cities to displace poorer residence. See, e.g., J. Mollenkopf, supra

note 121, at 162-79.
342. As Yates has observed, "Tiebout's argument is a recipe for certain disaster
because most cities simply cannot compete with most suburbs for fiscally profitable residents and industries .... Because of their fiscal structure and service obligations, cities
cannot compete (or even survive) in a system of free market federalism." D. Yates, The
Ungovernable City 186-87 (1977).
343. Participation theorists also pay relatively little attention to the implications of

interpersonal or interlocal wealth inequalities for localism. Although local participation
is said to be empowering, class and wealth differences affect the ability to participate

within a locality, as well as the ability to relocate from one locality to another. See
Sharp, supra note 272, at 72, 80 ("[C]onsidered individually, responsiveness to voice

and responsiveness to potential exit each should tend to bias local government decisionmaking toward the preferences of the higher status group; but more importantly, the

combination of responsiveness to voice and responsiveness to potential exit would, in
principle, compound that bias"); cf. J. Mansbridge, supra note 207, at 80-82 (impor-

tance of education, status and income cleavages, particularly among newcomers, in affecting propensity to participate in New England town meeting). Moreover, differences
in wealth among localities create substantial disparities in the potential scope of local
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c. Local Size and Local Boundaries: The Shared Shortcomings of Political
and Economic Localism. - Although the economic and political theories,
when examined separately, fail to provide a persuasive justification for
local autonomy, the two together might make the case for localism. Instead, cumulating the two theories only highlights their common shortcomings: both rest on assumptions about the relationship between
local governments and the scope of local actions that reveal strong and
largely unresolved tensions between each theory's central animating
concerns and the actual practice of local autonomy.
Both models assume that the consequences of local actions are
borne primarily within the acting locality-internalized, in the economists' term. Tiebout makes this premise express: in his idealized
model, local government will be efficient only when locally supplied
public services "exhibit no external economies or diseconomies between communities. '3 44 Frug makes no similar explicit statement, but
for him the value of participation is that it enables people to be directly
involved in the collective decisions that affect their lives. 34 5 This assumes that all individuals affected by a locality's action have a right to
participate in those decisions. A local government that permitted only
some of its residents to participate in local politics or gave greater
weight to the participation of some over others would fail the standard
of participatory democracy.3 46 Yet a locality that includes within its
borders only some of the people directly affected by the local government's actions should be equally problematic from a participatory
34 7
perspective.
Today, local borders cut across densely packed and economically
and socially intertwined metropolitan areas, virtually guaranteeing that
there will be externalities and that some people, namely nonresidents,
will be excluded from participating in the decisions of one of the reprograms. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 20-21 (discussing disparities in wealth revealed
in trial records in school finance cases).
Nevertheless, since inequality is an important contemporary political concern, the
failure of economic localism to address the problems of interlocal inequality provides an
important political perspective on the economic justification of local autonomy. The
implications of differences in local wealth for the participation-based argument for localism are discussed more fully in Section E, infra.
344. Tiebout, supra note 230, at 419; see Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren, supra note
247, at 837-38.
345. See Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1068.
346. See, e.g., Board of Estimate v. Morris, 109 S.Ct. 1433 (1989) (applying oneperson, one-vote standard to invalidate New York City Board of Estimate); Hill v. Stone,
421 U.S. 289 (1975) (municipal bond elections that required approval of concurrent
majorities of all voters and all property taxpayers unconstitutional); Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (applying one-person, one-vote rule to general purpose
local governments).
347. Cf. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (invalidating under the fifteenth amendment Alabama's redrawing of Tuskegee's municipal boundaries, which
had resulted in exclusion of blacks from municipality and, consequently, denied blacks
the right to vote in Tuskegee's municipal elections).
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gion's many local governments though they are intimately affected by
these decisions. Thus, full internalization of all local actions and full
participation for all those affected by local decisions would tend to require larger local units. Yet both economic and political localism are
3 48
predicated on the smallness of local governments.
Localists must reconcile the conflict between large and small. A
commitment to local autonomy based on efficiency requires a theory of
local size that would draw local boundaries large enough to internalize
costs and benefits, minimize spillover effects and achieve economies of
scale, yet small enough to keep down political decision-making costs
and maximize ease of relocation. A participation-based theory of local
autonomy requires localities small enough to permit each citizen to engage in face-to-face dialogue with her neighbors and affect local decisions, yet large enough so that local governments would have the fiscal
and administrative resources to carry out the results of local deliberations and allow participation by all those directly affected by local
decisions.
Although issues of size and boundaries are critical to a theory of
local government, neither economic nor political localism has a theory
of optimal local size or of local boundary formation. Moreover, in practice there is an enormous variance in the size of local governments,
which range in area from less than a square mile to several hundred
square miles and in population from hamlets of a few dozen people to
New York City, with its nearly eight million inhabitants. Surely a significant number of local governments are simply the wrong size for efficient or participatory operation. Yet neither political nor economic
localism accounts for this wide range of local sizes or addresses the
question of what to do about those localities that are too large or too
3 49
small.
Frug's writings are silent on optimal local size. He appears to embrace both large and small localities, despite the enormous differences
between them.3 5 0 The importance of small size is a basic tenet of his
348. It is the locality's smaller size that differentiates it from state and nation; small
size that reduces the costs of interlocal mobility and the internal costs of political decision making; and small size that enhances the role of the individual citizen and makes
possible both individual empowerment and community-spirited decisions. See supra
text accompanying notes 215-222, 250-253.
349. Although localists usually have more trouble with cities that are too large for

optimal efficiency, see, e.g., V. Ostrom, R. Bish &E. Ostrom, supra note 24, at 71-73, or
participation, see, e.g., D. Elazar, supra note 20, at 46, it has also been suggested, that

small towns are too small to be politically effective. See R. Martin, Grass Roots 42-70
(1957).
350. Frug defines "city" "to include the concepts of neighborhood and regional

government," Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1061, and "to refer to any
other institution that exercises general governmental authority in an area smaller than,
yet within, an American state." Id. at 1061 n.4. Thus, he "generally make[s] no distinction between cities and towns, or between them and any other local government entity."
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theory; small size is intimately connected to citizen empowerment, the
incentive to participate and the possibility of community-spirited decision making. Yet Frug repeatedly uses the term "city" with all of its
connotations of major urban centers. 35 ' He relies on the history of
home rule and state interference with local autonomy, which is primarily the story of political conflict between states and big cities. 352 His
call for cities to operate financial institutions, provide housing, create
a profood cooperatives and run profit-making businesses is primarily
35 3
gram for large cities, not small towns or residential suburbs.
Frug apparently would not exclude New York or Chicago from the
category of optimally sized local governments, even though they have
larger populations than many states and some nations. 3 54 These are
just the municipalities with the political constituencies to support and
the resources to undertake activist economic and social programs. Yet
given their large populations, they are too big to realize the participatory benefits of small size and local autonomy. 3 55 How a theory
based on participation and small size can justify autonomy for all localities given the enormous differences in local size is never addressed.
Without formally resolving the conflicting imperatives of reduction
of externalities and maximization of internal efficiency and ease of exit,
the urban economists appear to prefer smaller units for most governmental functions. 3 56 They contend that most economies of scale are
achieved by cities of 50,000 to 100,000 inhabitants and that benefits
beyond this range are often attained at too great a price in terms 35of7
increased local decision-making costs and burdens on relocation.
351. The title of Frug's principal article, as well as the title of four of the five parts
of that article, use the words "city" or "cities." See id. at. 1057 (table of contents).
352. See id. at 1109-19.
353. See id. at 1150; Frug, Property and Power, supra note 203, at 687-91.
354. New York City is bigger in population than all but 9 of the 50 states. See A.
Hacker, supra note 21, at 15-18.
355. As Robert Dahl put it, from a participationist perspective "[t]o regard the government of New York as a local government is to make nonsense of the term." Dahi,
supra note 210, at 968.
By contrast, Dean Sandalow, writing from a Madisonian perspective sensitive to the
dangers of majoritarian excess in small units, has observed that these dangers would be
mitigated if home rule were limited to the big cities, whose larger and more heterogeneous populations resemble those of states. See Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal
Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 643, 709-10 & n.263
(1964).
Douglas Yates contends that New York City is both too large and too small-too
large to permit a participatory government and too small to affect the state and national
forces that contribute to local problems and constrain the range of local solutions. D.
Yates, supra note 342, at 178.
356. See V. Ostrom, R. Bish & E. Ostrom, supra note 24, at 153-82; Bish, supra
note 142, at 54, 55.
357. SeeJ. Bollens & H. Schmandt, supra note 85, at 232 (citing W. Henderson &
L. Ledebur, Urban Economics: Processes and Problems 94-98 (1972)); Bish, supra note
142, at 153; see also D. Elazar, supra note 20, at 38-42 (concluding that communities
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Even without developing a standard linking size and efficiency, this economic analysis implies that large cities are too big to be efficient,
although calls for the actual dissolution of big cities are rare.

5 8s

How

can a theory based on efficiency and on the connection between efficiency and small size, justify local autonomy in general when so many
localities are the wrong size to be efficient?
The question of proper local boundaries adds another slant to the
problematic nature of localism. Local boundaries do not simply define
the size of the locality; they also determine who is left out. If local
boundaries corresponded to divisions between relatively self-contained
and self-sufficient communities, marked by tight economic, political
and social bonds, distant or at least relatively detached from their
neighbors, then the exclusionary aspect of boundaries might not be significant. Each person could then reside in and be a member of the locality that had the dominant impact on her life. But today most
localities are not self-contained or self-sufficient. Nor are local boundaries typically drawn with a concern to promote efficient local operations
or to include within local borders all those people with a strong stake in
local decisions. 359 Local borders enclose only small fractions of interdependent urbanized areas. As a result, local decisions regularly imare not
pose externalities on people outside the local polity who
3 60
entitled to participate in the local decision-making process.
Neither economic nor political localists give much attention to the
problem of local boundaries. Nor do they attempt to justify their acranging in population from 40,000 to 120,000 are optimal for political communication
and economies of scale).
358. Urban economists more commonly are content to warn against the dangers of
central city expansion or the consolidation of cities with their metropolitan areas. See,

e.g., R. Bish, supra note 142, at 79-103 (comparing costs of a consolidated metropolitan
area with benefits of a fragmented region composed of smaller localities); Warren, supra
note 245, at 193; cf. Greene & Parliament, Political Externalities, Efficiency, and the
Welfare Losses from Consolidation, 33 Nat'l Tax J. 209, 215 (1980) (pointing to in-

efficiencies created by combining local school districts to form county-wide school district).
Daniel Elazar, an urbanist writing from an economic perspective, does urge "seri-

ous consideration" to breaking up central cities. D. Elazar, supra note 20, at 222. Elazar
does not address the question of how slum neighborhoods would fare after such a

breakup.
359. Municipal boundaries are often the product of history and reflect political and

geographic concerns and considerations arising from the production, communications,
or transportation technologies of the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. Other bound-

aries may have originated in the self-interested schemes of developers. Municipal
boundaries are usually determined by local interests and, once fixed, are usually difficult
to alter. See Briffault, supra note I, at 73-85.

360. Moreover, the policies of one locality may have a direct effect on the policies
of another. A locality's decision to exclude multifamily housing, for example, may lead

neighboring localities to adopt the same exclusionary measures in order to prevent an

influx of residents from the initial excluding community. See Burnell & Burnell, Community Interaction and Suburban Zoning Policies, 24 Urb. Aff. Q. 470 (1989) (develop-

ing this hypothesis and applying it to zoning policies in the Chicago metropolitan area).
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ceptance of boundaries that were laid down without concern for either
participation or efficiency and that ineluctably create unfair exclusions
and externalities. Instead, both are drawn to the same solutions: interlocal contracts and cooperation.
Localists argue that local governments can deal with the problems
of spillovers, economies of scale and the unequal distribution of resources through a process of interlocal bargaining, accommodation, informal understandings, dialogue and compromise. 36 1 Localities, they
maintain, can form joint ventures or special-purpose districts when the
36 2
supply of services on a regional basis provides economies of scale.
Localities that are too small to provide basic services efficiently can contract to buy them from other governments. 3 63 Interlocal service contracts can improve efficiency by eliminating the duplicative
administrative and infrastructure costs that would occur if many small
localities each supplied all of their own services. Negative externalities
can be dealt with through bilateral bargaining and the payment of
compensation.364
According to localism's adherents, even exclusionary zoning and
the unequal resources available for public schools may be addressed
through interlocal discussion and deliberation. In Frug's view, "the issue of exclusionary zoning [is] a problem of establishing a mechanism
that will allow dialogue among the communities affected by the zoning
action; both those excluded and those seeking to exclude must be allowed to participate in the process of resolving their interconnected
housing problems. '3 65 Similarly, school finance reform could be accomplished by having institutional forums in which property-rich and
as "equal[s] in working out
property-poor school districts participate
3 66
how school funds are to be allocated."
By contrast, Frug views recourse to the states, even to redress the
effects of local exclusionary activity, as a threat to local autonomy to be
avoided at all costs: "[elvery time a decision is made to defer decisionmaking responsibility to someone else, there is a loss of freedom-a
'3 67
loss of the ability to have a voice in determining one's own future.
The state court decisions limiting exclusionary zoning and ordering
361. See, e.g., R. Bish & V. Ostrom, supra note 147, at 66-68; D. Elazar, supra note
20, at 145-47; Frug, Empowering Cities, supra note 6, at 561-63; Ostrom, Tiebout &
Warren, supra note 247, at 831; Warren, supra note 245, at 193.
362. See, e.g., R. Bish & V. Ostrom, supra note 147, at 59-61, 99; Ostrom, Tiebout
& Warren, supra note 247, at 838; see also supra text accompanying notes 128-140
(discussing special purpose districts).
363. See supra text accompanying notes 141-148 (discussing interlocal contracting).
364. See, e.g., Fox, An Evaluation of Metropolitan Area Tax Base Sharing: A Comment, 34 Nat'l TaxJ. 275, 276-77 (1981).
365. Frug, Empowering Cities, supra note 6, at 560.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 562.
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school finance reform are considered no improvement over local exclusion and interlocal inequalities, because, through those cases, "some
cities have been stripped of their ability to participate in the decision
making that vitally affects their interests, let alone of the ability to decide their future by themselves. ' 3 68 Reform must come out of interlocal discussions and agreements, not state intervention.
Although theoretically attractive, interlocal cooperation has in
practice been relatively narrow in scope 3 69 and typically confined to
matters of technical infrastructure that realize economies of scale 'and
effectuate regional economic integration, but that have only limited implications for local wealth and social status. 3 70 For services affecting
local prestige and individual lifestyles, interlocal cooperation is "a function of social and economic distance. ' 3 7 i Localities will tend to make
agreements concerning such services only with localities of comparable
status and wealth. The more socially and economically differentiated
37 2
the region, the more cooperation is tied to social rank.

Thus, localities may cooperate in providing roads, sewers, water
supply, waste disposal, fire-fighting equipment and other capital-intensive projects that benefit from a regional commitment of resources and
enhance the general economic well-being of the area but do not sacrifice local control over the pace and character of local development or
require interlocal wealth transfers. 37 3 With respect to those activities
with the greatest significance for local wealth, status and characterland-use planning, zoning, housing, urban renewal and schools3 74 -in368. Id. at 566.
369. See, e.g., J. Bollens & H. Schmandt, supra note 85, at 328 (the number of
interlocal agreements involving suburbs "is remarkably small" because of suburban
fears of becoming dependent); E. McQuillin, Law of Municipal Corporations § 1.53, at
79 (3d ed. 1988) ("Generally, attempts to deal with metropolitan problems through the
collaboration of the municipalities concerned have not been very successful.").
370. See, e.g., Dye, Liebman, Williams & Herman, Differentiation and Cooperation
in a Metropolitan Area, 7 MidwestJ. Pol. Sci. 145, 154-55 (1963); Williams, supra note
131, at 303-05; see also supra notes 134-140 and accompanying text (discussing narrow
topical focus of special-purpose districts).
371. Dye, Liebman, Williams & Herman, supra note 370, at 146.
372. See, e.g., id. at 154-55; Street & Davidson, Community and Politics in City
and Suburb, in Handbook of Contemporary Urban Life, supra note 157, at 476, 476.
373. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 64-72.
374. Localities may sometimes cooperate with respect to education, as when localities that are each too small to run separate high schools agree to provide one jointly, but
because of the close connection of schools to family class and status, and local social and
cultural values, such cooperation occurs primarily between communities composed of
residents of comparable income and ethnicity. See Dye, Liebman, Williams & Herman,
supra note 370, at 149-51. Affluent school districts stoutly oppose aiding other districts.
See, e.g., Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 557, 247 N.W.2d 141, 144 (1976) (suit by
affluent school districts and property taxpayers residing in those districts to challenge
state school aid plan that would require affluent districts to make payments to the state
for distribution to poorer districts); Brief for 85 Public School Districts as Amici Curiae
at 3, Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27,439 N.E.2d 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982)
(brief filed by affluent suburban school districts in appeal of lower court determination
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terlocal cooperation is highly unusual and more commonly the product
of state or federal compulsion than voluntary local action. 37 5
Localities may accept some form of regional planning as long as
the regional body lacks the power to effectuate its plans without local
approval. 3 76 Similarly, the federal or state government may create regional housing authorities, but if, as usually is the case, permission to
build new housing is contingent on local cooperation, the more affluent
localities will decline to cooperate.3 77 And, of course, voluntary inthat New York school financing system was unconstitutional; principal argument of
amici, as contained in a caption in their brief, is that "present system is premised on, and
required by, the fundamental interest in local control of local schools"), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1138 (1983).
Some metropolitan areas have engaged in voluntary city suburb interdistrict school
desegregation plans, but these have usually resulted from settlements designed to avert
even more intrusive court orders and have required substantial state financial support.
See, e.g., Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1984) (metropolitan area school
desegregation plan involving consensual settlement and significant state assistance),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 816 (1984); Wells, St. Louis Evaluates Its Pioneer Integration
Plan, N.Y. Times,June 8, 1988, at B4, col 1. More commonly, suburban school districts
resist interdistrict remedies, see, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 728-31 (1974)
(intervention by suburban school districts to oppose court-ordered metropolitan area
school integration plan);Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986) (en
banc) (affirming district court's imposition of intradistrict remedy and rejection of interdistrict relie), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816 (1987), and states resist funding remedial
and compensatory programs, see, e.g., School Bd. of Richmond v. Baliles, 829 F.2d
1308 (4th Cir. 1987) (upholding state's refusal to fund remedial and compensatory educational programs following intradistrict desegregation program that left Richmond's
schools over 86% black).
375. See, e.g., J. Bollens & H. Schmandt, supra note 85, at 327-28.
376. See, e.g., Lineberry, supra note 134, at 684-85 (metropolitan Seattle authority
created to handle sewerage problems also granted enabling authority to expand into
water supply, public transportation, garbage disposal, parks and comprehensive planning; but voters rejected metropolitan action on public transportation and no expansion
of the authority's roles took place); id. at 705-06 (Minnesota Metropolitan Council created for the Twin Cities area was given taxing authority, but its operational powers were
limited to planning, data gathering and research); see also M. Danielson, supra note 24,
at 269-70 (failure of councils of governments to develop voluntary "fair share" plans for
the siting of federally subsidized housing in the suburbs).
Even when local governments are given veto power, states are still reluctant to create metropolitan bodies with authority to build low- and moderate-income housing.
The Minnesota legislature, which has been more progressive than most state legislatures
in dealing with metropolitan problems, rejected a proposal for a metropolitan housing
board with authority to stimulate and coordinate low- and moderate-income projects
throughout the metropolitan area, including the power to acquire, sell and lease land.
Before implementing any project, the board would have had to seek approval from the
municipality involved. If approval were denied, review by a special appeals board would
have been possible. See F. Bosselman & D. Callies, The Quiet Revolution in Land Use
Control 150-51 (1971).
377. See, e.g., Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., 500 F.2d 1087, 1089 n. 2
(6th Cir. 1974) (52 of 56 municipalities in metropolitan Cleveland refused to accept
subsidized housing), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1108 (1975); see also Hills v. Gautreaux, 425
U.S. 284, 303-06 (1976) (Court relies on local right to veto public housing projects in
affirming metropolitan remedy for discriminatory siting of public housing); N.Y. Uncon-
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terlocal payments not tied to the provision of services, for example, as

compensation for spillovers or to ameliorate wealth differences are virtually unknown.

Voluntary interlocal cooperation is tightly linked to class and status. It may realize certain economies of scale, but it is highly unlikely to
resolve negative externalities, ease interlocal wealth disparities or give
nonresidents affected by local exclusionary actions a voice in local decision making. This should not be surprising. Our localism gives local
governments exclusive control over local resources and broad discretion in local land-use regulation, permits governments to be formed to
maintain class and status differences and makes the decision to enter
into an interlocal agreement itself a matter of local self-interest. Affluent localities may find it worthwhile to collaborate on matters that are
perceived as having little or no impact on local status or class composition and that permit the reduction of local costs. But they have no interest in cooperation which would open them to less affluent settlers
expose them to demands for
from different ethnic groups or would
3 78
assistance from poorer jurisdictions.
In the absence of state or federal intervention to change the underlying legal rules of local autonomy within pre-existing boundaries, voluntary interlocal contract or cooperation is at best a limited solution to
the local government boundary problem.3 79 Economic and political losol. Law § 6265 (McKinney 1988) (state Urban Development Corporation may not
adopt any new residential projects if the governing body of municipality in which project
is proposed to be built objects).
A study of the suburbs around Philadelphia found that suburban counties had refused federal assistance for the acquisition of open land to be used as parks or recreation
areas because of federal requirements that the lands be open to use by nonresidents,
e.g., people from Philadelphia: "better no land at all than invasion and vandalism from
the central city" was the suburban attitude. C. Gilbert, supra note 223, at 173. Only
when federal assistance was increased, with a premium for regional cooperation, did all
five counties of southeastern Pennsylvania finally join in a consultative arrangement.
See id.
378. Cf. R. Babcock, supra note 120, at 38. Indeed, a locality may decline to cooperate even with respect to an infrastructure matter like a mass transit system if that development is seen as a means of opening the suburbs to city residents. See, e.g.,
Schmidt, supra note 134 (Cobb and Gwinnett Counties north of Atlanta have refused to
join the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA), allegedly because they
fear that MARTA will bring blacks to the suburbs); Reinhold, Plan for Rail Line Sets
Suburb Against City in Los Angeles, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1988, at A22, col. 1 (residents
of San Fernando Valley opposing light rail connection to Los Angeles because of fears it
would lead to closer contacts between city and suburb).
379. In land use and housing, the most significant form of interlocal cooperation is
the New Jersey regional cooperation agreement-the arrangement by which New
Jersey's suburbs may discharge part of their Mount Laurel obligation by making payments
to poorer municipalities for the construction or rehabilitation of housing in those cities.
But the cooperation agreements did not grow out of the suburbs' recognition that their
exclusionary practices were imposing costs on nonresidents and on the fiscal capacities
of other localities. Nor are they a result of a dialogue among localities in which the
affluent came to understand their commonalities with the poor or suddenly acknowl-
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calists have no effective response to the cross-border effects and interlocal fiscal disparities built into our localism. These fiscal disparities,
the inequalities in the provision of basic public services that flow from
them and the exclusionary land-use policies that they inspire, are a constant challenge to localism. Local governments will not, as long as they
need not, take extralocal effects into account, give a voice to nonresidents affected by local actions, internalize externalities, make compensatory payments for negative spillovers or transfer local wealth to other
communities in the region to ameliorate fiscal disparities. Without federal or state intervention, so roundly condemned by localists, the pervasive problems of externalities and interlocal service inequalities
8 0°
reflecting tax-base disparities will certainly persista
The reliance on interlocal cooperation to redress the externalities
and inequalities that grow out of the local government system-and the
failure of interlocal agreements to do so-indicate the problematic nature of contemporary localism. The greater opportunities for exit and
voice at the local level may make local governments more responsive to
their inhabitants and may promote efficiency and public participation
within local units. But most local governments today are not self-contained communities, set apart from each other. They are tightly packed
together in metropolitan areas, with decisions made in one locality regularly affecting the lives of residents in neighboring jurisdictions. So
long as negative externalities remain endemic, at least when viewed
from a regional perspective, the efficiency of the system will remain
contestable.
Localist theory also overlooks the race, class and wealth differences
among localities and the accompanying tendency of many localities to
be hostile to each other and to the residents of other places. Economic
localism triyializes interlocal inequality into a matter of varying private
tastes and preferences. Participation theory either does not see the inequality and the pattern of conflict among localities or blithely assumes
the problem can be resolved through an interlocal dialogue that will
lead to the transcendence of differences. As the school finance and exclusionary zoning litigations and boundary formation law reviewed in
Part 1381 and the history of the emergence of the suburbs presented in
section B of this Part38 2 should suggest, however, the last thing that

many localities want is to transcend differences with their neighbors.
The problems with localism become apparent when one steps back
from the individual locality and from the usual contrast of the locality
edged that all localities are members of a broader community. Rather, they are the
product of the Mount Laurel litigation and subsequent st'ate legislative action. See
Briffault, supra note 1, at 54-56.
380. See, e.g., F. Levy, A. Meltsner & A. Wildavsky, Urban Outcomes: Schools,
Streets and Libraries 251 (1974) (calling for federal intervention to remedy extreme
disparities in taxes paid and benefits received at local level).
381. Briffault, supra note 1, at 20-41, 65-69, 78-91.
382. See supra text accompanying notes 50-158.
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with the state and focuses instead on the set of localities in a region, the
differences among them and the structure of interlocal relations. This
requires a return to the issues raised previously concerning the
suburbanization of local government and of local government law.
E. Toward a Legal Theory for Local Government in the Age of Suburbs
1. Local Government in the Suburbs: Participationin the PrivatePolis.
Legal theory must take into account the suburbanization of local government, especially the impact of suburbanization on the nature of participation at the local level.3 8 3 The suburbs are essential to the analysis

of local participation because suburbs are the future-indeed, the present-of American local governments. 38 4 Moreover, suburbs constitute
the principal case for participatory localism today.38 5 Suburbs are generally smaller in population and area than the larger cities, so suburban
residents have a greater opportunity for direct involvement in local decisions. The legal and fiscal resources of more affluent suburbs may
enable them to be more successful in attaining local goals, thus satisfying the concern that participation will occur only where governments
are effectively empowered. Indeed, there is some evidence that citizens
do participate more in suburbs than in cities and that suburban governments are more responsive to their residents.3 8 6 Suburbs may be the
best hope metropolitan America has of capturing the participatory possibilities of the polis ideal, and this may account for some portion of the
suburbs' appeal to prospective residents. 38 7 But does the prospect for
383. Participation, rather than efficiency, is critical because the commitment to par-

ticipation accounts for the powerful hold localism has on legal doctrine. See generally
A. Syed, supra note 255; see also E. McQuillin, supra note 369, § 1.37, at 44 ("our
country was conceived in the theory of local self-government").

384. As indicated in Section A, more people live in suburbs than in any other type
of locality, and the suburban share of population, employment opportunities and na-

tional wealth continues to rise. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
385. Economic localism is also better suited to the suburbs. It is the large number
of small suburbs, adjacent to each other and in commuting range of job prospects in
many other localities in the region that economists see as validating Tiebout's theory
and giving residents multiple opportunities to satisfy their preferences. Big cities are

often considered to be inefficient. See, e.g., R. Bish, supra note 142, at 100-03; Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren, supra note 247, at 837. Elazar combines both the economic
and political criticisms of big cities: "[Large] cities, undivided, cannot be meaningful...
communities from either a functional or a democratic point of view." D. Elazar, supra
note 20, at 42.
386. The higher level of suburban participation may also be attributable to the

higher levels of income, education and professional attainment of suburban residents
since these characteristics generally correlate strongly with political participation. See,
e.g., Checkoway & Van Til, What Do We Know About Citizen Participation? A Selective
Review of Research, in Citizen Participation in America 25, 28 (S. Langton ed. 1978)
(" 'The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-

class accent.' ") (quoting E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People 35 (1960)).
387. Some theorists argue that the exodus from city to suburb and the suburban
resistance to annexation to the central city are motivated in part by the migrants' desire
for smaller, more accessible, more participatory government. See, e.g., H. Arkes, The
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political participation even in idealized suburbs provide a satisfactory
justification for localism?
For legal theory, the critical aspects of the suburban model of local
government should not be a small size-Frug's concern-or ease of
relocation-Tiebout's point-but metropolitan area fragmentation, the
social and economic differences both among suburbs and between suburbs and cities and the resulting constraints on the range of issues on
suburban political agendas and the quality of internal local political
life.a8 8
Suburbs, although small, are not microcosms of metropolitan areas
or reflections of regional diversity. Instead, suburbs are often highly
specialized by economic function,3 8 9 race and ethnicity3 9 0 and class and

income of residents.3 9 1 Race, class and income go together in subur3 92
ban settlement patterns as they do in so much else of American life,

and contemporary metropolitan areas are characterized by a close connection between interpersonal and interjurisdictional economic inePhilosopher in the City: The Moral Dimensions of Urban Politics 323-25 (1981); R.
Wood, supra note 24, at 12-19, 102-14. Wood, in particular, defines suburbia "as an
ideology, a faith in communities of limited size and a belief in the conditions of intimacy." Id. at 18. Indeed, according to Wood,
[T]heory has been the crucial force that preserves the suburb. There is no economic reason for its existence and there is no technological basis for its support. There is only the stubborn conviction of the majority of suburbanites that
it ought to exist, even though it plays havoc with both the life and government
of our urban age.
Id. at 19.
388. As previously noted, one result of the suburbs' fragmentary nature is the inevitability of spillovers and cross-border effects. See supra text accompanying notes
348-380.
389. Many suburbs are residential, some are primarily industrial or commercial, but
relatively few accommodate both businesses and residences. See, e.g., Logan, Industrialization and the Stratification of Cities in Suburban Regions, 82 Am. J. Soc. 333, 334,
341 (1976). Even with the significant shift of new employment opportunities to the suburbs, few suburbs that contain substantial employment include homes as well as jobs for
the workers employed there. For example, "[I]n 1970 the zoning ordinances of twenty
suburbs in central New Jersey set aside sufficient land for industrial and research purposes to support 1.17 million jobs, but would allow residential development to house
only 144,000 families .... ." M. Danielson, supra note 24, at 41; see also Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel 67 N.J. 151, 161-64,336 A.2d
713, 718-19 (1975) (township with population of 11,000 zoned 29.27 of its land for
industry; if land were fully utilized 43,000 jobs could be created, but no provision was
made for a commensurate increase in residential use).
390. Few suburbs are racially integrated. See, e.g., W. Frey & A. Speare, Regional
and Metropolitan Growth and Decline in the United States 258-66, 277-78 (1988).
Blacks, in particular, appear to be segregated in predominantly black communities,
whether inner city neighborhoods or black suburbs. Massey & Denton, supra note 43, at
593-94.
391. See, e.g., P. Florestano & V. Marando, supra note 43, at 23.
392. See id. This is partly attributable to exclusionary suburban land-use controls.
See Briffault, supra note 1, at 21-22.
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quality.3 93 Indeed, the greater the number of municipal governments
in a metropolitan area-in other words, the more suburbs there are3 94
the greater the intermunicipal inequality.
The functional, racial and class specialization of suburbs sets them
off from the larger cities, the larger urbanized regions in which they are
located and the polis of the legal theorist's nostalgic memory. 39 5 The
fragmentation of heterogeneous urbanized areas into municipalities
segregated by race, class and function has obvious consequences for
local public services. The separation of rich from poor and of businesses from residences leads to a separation of taxable wealth from
public service needs. Central cities are, of course, also marked by wide
ethnic, functional and class differences among neighborhoods, but
within cities services are ordinarily funded on a city-wide basis, so that
all neighborhoods can call on the tax base of the entire city.3 96 Furthermore, poorer and minority residents can participate in city politics,
are represented in city legislatures and influence the allocational decisions of city governments.3 9 7 In the suburbs, by contrast, the spatial
segmentation of rich and poor and industry and homes takes on added
significance, because the separated spaces are also autonomous legal
jurisdictions. With municipal budgets largely dependent on the local
tax base, intermunicipal wealth inequality becomes the source of signif393. See, e.g.,J. Harrigan, supra note 18, at 40-41.
394. See Hill, Separate and Unequal: Governmental Inequality in the Metropolis,
68 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1557, 1566 (1974).
395. The cities continue to be characterized by a mix of races, classes and economic
activities. The shift of people and jobs out of the cities may have reduced their internal
diversity, but they remain home to industry, commerce and residence, whites and nonwhites, rich, middle class and poor. The historic small town was also a place of both
homes and jobs and included people of all income levels, even if the class differentiation
and ethnic diversity of the small town was much less than in contemporary urban centers. See, e.g, W. Frey & A. Speare, supra note 390, at 236-79.
396. There is some evidence that the quality of services within cities does not necessarily correlate with neighborhood wealth. See, e.g., F. Levy, A. Meltsner & A.
Wildavsky, supra note 380, at 70-90 (in terms of expenditures, the schools in the
poorest areas of Oakland received very high levels of city resources); R. Lineberry, supra
note 286, at 181-86 (finding that service inequalities within cities are unpatterned, and
in particular not biased against the poor). Moreover, although intracity service inequalities no doubt exist, legal theory may support a requirement that internal local expenditures be based on need or at least that equal local service levels be provided for all
neighborhoods. See C. Haar & D. Fessler, The Wrong Side of the Tracks 194-221
(1986). But as the school finance cases indicate, it has been very difficult to establish a
doctrinal basis for requiring the equalization of local tax bases or local spending across
jurisdictional boundaries. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 24-39; see also Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-750 (1974) (sharply limiting the availability of interlocal
remedies for school segregation).
397. The 1982 amendment to the Voting Rights Act, 96 Stat. 131 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973c (Supp. III 1985)) has provided a particularly important impetus
to the enhancement of minority representation in local governments through the restructuring of local legislatures from at-large to district election systems. See supra note
122.
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39 8
icant differences in the quantity and quality of public services.
The jurisdictional separation of wealth and need that results from
the fragmentation of most metropolitan areas into a central city surrounded by a multiplicity of suburbs perpetuates interpersonal as well
as interlocal economic and social inequalities. The movement of industrial and commercial firms to the suburbs, combined with the exclusionary land-use practices of many suburbs and the lack of adequate
mass transit systems in most metropolitan areas, limits central city residents' access to new job opportunities and contributes to the everwidening income gap between city and suburb. Suburban zoning
makes it more difficult for less affluent people to buy homes, thereby
restricting their access to the major source of wealth and equity appreciation available to most Americans and reinforcing the wealth differences between homeowners and nonowners.3 9 9 Most importantly,
children in poorer localities are likely to receive inferior educations and
thus remain at a disadvantage in the competition for jobs and income
40 0
when they become adults.
Although the fragmentary character of most suburbs has evident
class-related consequences for the quality of local public services, these

398. See Logan, supra note 389, at 340. Poorer suburbanites, residing in communities lacking either industry or more affluent residents, have little local wealth to draw
on and tax themselves at higher rates, but still cannot fund services comparable to those
in richer suburbs. Poorer localities usually have greater economic and social needs than
more affluent ones, but they must meet these needs out of smaller tax bases. And
poorer suburbanites are often even worse off than central city residents in terms of public services since the poorer suburbs lack the commercial and industrial property still
found'in many large cities. Id. at 337-38.
399. In his study of metropolitan Cleveland, Swanstrom found that suburban segregation led not only to the uneven provision of public services but to the uneven distribution of the externalities of the metropolitan housing market-noise, air pollution, lack
of open space, crime-thereby exacerbating income inequalities. See T. Swanstrom,
supra note 28, at 69-70.
Suburban class segregation has a further regressive effect through the uneven appreciation of home values. Swanstrom found that suburban homeowners were able to
monopolize the positive externalities of the housing market so that suburban home values soared while inner city home values stagnated. In 1969, the average selling price of
a single-family home in Cleveland was only 53% of the average sales price in the suburbs. In 1979, the average sales price of all one- to four-family properties in the city was
only 44% of the average sales price in the suburbs. Id.
400. See, e.g., D. Harvey, supra note 325, at 60-64 (discussing the distributive effects of the increasing separation ofjobs from housing); J. Logan & H. Molotch, supra
note 17, at 48-49; C. Perin, supra note 93, at 194 (analogizing local zoning, taxes and
services to immigration restriction as the "major rationing and categorizing device" for
determining access to financial, educational and social resources).
Hill found that interpersonal and interlocal inequalities were closely correlated.
The greater the inequality in the distribution among families in the metropolitan area,
the greater the inequality among municipalities; the greater the residential segregation
by social class in the metropolitan area, the greater the inequality among municipalities;
and the more segregated the distribution of housing by quality, the greater the inequality among municipalities. In addition, Hill found that the more municipal governments
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may be ameliorated by intergovernmental assistance. But the fragmentation of metropolitan areas has additional consequences for the quality
of local public life that are perhaps more damaging to the participationist commitment to local autonomy.
The fragmentary nature of contemporary localities-the separation
of work from home and the segregation of ethnic and income groupshas two consequences for the quality of local political activity: the narrowing of discussion through the exclusion of a broad range of critical
public issues from local debate and, as a corollary, a tight focus on the
private economic and social concerns of local residents.
Suburban politics is the politics of residence. Suburban residents
share a bit of territory and, perhaps, common social and cultural values
growing out of their relationship to the local territory. But they do not
have work in common. They neither work in their home locality, nor
do they usually work together in another jurisdiction. The separation
of residence from work means that issues relating to the organization of
the economy, the role of government in regulating business, the relationship between the nature of production and distribution of the
goods and services produced, the size of business profits, the structure
of the work place-issues at the heart of contemporary American lifeare simply off the local agenda. There is little room for the politics of
the work place or the politics of the economy in residential
401
communities.
in a metropolitan area, the greater the inequality among municipalities. See Hill, supra
note 394, at 1565-66.
Metropolitan development appears to result in an increase in the social and economic differentiation of city and suburb. The gap in local wealth between central cities
and suburbs is greatest in the oldest metropolitan areas. See, e.g., J. Harrigan, supra
note 18, at 157-60; see also P. Florestano & V. Marando, supra note 43, at 17.
401. Ira Katznelson makes an analogous argument that the separation of work and
residence within a large city takes work place issues off the agenda of neighborhood
politics. See I. Katznelson, supra note 211, at 1-72. But at least in a large city-and
Katznelson's book is primarily concerned with politics in one New York neighborhoodwork and home are still often found within the same jurisdictions. When work and
home are fragmented into two separate municipal corporations, as is the case for most
suburban residents, the argument seems even more compelling.
Popenoe makes a similar point when he contends that the physical separation of
work and residence into separate localities leads people to divide life into two distinct
social worlds-the external world of work and the private world of home and leisure.
Work is seen as a means for attaining a rewarding personal life, not as a basis for social
activity. The separation of work and residence thus contributes to an ethic of consumption, not production. See D. Popenoe, supra note 297, at 112. This further diminishes
the ability of local politics in residential areas to address seriously issues of economic
organization.
The separation of work and residence was itself connected to the emergence of
suburbs. As Fishman observes, "The growth of suburbia was to build into the physical
environment that division between the feminine/natural/emotional world of family and
the masculine/rational/urban world of work." R. Fishman, supra note 51, at 62.
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The separation of work and residence also makes it difficult for
questions concerning the roles of government and private enterprise in
the organization of the economy and the place of workers in the governance of firms to be debated in public life. The more political power
is devolved to the local level, the less likely the basic components of the
40 2
economic system will be addressed within the political process.
Thus, more affluent residential localities become concerned about
industry and the role of the private sector in the economy only when
they feel threatened by the possibility that unwanted businesses or
housing developments will come into their communities, where the
benefits to the local tax base may be outweighed by the problems of
pollution, congestion, necessary new infrastructure and potential erosion of property values. Conversely, poorer localities confront the
broader economy only when they seek to attract commercial or industrial firms and are *willingto accept the costs those firms impose in order to build up the local tax base. But in neither case do residents
confront, in the course of local public life, the basic presuppositions
about the appropriate power of business and government. As a result,
localism tends to assure that what Charles Lindblom calls the "privileged position of business" '40 3 in American life will remain unexamined
and unchallenged.
With issues related to work and the economy off the agenda, the
focus of local public life in most autonomous residential localities is on
issues of residence-land use, schools and property taxes. These questions are usually addressed primarily in terms of their implications for
the residents' private lives-their homes, families, privacy and personal
security, the preservation of personal wealth and the creation and
maintenance of an atmosphere conducive to the individual consumption of consumer goods. 40 4 Politics is framed in terms of "family territoriality": "The motivating vision in the development of the American
suburbs has been ...

that of the family preoccupied with achieving a

private environment, and extending the family's personal space both
'40 5
within and without the house.
In this setting, public life is often focused on the protection of private life and the insulation of home and family from broader public
concerns. 40 6 Local authority over land use, schools and taxes typically
402. The ethnic and income separation of residents into distinct localities within
metropolitan areas also contributes to the inability of most local governments to address
broader issues of economic and social organization. Such spatial separation exacerbates

the factors like race, religion or life style that divide workers and obscure whatever class
interests they have in common. See, e.g., Sawers, New Perspectives on the Urban Polit-

ical Economy, in Marxism and the Metropolis, supra note 88, at 3, 12-13.
403. C. Lindblom, Politics and Markets 170 (1977).

404. See M. Castells, supra note 286, at 169 ("American residential suburbs ... are
powerful instruments for the stimulation of commodity consumption.").
405. Buder, supra note 166, at 200.

406. See K. Jackson, supra note 50, at 54-61, 279-80.
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is deployed to secure the domestic autonomy of the family. Local control over schools permits the reproduction of family values and the
minimization of the possibility that education will expose family members to alien social and cultural influences, while providing local family
members with the preparation essential for future economic competition when they enter the work force. Similarly, zoning and other policies are geared mainly to the defense of the home-the family's
principal investment, the center of domestic consumption and the environment for family development.
In contemporary metropolitan areas, local government in autonomous, residential localities frequently serves to mirror and extend the
suburban settlement pattern of relatively deconcentrated neighborhoods of single-family detached homes. 40 7 Much as modem culture
tends to sanctify the private life of family and home as a place of refuge
and a personal bastion against society, local public policies-incorporation, zoning, school finance, property taxation-defend the insulation
of the family and the separation of homes. Under the suburban model,
local government becomes a legal rampart for the defense of the family
castle.
The privatization of the local public sector becomes more apparent
and takes on a parochial edge when the segregation of people by income and race is joined to the separation of work from residence. The
protection of home and family is not simply about assuring domestic
privacy and individual autonomy, it also tends to become associated
with efforts to preserve interlocal class differences and the economic
and social benefits of residence in high-income, high-status localities.
Internally, this results in a local politics aimed at the maintenance
of class and ethnic homogeneity. Local homogeneity is attained by separate incorporation, often followed by the adoption of exclusionary
land-use policies. Although most common in affluent areas, exclusion
is not the prerogative of the wealthy; less well-to-do communities are
just as concerned about maintaining community status against the deterioration usually attributed to the influx of racial and ethnic minorities
and poorer people. 40 8 The protection of turf through the prevention
of internal racial or income differentiation is an important feature of
suburban politics. 40 9 Observers of suburban life have noted, "[O]ne
need only attend a few public hearings on controversial zoning changes
in suburban areas to realize that the people consider their right to pass
judgment upon their future neighbors as sacred."'4 "' Similarly, the insistence on separate suburban school districts reflects a determination
407. See R. Fishman, supra note 51, at 185 ("The true center of this new city is not
in some downtown business district but in each residential unit.").
408. SeeJ. Harrigan, supra note 18, at 259 (Philadelphia suburbs with residents of

different social classes agreed on the importance of "keeping undesirables out.").
409. See M. Baldassare, supra note 22, at 76-77.
410. R. Babcock & F. Bosselman, Exclusionary Zoning 90 (1973).
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to shield local children from exposure to economic, social and cultural
differences that are perceived as a threat to family values.
Externally, suburban policies frequently seek to deny the suburb's
membership in the metropolitan community or its responsibility for the
economic and social ills of the region, especially those of the central
city. Suburbs often refuse to permit facilities necessary for the economic development or social order of the region to be located within
their borders. Solid-waste disposal sites, power plants, transportation
facilities, low-cost housing for area workers, shelters for the homeless,
halfway houses for the mentally ill and convalescent homes for AIDS
41
patients; all lead to cries of "NIMBY"-"not in my back yard." '
NIMBY is certainly not a uniquely suburban phenomenon. City-dwellers are no more altruistic than suburbanites, and the residents of city
neighborhoods also frequently resist locally unwanted facilities, 4 12 but
411. See, e.g., Winerip, NIMBY Views on People with AIDS, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5,
1988, at BI, col. 1. Winerip describes demonstrators in Wanaque, N.J. who protested
state plans to house 120 AIDS patients at the Wanaque Convalescent Home, and quotes
local civic leader as saying "We believe in Nimby too! You said it, Nimbyl That's what
we believe." Wanaque is in Passaic County, which has the third highest number of AIDS
cases in New Jersey. Id. See also Feron, 3 Targeted Suburbs Fight a Novel Plan to
House Westchester's Homeless, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1988, § 1, at 30, col. 1; Glaberson,
Coping in the Age of 'Nimby,' N.Y. Times, June 19, 1988, § 3, at 1, col. 2; Winerip,
Neighborliness, the Homeless, and Westchester, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1988, at BI, col.
1; Winerip, There's No Room in Neighborhood for Mentally Ill, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11,
1987, at BI, col. 1; Massachusetts Town Weighs Seceding Over a Waste Site, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 19, 1984, § 1, at 84, col. 1.
412. See, e.g., Verhovek, Neighbors Now More Likely to OpposeJails and Shelters,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1987, at Al, col. 4.
"NIMBY" is often an unfair pejorative term. NIMBY problems may arise as a result
of the failure of upper level governments-city halls or the states-to give sufficient
notice to or adequately consult with affected communities or neighborhoods or to properly take into account particular local circumstances in making siting decisions. As then
New York City Councilmember and current Manhattan Borough President Ruth
Messinger has observed, the city government
in its role as a facility locator... attempts to surprise and overwhelm communities. It waits until the crisis is, quite literally, in the streets. Then it opens an
ill-conceived and poorly-planned shelter, names a pier for a new prison barge,
or shuts down a school literally overnight if it can.... Communities and community boards feel besieged, and they respond in kind. They focus all their
energies on what they don't want, because no one seems the least bit interested
in what they do seek. Their positions escalate and they stake them out with
ferocity.
Messinger, Framing the Issues: Land Use and Charter Revision, in Neighborhoods,
Land Use and the New York City Charter: A Working Conference on Options for Charter Revision, Conference Summary at 31-32 (November 20-21, 1987). Better planning-including requirements that locally undesirable land uses be fairly distributed
among communities-procedures that require early consultation and measures
designed to ameliorate the negative effects of new facilities on communities could go far
to mitigate NIMBY attitudes. Cf. New York City Charter § 203(a) (1989) (requiring the
development of criteria for the location of City facilities that "further the fair distribution among communities of the burdens and benefits associated with city facilities, consistent with community needs for services and efficient and cost effective delivery of
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they usually lack the legal authority to enforce NIMBY attitudes: they
may be overruled by city governments. But suburbs, as independent
municipal corporations, usually have presumptive authority to exclude
regionally necessary but locally undesirable facilities. States have the
formal power to displace such local decision making, but such state action is unusual, and is focused more on controlling development or
permitting the siting of industrial infrastructure rather than supersedthat exclude facilities intended to serve the
ing local decisions
4 13
disadvantaged.
Suburban autonomy and the focus of suburban politics on internal
concerns may contribute to a declining interest in cooperative interlocal approaches to regional economic development or the solution of
the social problems of metropolitan areas. Suburbs compete with each
other and with the cities to attract desirable residents and nonpolluting
industries and to exclude undesirable production facilities, subsidized
housing and all programs to assist the poor. In most metropolitan areas there is little interest in cooperation among municipalities concerning local taxes, schools, housing or economic development. Integrated
regional policies on these matters are uncommon, as the suburbs prefer
to rely on their own resources, protect their own values4 14and shun fiscally draining and socially threatening ties to the cities.
Most striking is the emergence of what historian Kenneth Jackson
calls "a new suburban consciousness," 41 5 which denies the historic association of suburbs with their cities and treats cities and their residents
with a mixture of fear and disdain. At one time, the central cities set
the tone for their metropolitan areas. The city was the primary center
of jobs and commercial and cultural institutions for the region. The
prosperity of the suburbs was linked to that of the cities, suburbanites
knew it, and suburbs cooperated with policies aimed at promoting regional interests. The movement of industry out of the city and the creation of centers of commerce and employment in the suburbs has
reduced suburban dependence on the city and has made it possible for
4 16
residents to deny the economic links that integrate a region.
Whereas formerly "suburban" implied a relationship to the city, it now
services and with due regard for the social and economic impacts of such facilities upon

the areas surrounding the sites."); id. § 204(g)(1) (providing for community review of
proposed City facilities in light of the "fair share" siting criteria).

413. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 67-70.
414. See, e.g., M. Danielson &J. Doig, supra note 47, at 5.

An extreme example of suburban efforts to separate themselves from adjacent cities
is the decision of Hammond, Indiana to build a nine-foot-high barricade along its border with the city of Gary. See Schmidt, Earthen Barrier Serves as Both Dam and Symbol, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1988, at A6, col. 3; see also Some Rich Towns Being Walled
Off, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1983, at A12, col. 4.

415. K.Jackson, supra note 50, at 276.
416. See R. Fishman, supra note 51, at 199 (the sundering of the social and eco-

nomic ties that once linked cities and suburbs and contributes to the "profoundly antiurban" feeling of contemporary suburbs).
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suggests a distinction from the city and from the problems the city has
come to symbolize. 41 7 So, too, the widening gap between suburban
and urban incomes 418 and the polarization of the races between city
and suburb sharpen the suburban sense of city-suburb differences and
heighten the suburban tendency to treat the city as an alien place, one
which merits little assistance, support or cooperation. Local politics in
the suburbs is aimed at keeping the city and its concerns out, and the
law of local autonomy-the rules governing local government formation, land use, school finance and local taxation-enables many suburbs
to attain these goals.
The privatization of suburban public life, the class and race homogeneity of many suburbs, the parochialization of the local relationship
to outsiders and the legal rules that permit and sustain the insulation of
suburbs from regional problems, all breed an ideology of localism-a
belief that land-use regulation, schools and tax policy ought to be controlled locally, with the interests of local residents as the exclusive desideratum of local decision makers. Localism reifies local borders,
using invisible municipal boundary lines to delimit the range of local
concern and the proper subjects of local compassion and treating the
creation and maintenance of local borders as a basic right.
Localism translates questions about the proper structure of government and the proper relationship between different levels of
government (and between different governments at the same level) into
a language of rights. The focus of local public policy on home and
family and the use of local public powers to advance these private interests lead to an association of the locality with individual autonomy. Local self-government within existing borders and effective local powers
417. As Jackson points out, at one time the very name of the suburb emphasized
the linkage to the city, as in East St. Louis, North Chicago and West New York, and
suburbanites knew that their well-being was tied to the health of the city. Today, subur-

ban names seek to invoke a bucolic image as distant from the city as possible. In the
Chicago area there are now 24 suburbs with either "Park" or "Forest" in their names
(including both Park Forest and Forest Park). In recent years, East Paterson, NewJersey
changed its name to Elmwood Park, and East Detroit, Michigan became Erin Heights.

See K. Jackson, supra note 50, at 272-73.
West Paterson, NewJersey started out its municipal life as Little Falls and renamed
itself in 1914 to emphasize its proximity to the then-booming industrial city of Paterson.
West Paterson is currently considering a change of name, and all of the candidatesWoodcrest Park, Westmont, Wedgewood and Great Notch-represent an increase in
rusticity and a disaffiliation from Paterson's urban problems. See James, W. Paterson
Wavers on Namesake, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1989, at B2, col. 1.
418. See, e.g., Winsberg, Income Polarization Between the Central Cities and Suburbs of U.S. Metropolises, 1950-1980, 48 Am.J. of Econ. & Sociology 3 (1989) (between
1950 and 1980 considerable polarization of household income between central cities
and suburbs occurred in the 37 largest U.S. standard metropolitan statistical areas; by
1980 the median share of the poorest within total households in central cities had risen
to well over double the share of the same group in total households in suburbs and the
share of the wealthiest households in total for suburbs rose to double that of that
group's share of total central city households).
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over land use and schools are treated as a right much like the personal
right to privacy in one's home and to make family decisions immune
from state interference.
Localism as a set of beliefs adds to the existing legal restrictions
that inhibit the realignment of local boundaries to better match local
wealth to local needs or the adoption of area-wide approaches to regional problems. 4 19 Local borders, once created, reinforce local identification, become a focus of sentiment and symbolism and create a
powerful legal bulwark for the preservation of local interests. Localism
provides a normative basis for excluding regionally necessary but locally undesirable facilities and for treating problems that originate
outside local borders as unworthy of local concern or the expenditure
of local resources.
The suburbanization of local government thus presents a paradox
for the participationist case for local autonomy. By their size, homogeneity and power over issues of basic importance to local residents, suburbs are optimal places for participatory government. Suburbanites
have greater opportunities to participate in local decision making and
suburban governments are particularly responsive to the values and interests of their residents. Local autonomy empowers residents of suburban communities-but does so at great cost to other localities and to
the public values participation theory holds dear.
The app5eal of participation theory is the promise it offers for the
transformation of public life: the vision of people actively engaged in an
ongoing discussion over issues fundamental to their collective lives,
reconciling their differences through dialogue and mutual accommodation and creating a community of public-spirited citizens. 4 20 It assumes
that local participation will provide the experience in community-regarding decision making that can provide a basis for a more participatory national political life. But participatory activity on the
suburban model is unlikely to fulfill that promise or advance the realization of that goal. Many critical public issues relating to the operation
and regulation of the economy and the nature and structure of work are
off the suburban agenda. Greater local autonomy would make it even
more difficult to raise these issues; further, the intensity of the interlocal competition for development assures that when most local governments address economic issues, they do so to satisfy the demands of
business or wealthy residents.
419. See, e.g., Baldassare, Citizen Support for Regional Government in the New

Suburbia, 24 Urb. Aff. Q.460, 463 (1989) (survey of public opinion in heavily suburban
Orange County, California found 63% of respondents opposed to governmental reorganization that would merge local and county governments into "one large countywide government"). According to Baldassare the preference- for municipal-level
authority indicated "an unwillingness by residents to give away local power, even if it
means a suburban-level, rather than a metropolitanwide, reorganization." Id. at 467.
420. See supra text accompanying notes 202-214. R. Fishman, supra note 51, at
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Moreover, the combination of jurisdictional boundaries with residential segregation along ethnic and economic lines contributes to the
polarization of races and classes. Local approaches to interlocal or regional problems are too often shaped by an apparent tendency to adopt
an "us against them" mentality. Participation in suburban local governments thus may result in the opposite of what the participationist
argument for local autonomy anticipates. Instead of promoting the reconciliation of ethnic and economic differences, political participation
may lead to policies and attitudes that seek to insulate the smaller, relatively more homogeneous locality and to deny its connection to a more
heterogeneous nation.
Localism in this setting enables residents to believe that their
range of concerns is, and ought to be, limited by local boundary lines.
Poverty, crime, deteriorating school systems and the lack of affordable
housing outside the home community are defined as the private, local
problems of other communities and not as subjects of public concern.
Local participation may drive communities apart, intensify the sense of
interlocal difference and reduce the possibilities of fashioning regional
solutions to regional problems.
This objection to local autonomy derives not from the potential
internal oppressiveness of local majorities that troubled Madison, but
rather from the function-, race- and income-segregated nature of the
contemporary polis. The suburb can be a very private polis, 4 2 1 both in

terms of the issues that are the focus of local politics and the desire to
avoid extralocal problems. The fragmentary nature of localities and the
interlocal differences in personal wealth and municipal fiscal capacity
mean that local autonomy will be worth a great deal more to some localities than others. Interlocal ethnic and class differences shape local
decision making, leading to the adoption of land-use, tax and spending
policies that perpetuate inequities and maintain residential separation.
The private nature of local public values leads to the narrowing of local
politics, the disclaiming of responsibility for problems beyond local
borders and the rejection of interlocal cooperation on matters of social
significance. They tend to lead as well to the pursuit of localist objectives at higher levels of government.
Local autonomy, thus, should be seen as normatively ambiguous.
Although it may provide opportunities for political participation and
421. Notions of what is "public" and what is "private" are, of course, endlessly

debatable. Although Elazar describes the purposes of suburban incorporation as "public," I think he is making the same point about the "private" nature of suburban political
activity when he states:
People sought suburbanization for essentially private purposes, revolving

around better living conditions. The same people sought suburbs with independent local governments of their own for essentially public ones, namely
the ability to maintain those conditions by joining with like-minded neighbors
to preserve those lifestyles which they sought in suburbanization.

D. Elazar, supra note 20, at 31.
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responsive government, local autonomy also contributes to the preservation of the political, economic and social status quo and to the privatization of American politics. In empowering some, local autonomy
disempowers others. Given the political economy of contemporary
metropolitan areas and the resulting implications for local politics, the
contention that greater local power and a categorically localist resolution of questions of local government law would enhance the quality of
American political life and create new opportunities for the advancement of a progressive political agenda simply cannot be justified. 4 2 2
2. Legal Theory and a Role for the States in Contemporary Local Government Law. - Localism generally deprecates the states. The states are
seen as too big and too remote from the ordinary citizen to permit
either voice or exit, and state power is equated with excessive centralization and the loss of participation and efficiency. State governments
are frequently treated as backward, rural-dominated institutions, hostile to cities and prone to intervene in local matters for partisan, political purposes. Even Robert Dahl, whose support for local autonomy is
tempered by a recognition of local limitations, assumes that the states
are "destined for a kind of limbo of quasi-democracy .... [W]henever

we are compelled to choose between city and state, we should always
keep in mind, I think, that the city, not the state, is the better instru''4 23
ment of popular government.
But much as the fragmentation of the contemporary metropolis
into multiple local governments changes the significance of local autonomy, it also provides a different perspective on the place of the states in
local government law. The states are larger and far more politically,
economically and socially complex than are individual localities. States
are usually demographically diverse, and include both businesses and
homes. They consist of many localities, cities as well as suburbs, so that
422. The Fabian socialist H.G. Wells reached a similar conclusion in an early twentieth-century paper opposing the adoption of socialism at the local level. Wells noted
that in metropolitan London the daily lives of an increasing proportion of the popula-

tion straddled municipal lines-that people had become "delocalized." A salient aspect
of that delocalization was "the withdrawal of all the wealthier people from the areas that
are specializing as industrial centers, and which have a rising population of poor workers, to areas that are specializing as residential, and which have, if anything, a falling
population of poor labourers." The residents of the more affluent communities belonged "to the same great community" as the city's industrial workers, and yet "pay only
the most trivial poor rate and school rate for the benefit of their few immediate
neighbours, and escape altogether from the burthens of West Ham [a poor district]."
Wells, A Paper on Administrative Areas Read Before the Fabian Society, reprinted in

Area and Power: A Theory of Local Government 217 (A. Maass ed. 1959).
Under these circumstances, Wells determined, "to put more power, and still more

power in the hands of these petty little administrative bodies that we have today, is, I
submit, folly and darkness." For Wells, the solution was the redrawing of municipal

boundary lines and the consolidation of metropolitan regions into municipalities. Id. at
221.
423. Dahl, supra note 210, at 968.
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an aggregation of internally homogeneous localities will constitute a
heterogeneous state.
Moreover, the states have greater resources than most local governments. States contain and therefore can tax the corporations and
affluent residents beyond the reach of most localities. Their larger and
more diversified tax bases and superior administrative capabilities enable them to tax personal and corporate income and sales-sources of
revenue beyond the reach of most localities' fiscal powers.
The states' greater geographic scope, superior fiscal resources and
social and economic heterogeneity give them a greater capacity to control local externalities and address interlocal and interpersonal wealth
differences. Because they include many localities, the states can internalize a wider range of decisions and can take a regional perspective on
regional problems. The states are potentially subject to the political
influence of low income and poor as well as affluent residents, to the
demands of cities as well as suburbs. The larger size and smaller numbers of the states make it harder for taxpayers to exit their states and
may reduce state vulnerability to the flight of capital. Interstate wealth
and tax differences are smaller than such interlocal differences, making
it more difficult for businesses to play the states off against each other
and to find state tax havens.
The states in recent decades have, in fact, become somewhat more
progressive, certainly when compared to local governments and the
federal government. Reapportioned state legislatures and modernized
state governments have experimented with innovative economic development, social services, environmental, educational and housing programs. 424 Following the Reagan budget cuts, the states assumed some
financial responsibility for many health, social service and training pro42 5
grams that had previously been funded by the federal government.
In terms of interlocal relations, some states have taken modest
steps toward addressing interlocal externalities and fiscal disparities.
As noted in Part I, a number of states have adopted boundary review
laws to control the formation of new localities and to limit the ability of
regional fragments to separate themselves from regional problems. 42 6
Several states have enacted land-use laws to control the external effects
of local economic development and to require localities to take regional
interests into account. 4 2 7 The few efforts to promote interlocal cooper424. See D. Osborne, Laboratories of Democracy (1988).
425. See R. Nathan, F. Doolittle & Associates, Reagan and the States (1987).
426. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 82-83.
427. Massachusetts has adopted some restrictions on the ability of localities to exclude subsidized housing. See Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 40B, §§ 20-32 (Law Co-op. 1983).
Connecticut recently established an "affordable housing land use appeals procedure for
the judicial review of local actions having "a substantial adverse impact on the viability"
of certain low- and moderate-income housing. Act ofJune 29, 1989, Conn. Pub. Act.
No. 89-311, 1989 Conn. Legis. Serv. 706 (West). New Jersey's Fair Housing Act of
1985, 1985 NJ. Laws C. 222, (codified at NJ. Stat. Ann. §§ 52:27D-311-312 (West
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ation in areas affecting local social status or fiscal capacity have been
the results of state actions. 4 2 8 A number of state supreme courts continue to grapple with the dilemmas of school finance reform, seeking to
coax their legislatures into committing the resources necessary to fulfill
state constitutional guarantees of adequate education to children in all
localities while respecting the deep-seated political value of maintain42 9
ing considerable administrative responsibilities at the local level.

With or without the prodding of state judiciaries, some state legislatures have put more of the fiscal resources of the state as a whole into
school aid formulas, thereby indirectly compelling the residents of
more affluent districts to contribute to those who live in the poorer
ones. 43 0 Looking at interlocal fiscal disparities more generally,
Minnesota has adopted a form of tax-base sharing for municipalities in
the Minneapolis-St. Paul area that requires localities enjoying aboveaverage industrial and commercial property tax growth to share a percentage of the increment with other localities, with the size of the inturning on the population and needs of the
terlocal payments
recipients. 43 '
1986)), has endorsed the regional fair share principle for the location of low- and moderate-income housing and now requires affluent communities either to take steps to encourage the location of low-cost housing within their borders or to make paym.ents to
other localities.
Other states have also sought to make regional housing needs a factor in local landuse planning. See, e.g., Cal. Gov't Code §§ 65302(c), 65583(a), 65584(a), (b) (West
1983 & Supp. 1989) (local land-use plans must provide for the "locality's share of the
regional housing needs ... of persons at all income levels"); id. § 65584(a) (West 1983)
(local housing plans to be developed through state-local consultation, with state agency
having authority to ensure that local determinations accord with statewide housing
needs). But cf. id. § 65584(d), (e) (local governments retain power to limit building
permits and impose moratoria on residential construction; state's authority to revise a
local government's share of regional housing need "shall not constitute authority to
review, approve, or disapprove the manner in which the local government's share of the
regional housing need is implemented through its housing program," id. § 65584(e)
(Supp. 1989)).
428. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 65-72 (discussing regional contribution agreements under the New Jersey Fair Housing Act, DRI measures in Florida, Massachusetts
Zoning Appeals Law and new Connecticut law).
429. In 1989, three state supreme courts invalidated their states' school finance
systems; see Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 1989 Ky. Lexis 55, 1989 W.L. 60207
(Ky.); Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, amended, 784 P.2d
412 (Mont. 1989); Edgewoood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.
1989). This makes 1989 the most propitious year for court-ordered school finance reform in more than a decade. In all three cases, the courts sought to combine interpretations of state constitutional education articles that would mandate "substantial equality"
of educational opportunities throughout their states with continued autonomy for local
school districts. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 36-37.
430. See id. at 59-60. State school equalization formulas tend to stop well short of
complete equalization. See id. at 60-64.
431. Minnesota Metropolitan Fiscal Disparities Act, 1971 Minn. Laws c. 24 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 473F.01-.13 (West 1977 & Supp. 1990)). The
constitutionality of the Minnesota Act was sustained in Village of Burnsville v. Onis-
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This brief summary of redistributive state programs should not exaggerate what the states have accomplished or ignore the structural
limitations on state correction of the inequities endemic to localism.
Only a minority of states have been active in any of these areas. Many
of those prominent reforms-the Massachusetts Zoning Appeals
Law, 43 2 the Minnesota Fiscal Disparities Act, 43 3 the various state

boundary review commissions 4 34-were adopted some years ago and
have not been emulated by other states. Although individual states
continue to deliberate new school finance and land-use programs, 43 5
the evidence of a nation-wide trend toward systemic reforms in these
areas is tentative at best.
An irony of state legislative reapportionment is that it came too
late for most cities. Decades of rural domination have ended, but in
states with large metropolitan areas the principle of one person, one
vote means that the largest bloc of legislators will come from the suburbs and will represent suburban concerns. This assures that legislative action, even in the direction of a greater state role, will continue to
be influenced by a localist orientation and will likely leave much of the
structure of local autonomy intact. State legislatures remain attentive
436
to the suburban interest in local autonomy, particularly in land use,
and state programs of intergovernmental assistance are only modestly
redistributive, often providing general support for all local govern43 7
ments rather than directing aid to communities most in need.

chuck, 301 Minn. 137, 152-54, 222 N.W.2d 523, 532-33 (1974), appeal dismissed, 420
U.S. 916 (1975); see also Reschovsky, supra note 335, at 55; Note, Minnesota's Metropolitan Fiscal Disparities Act-An Experiment in Tax Base Sharing, 59 Minn. L. Rev.
927 (1975).
432. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (Law. Co-op. 1983). For a critical evaluation, see Reed, Tilting at Windmills: The Massachusetts Low and Moderate Income
Housing Act, 4 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 105 (1981).
433. See supra note 431.
434. For a discussion of state boundary review commissions, see Briffault, supra
note 1, at 82-83.
435. See, e.g., the recently enacted Connecticut low-income housing law discussed
id. at 70 n.301.
436. State legislative departures from local land-use autonomy are more likely to
involve the siting of infrastructure facilities and the control of local development that
has extralocal effects than housing for low- or moderate-income people. For example,
New York repealed the authority of its Urban Development Corporation to supersede
local zoning in the siting of subsidized housing. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 68-69.
Even NewJersey's Fair Housing Act is as noteworthy for its authorization to the suburbs
to buy their way out of the Mount Laurel fair share obligation through its regional contribution agreements as for its formal acceptance of the fair share standard as a criterion
for local zoning. See id. at 33-35.
437. One study of the states' reaction to the Reagan budget cutbacks found that to
a substantial degree the states replaced the lost federal aid. The study went on to observe that the states were less likely to fund redistributive programs and tended to
change the intrastate allocation of aid to provide small grants to a larger number of
localities rather than aid a targeted number of needy cities, which had been the federal
pattern. "[T]he stronger the redistributive purpose of a given grant program (i.e., redis-

1990]

OUR LOCALISM

Moreover, the states, like localities, are constrained by the mobility
of capital and the decreasing significance of particular places in the location of economic activity. The fact that there are fewer states may
entail longer, costlier moves than interlocal relocation, but state redistributive activity, too, is restricted by the ability of investors, industries
and affluent residents to decamp to states with lower taxes and less of a
commitment to redistribution. Although less pressed than many localities, the states are also in competition for economic development, investment and tax base. Progressive economic and social programs are
difficult to carry out at any subnational level in an increasingly integrated national economy. But that is a problem for "our federalism" as
well as our localism, and beyond the scope of this Article.
A more compelling objection to a greater state role would be that
the states have always had the nominal authority to control the local
government system and typically have exercised that authority by delegating power to local governments-just the phenomenon this Article
has criticized. How, in other words, can states be the solution when
they are the source of the problem? The answer is that what is needed
is not greater state power-states already have ample underlying authority-but a greater willingness on the part of state governments to
exercise that power and take a state-centered approach in policy making. States must take more active responsibility for government decisions, state and local, within their borders, either by making more
decisions at a state level or by making greater efforts to ameliorate or
control the consequences of interlocal inequality and the external effects of local actions. State power is not, by itself, sufficient to remedy
the harmful effects of localism since state power has often been exercised to promote localism; a state-oriented perspective in state decision
making is also necessary. But greater use of state power provides the
essential prerequisite for controlling local autonomy. Without greater
recourse to the states and greater state activism in pursuit of statewide
tributive to the poor), the less likely was it to be protected by state and local govern-

ments from the effects of cuts made in federal aid." R. Nathan, F. Doolittle &
Associates, supra note 425, at 96. The states were more likely to fund highway, mass

transit, waste water treatment programs and assistance to the elderly and less likely to
replace lost federal money for welfare or housing. See id. at 96-98. When federal block

grant rules were rewritten to give the states greater discretion in the intrastate allocation
of federal funds, small towns and rural areas tended to benefit at the expense of central
cities:
New state distribution decisions further reduced funding for some community
services agencies; this was particularly the case in large cities. A number of the
states in the sample spread the funds they received under this block grant more
widely across the state, taking some funds away from big-city community action
agencies that had done relatively well under direct federal administration of the
program.
Id. at 80; see also id. at 152, 256, 278 (under state funding practices in Reagan years
cities tended to lose funds relative to other areas); Briffault, supra note 1, at 60-64 (discussing limitations on equalizing effects of state school aid).
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goals, the problems of interlocal inequities and local externalities cannot be satisfactorily addressed.
The real barrier to addressing the problems of the local government system, and the most significant constraint on state action, is not
local autonomy per se but the ideology of localism. In theory, local
autonomy is purely a matter of state legal and political decisions to vest
certain state powers in local governments. Local authority, according
to black-letter law, is merely a delegation from the state, to be exercised
by the locality as agent on behalf of the state as principal. 43 8 But, sustained by legal doctrines, embraced by powerful economic and political
interests and legitimated by academic theorists, local autonomy has
been transformed from a principle of administration to a faith in the
decentralization of responsibility for the provision of public services
and the exercise of public power. Local electorates have become the
principals and local self-interest the principle governing the actions of
local government agents. Localist ideology masks local power and
hides the privatization of local public life behind the rhetoric of efficiency, participation, community and local self-determination. The
contingency of local authority, the linkage of location to wealth, class,
race and status and the parochial nature of local political activity are
obscured by the nostalgia for the polis and the New England town and
by abstract assumptions about the marketplace for municipal services.
Localist ideology has a hegemonic effect, imbuing localities with a
belief in the justice of their freedom from extralocal concerns while
crippling the willingness of states to take a statewide perspective and
displace local authority when considerations of equity or efficiency
make it appropriate to do so. The localist faith imposes a conceptual
obstacle to the framing of public policies for the manifold economic
and social ills pressing on cities, states and metropolitan areas.
Local autonomy is not always wrong; state displacement of local
authority is no panacea for public policy. Although this Article has
been critical of local government decision making, that is due in part to
a desire to rectify the prolocal bias reflected in both state law and the
existing academic literature. Many matters are, in fact, inappropriate
for uniform state-wide treatment and are better suited to local decisions that reflect particular local beliefs and local needs. Many areas of
public action benefit from the opportunities for experimentation that
the decentralization of law-making and regulatory authority provides.
It is understandable that land use and schools form the heart of local
autonomy since they are closely connected to core areas of personal
autonomy and many people want the locus of decision making over
these matters vested in the governments they feel are closest to the
community.
438. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 6-18; id. at 85-91 (federal constitutional law).
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Local autonomy as community-based governance would be an attractive, indeed a compelling vision in a more equal society or even in a
society composed of more racially and economically integrated communities. In such a society, interlocal wealth differences would play a
lesser role in determining the quality of public services, and local participation would entail efforts to find common ground out of ethnic and
economic diversity. Participation could mean empowerment for all.
But in contemporary America, where local boundaries mark racial
and class inequalities as well as the divisions between jurisdictions, the
value of local autonomy is fundamentally uncertain. By championing
autonomy even in settings where local action without state monitoring
or support is inappropriate, localism is too often a recipe for the perpetuation of injustice. The proliferation of municipalities in metropolitan areas translates race and wealth differences into territorial
segregation and fiscal separation. The interplay of local incorporation
law and state decentralization of fiscal and regulatory responsibilities
turns poor places into poor municipalities. By forcing residents of
these poorer municipalities to rely primarily on local resources and discrediting their claim to a share of the resources of the region, state or
nation, localism further disempowers the weak. By enabling affluent
localities and their residents to separate themselves from their poorer
neighbors and by providing them with an ideology that justifies their
resistance to the claims of the larger society outside their borders, localism further empowers the already powerful. Given the extent of
place-related inequality in American society, an absolute commitment
to local autonomy is not a basis for a progressive social transformation
but rather can be an obstacle to efforts to reduce inequality and ameliorate class and race antagonisms.
Rather than seeking a state-local relationship characterized by
either complete state dominance or one of complete local autonomy,
elements of both perspectives should be combined. We must strive to
develop legal doctrines and governmental structures that combine local
initiative, participation and voice with state financial support, state
oversight and statewide perspectives for evaluating local action. 4 39
Such an integration of state and local concerns would be more appropriate than either a general expansion of local power or a centralization
of authority in the states.
439. The three recent state court decisions vindicating school finance reform
claims, see supra note 429, indicate the possibility that state legal systems will take an

approach for education, a core local concern, at least when the limited fiscal capacity of
poorer localities to provide the public service with the broadest implications for the

long-term well-being of the national economy and the national polity has been demonstrated. Nonetheless, as the overall record of the courts in deciding school finance reform cases indicates, see Briffault supra note 1, at 24-39, it is too soon to treat these new

decisions as a harbinger of a new era in the decades-old school finance reform movement, let alone as evidence of the beginning of the end of legal localism.
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But to achieve such a pragmatic stance, the ideology of localism
must be jettisoned and state and local problems examined without a
preexisting commitment to the normative superiority of local power. I
hope this Article, by demonstrating the scope of local legal authority in
practice, examining some of the effects of local autonomy on urban development, exploring some of the differences among cities and suburbs
and criticizing the dominant contemporary theories of localism, will
provide a basis for the proper understanding of our localism and will
serve as a first step in moving local government law beyond localism
and toward a less abstract attention to particular substantive problems
440
and policies.
If I have been persuasive, the attitude of the reader should be that
of Philip Roth's Doctor Spielvogel: "So [said the doctor]. Now vee
1
'44
may perhaps to begin. Yes?"

440. But cf. Libonati, Reconstructing Local Government, 19 Urb. Law. 645, 651
(1987) (describing critically most literature about urban government as "policy
analysis").
441. P. Roth, Portnoy's Complaint 309 (1969).

